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I.

INTRODUCTION

The 2016–2017 Survey of Florida Cases Affecting Business Owners
reviews Florida appellate court decisions involving state tax and other
business law matters.1 While the cases that have been included are mostly
from 2016 through June of 2017, several important 2015 cases have been
included.2
Part II provides analysis of appellate cases where the courts were
presented with disputes by and among the business, its owners and their
transferees, and its key employees, whether sounding in tort, contract,
statutory law, or a combination thereof.3
Part III considers litigation with third parties starting with several
important state tax cases involving constitutional and procedural issues of
note.4 Cases arising in and out of the ordinary course of business, again,
*
Associate Professor of Taxation and Business Law, Master of Taxation
and Master of Accounting Programs, H. Wayne Huizenga School of Business and
Entrepreneurship, Nova Southeastern University; B.A., New York University; J.D., New York
Law School; LL.M. (Tax), New York University School of Law.
1.
See infra Parts I–II.
2.
See infra Parts II–III.
3.
See infra Part II.
4.
See infra Part III.
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whether sounding in tort, contract, or statutory law—other than tax—or a
combination follow.5
II.
A.

CORPORATIONS, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES, AND
PARTNERSHIPS: DIVORCES OF ONE TYPE OR ANOTHER

Officers and Directors Liability
1.

Director and Officer Liability Policy: Insured Versus Insured
Exclusion

Mr. Durant, a shareholder of Bonifay Holding Company, Inc.
(“Corporation”), was formerly a director of Corporation.6 Mr. James, at all
times relevant to this case, was Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) and
President of Corporation.7 Mr. Durant previously sold his stock back to
Corporation8 but later repurchased the stock.9 After the repurchase, Mr.
Durant brought and prevailed in an action against Mr. James, which alleged
overvaluation of the repurchased stock.10 Mr. Durant attempted to collect the
money judgment awarded in that action—of more than $1 million—by
seeking a writ of garnishment against the directors and officers under a
policy issued by Progressive Casualty Insurance Company (“Insurance
Company”), which insured the Corporation’s directors and officers.11
Insurance Company counterclaimed and sought a declaration that the claim
was not covered by the policy.12 The policy contained an insured versus
insured coverage exclusion (“Exclusion”), whereby Insurance Company was
not required to pay claims by one [i]nsured [p]erson against another
[i]nsured [p]erson for a [w]rongful [a]ct,13 subject to two exceptions set forth
in the policy.14 The Exclusion did not apply to claims based upon an
insured’s employment or for contribution or indemnification of otherwise
covered claims.15 Mr. Durant argued that his suit against Mr. James was not
undertaken “as a director or [as a] former . . . director, . . . but [rather] in his
5.
See id.
6.
Durant v. James, 189 So. 3d 993, 995 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2016).
7.
Id.
8.
Id. Mr. Durant was required by the judgment of dissolution entered in his
divorce to sell his stock in Corporation. Id.
9.
Id.
10.
Durant, 189 So. 3d at 995.
11.
Id.
12.
Id.
13.
Id.
14.
Id. at 995 & n.1.
15.
Durant, 189 So. 3d at 995 n.1.
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[individual] capacity,” and the writ sought was based on damages awarded to
him under a “judgment unrelated to his former director position.”16 Both
Insurance Company and Mr. Durant filed motions seeking summary
declaratory judgment; the trial court granted summary judgment to Insurance
Company and Mr. Durant appealed.17 The Exclusion provided that “[t]he
insurer shall not be liable to make any payment for [l]oss in connection with
any [c]laim by or at the behest of the Company, or any affiliate of the
Company or any [i]nsured [p]erson”—the balance of the provision being the
two exceptions mentioned above.18 Insured persons were defined in the
policy as “any past, present or future director, trustee, officer . . . of the
Company,” and the definition of claim contained in the policy was “any
demand ‘against an [i]nsured [p]erson for a [w]rongful [a]ct;’” there was no
disagreement as to these definitions.19 The district court, noting that the fact
that Mr. Durant and Mr. James were both insured persons was not contested,
concluded that Mr. Durant failed to bring himself within the policy’s express
exceptions to the Exclusion, nor was he acting in furtherance of some
statutory duty.20 The First District Court of Appeal in Durant v. James21
considered the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal in Rigby v.
Underwriters at Lloyd’s22 and concluded that Rigby was distinguishable from
the case before the First District Court of Appeal.23 Rigby involved a trustee
in bankruptcy added to a previously issued director and officer liability
policy as an insured person, and specifically named in the amended
definition of the term director in the policy.24 The Third District Court of
Appeal in Rigby held that the Exclusion did not apply to the trustee in
bankruptcy acting in furtherance of statutory duties of the trustee under
federal bankruptcy statutes and suing other directors—on behalf of
creditors.25 The Third District Court of Appeal in Rigby held that the
bankruptcy trustee “did not bring the adversary action acting as an officer or
16.
Id. at 995.
17.
Id. at 994–95.
18.
Id. at 995 n.1.
19.
Id. at 995.
20.
Durant, 189 So. 3d at 995–96. The First District Court of Appeal
distinguished the facts before it from the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal in
Rigby v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s—involving a trustee in bankruptcy acting in furtherance of
the duties of the trustee under federal bankruptcy statutes. Id.; see also Rigby v. Underwriters
at Lloyd’s, 907 So. 2d 1187, 1189 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
21.
189 So. 3d 993 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2016).
22.
907 So. 2d 1187 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
23.
Durant, 189 So. 3d at 995.
24.
Id.; Rigby, 907 So. 2d at 1188–89. As discussed in Durant, there was an
amendment to the definition of director in the policy involved in Rigby to include, by name,
the bankruptcy trustee. Durant, 189 So. 3d at 995; Rigby, 907 So. 2d at 1189.
25.
Durant, 189 So. 3d at 995–96; Rigby, 907 So. 2d at 1189.
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director. As a result, the insured versus insured [provision] did not apply.”26
After distinguishing Rigby, the First District Court of Appeal in Durant
noted that it was “further persuaded by the opinions of other jurisdictions,
holding that the capacity in which the claimant sued the other officer or
director in the first instance had no bearing on the bar on coverage under a
[directors and officers] policy’s insured versus insured exclusion.”27 The
First District Court of Appeal concluded that the policy did not contain any
ambiguity and there was no “lack of clarity in the terms” requiring
interpretation.28
2.

Who Is on the Board and Where Did the Corporation Go?

The dispute in Wilson v. Wilson29 stemmed from the death of
Reverend John Wilson (“Reverend”).30 The Reverend had incorporated a
number of entities.31 The initial issue in the trial court was regarding the
identities of the members of the boards of directors of those corporations
(“Corporations”).32 Before trial, the judge allowed the former personal
representative of the Reverend’s estate (“Intervenor”) to intervene.33 The
Intervenor’s position was that the various Corporations formed by the
Reverend had not operated as not-for-profit corporations, and therefore, the
Corporations’ assets were part of the Reverend’s probate estate subject to
administration.34 As to the initial issue—the identity of the board
members—the trial judge’s order stated that neither the plaintiffs nor the
defendants had proven that they were board members.35 The trial judge also
ruled, in essence, that the Corporations were to be disregarded and that the
assets were part of the Reverend’s probate estate subject to administration,
which supported the Intervenor’s position.36 On appeal, the Third District
Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s ruling that the defendants were not
directors, but reversed the trial court’s decision that the plaintiffs were not
directors.37 The appellate court noted that the Corporations’ regularly filed
required annual reports identified the plaintiffs as members of the Board of
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Rigby, 907 So. 2d at 1189.
Durant, 189 So. 3d at 996.
Id.
211 So. 3d 313 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2017).
Id. at 314.
Id. at 317.
Id.
Id. at 315.
Wilson, 211 So. 3d at 315.
Id. at 316.
Id.
Id. at 319–20.
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Directors.38 The district court also reversed the trial court’s ruling that
effectively dissolved the Corporations—and went even further by deciding to
whom the dissolved Corporations’ assets belonged.39 Also, under the test set
out by the Supreme Court of Florida in Morgareidge v. Howey,40 the
Intervenor should not have been allowed to intervene as he had no interest of
the direct and immediate character required.41 Nor should the Intervenor
have been permitted to introduce new issues of validity of the Corporations
and of the ownership of the assets of the Corporations, as intervenors are not
allowed to introduce new issues.42
3.

Fiduciary Duties

The next case, Fonseca v. Taverna Imports, Inc.,43 is a consolidated
appeal of two Miami-Dade County Circuit Court cases.44 In Taverna
Imports, Inc. v. Maricela Fonseca (“Case One”), the allegations included the
following: Taverna Imports, Inc. (“Corporation”) issued 4500 of its 5000
authorized shares equally to three shareholders—Mario Taverna (“Mario”),
Maricela Fonseca (“Maricela”), and Jule Laudisio (“Jule”)—when
Corporation was formed in 2002.45 Corporation, in 2005, redeemed 1000
shares from Jule,46 and at the end of January 2007, Jule agreed, in writing, to
have her remaining 500 shares redeemed for cash—with checks for the
correct amounts transmitted to her at the end of January of 2007.47 This left
Mario and Maricela as the remaining shareholders.48 Within three days after
receipt of the checks, Jule attempted to disavow the sale of her remaining
shares and she returned the checks to Corporation.49 In late February 2007,
at a formal shareholders’ meeting, Mario, the elected president of
Corporation, was purportedly ousted from that role by a vote of the
shareholders, including Jule, which ouster occurred even though the

38.
Id. at 319.
39.
Wilson, 211 So. 3d at 317–18, 320.
40.
78 So. 14 (Fla. 1918).
41.
Wilson, 211 So. 3d at 316–17 (quoting Morgareidge, 78 So. at 15).
42.
Id.
43.
212 So. 3d 431 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2017).
44.
Id. at 434.
45.
Id. at 434–35.
46.
Id. at 435. After the 2005 redemption, 45% of the shares were owned by
Mario, 45% of the shares were owned by Maricela, and 10% of the shares were owned by
Jule. Id.
47.
Fonseca, 212 So. 3d at 435.
48.
Id.
49.
Id.
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corporate by-laws required that officers be removed by the Board of
Directors.50
Mario and Corporation sued: (1) Maricela; (2) Richard Fonseca
(“Richard”), Maricela’s husband; (3) Jule; and (4) Hans Eichmann (“Hans”),
a former member of the Board of Directors of Corporation, and an employee
and a former employee of Corporation.51 In the lawsuit, Corporation
requested a declaratory judgment declaring that the redemption of Jule’s
stock was valid and that the corporate actions taken after Jule’s stock had
been repurchased were invalid.52 Mario also sought damages for Maricela’s
alleged breach of fiduciary duty and for Richard’s alleged aiding and
abetting of Maricela’s alleged breach.53 On Corporation’s motion for partial
summary judgment, the trial court found that the redemption of Jule’s shares
was valid, that the election of a new president at the formal shareholders’
meeting was not valid, and that Mario was still president of Corporation.54
After trial, on the remaining issues, the jury awarded damages of $1,063,234
in favor of Corporation against all of the defendants for “wrongfully [taking]
corporate authority of [the Corporation], which caused [it] damages.”55 The
jury also awarded damages of $833,000 to Mario, individually, for
Maricela’s breach of fiduciary duty and Richard’s role in aiding and
abetting.56 The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed the lower court
proceedings except as to the calculation of damages.57 The redemption of
Jule’s shares to Corporation was valid even though only Jule signed the
agreement, and not Corporation, since the parties had performed under the
contract.58 The fact that Jule did not cash the checks was of no legal
consequence.59 Mario’s removal as president was ineffective as it was not
done “by a majority vote of the Board of Directors.”60 The district court also
held that there was competent substantial evidence to support the jury’s
verdict that Maricela breached her fiduciary duty to Mario under section
50.
Id. at 435–36. About a month later, after a special meeting, Mario found
himself locked out of the Corporation’s warehouse, although he was subsequently let in, at
which time he discovered that Hans, the former employee and former board member, was
back and managing the business. Id. Mario was eventually terminated. Fonseca, 212 So. 3d
at 436.
51.
Id. at 434 & n.3, 437.
52.
Id. at 437.
53.
Id.
54.
Id. at 435, 437.
55.
Fonseca, 212 So. 3d at 438.
56.
Id.
57.
Id. at 443.
58.
Id. at 440–41.
59.
See id. at 441.
60.
Fonseca, 212 So. 3d at 441–42.
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607.0831 of the Florida Statutes.61 In addition, the court found competent
substantial evidence in support of the jury’s verdict that Maricela’s husband,
Richard, aided and abetted Maricela in breaching her fiduciary duty owed to
Mario, with the Third District Court of Appeal holding that “Florida law
recognizes a cause of action for aiding and abetting the breach of a fiduciary
duty.”62
Richard Fonseca v. Taverna Imports, Inc.63 (“Case Two”) involved
Richard’s purchase of Bank of America’s judgments, one against
Corporation and one against Mario, but only the judgment for $110,309.36
against Corporation was before the appellate court.64 The trial judge, in Case
Two, granted Richard’s motion and allowed him to proceed as to the
purchased judgment against the Corporation—by levying and executing
against the 1000 shares redeemed by the Corporation from Jule in 2005.65
By allowing seizure of Jule’s formerly owned shares, Maricela, by way of
Richard, would own a majority interest in Corporation giving Maricela the
power to cancel Corporation’s judgments, the only remaining significant
assets of Corporation, against Maricela and Richard.66 The Third District
Court of Appeal reversed, holding that under the unique circumstances of
this case “[t]he trial court . . . should have applied Richard[’s monetary]
judgment” against Corporation as an offset to Corporation’s judgments
against Maricela and Richard in Case One.67 Otherwise, control of
Corporation would be obtained for an improper purpose.68
4.

Breach of Fiduciary Duty and Tortious Interference: Default/The
Ultimate Sanction

In 2010, Mr. Coghlan and Ms. Del Grosso (“Individual
Plaintiffs”)—while employees, officers, directors, and shareholders of The
Bare Board Group, Inc. (“Defendant Counterclaimant Corporation”)—
allegedly lent money to Mr. Doyle, a person who, like Individual Plaintiffs
and Defendant Counterclaimant Corporation, was “in the printed computer

61.
Id. at 442; see also FLA. STAT. § 607.0831 (2016).
62.
Fonseca, 212 So. 3d at 442.
63.
212 So. 3d 431 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2017).
64.
Id. at 434, 439 n.8, 445.
65.
Id. at 439 n.6. The district court noted that levy and execution was sought
only on the shares redeemed from Jule “given [Richard’s] position throughout the litigation
(and here on appeal) that Jule” still owned shares. Id.
66.
Id. at 445–46.
67.
Fonseca, 212 So. 3d at 434, 445–46.
68.
Id. at 447 (citing Rowland v. Times Publ’g Co., 35 So. 2d 399, 402 (Fla.
1948)).
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circuit board industry.”69 Individual Plaintiffs allegedly knew Mr. Doyle
planned to establish a printed circuit board company, which he did in 2010,
incorporating as ICMfg & Associates, Inc. (“Plaintiff Corporation”).70
Individual Plaintiffs resigned from their officer and director positions with
Defendant Counterclaimant Corporation on January 13, 2012.71 Individual
Plaintiffs had also been highly compensated employees of Defendant
Counterclaimant Corporation, but they resigned from their employment on
the same day that they resigned as officers and directors.72 They remained
shareholders of Defendant Counterclaimant Corporation, but Individual
Plaintiffs and Plaintiff Corporation73 brought a declaratory judgment action
against Defendant Counterclaimant Corporation to determine the proper
value of Individual Plaintiffs’ shares held in Defendant Counterclaimant
Corporation.74 They also sought a determination by the court because “they
were in doubt about their rights under the shareholder agreement.”75
Defendant Counterclaimant Corporation answered the complaint, alleged
various affirmative defenses and, in an amended counterclaim, alleged the
following as to Individual Plaintiffs: (1) [B]reach of fiduciary duty, (2) civil
conspiracy to defraud, (3) fraud, (4) “violation of the Florida Deceptive and
Unfair Trade Practices Act” (“FDUTPA”),76 and (5) “tortious interference
with business relationships;” and as to Plaintiff Corporation and Mr. Doyle,
alleged the following: (1) “[A]iding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty,”
(2) civil conspiracy to defraud, (3) violation of FDUTPA, and (4) “tortious
interference with [Defendant Counterclaimant Corporation’s] business
relationships.”77 The counterclaim was answered and contained affirmative
defenses.78 The trial court found that in the course of the litigation,
Individual Plaintiffs and Plaintiff Corporation (collectively “the Plaintiffs”)
had committed what amounted to fraud upon the court, and on Defendant
Counterclaimant Corporation’s motion to impose sanctions, the trial court
69.
ICMfg & Assocs. v. Bare Bd. Grp., No. 2D15-3557, slip op. at 2 (Fla. 2d
Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 17, 2017).
70.
Id.
71.
Id. at 3.
72.
Id. at 2–3.
73.
See id. at 3. Why Plaintiff Corporation was a plaintiff in the original
declaratory judgment action is not apparent from the appellate court decision.* However,
Plaintiff Corporation and Mr. Doyle were counter-defendants as to Defendant
Counterclaimant Corporation’s counterclaims. ICMfg & Assocs., slip op. at 3.
74.
Id.
75.
Id. The appellate court noted that the shareholder agreement gave
Defendant Counterclaimant Corporation “the first right of redemption” of Individual
Plaintiffs’ shares in the event their employment ended. Id.
76.
Id. at 3–5; see also FLA. STAT. § 501.204(1) (2011).
77.
ICMfg & Assocs., slip op. at 5.
78.
Id.
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struck the Plaintiffs’ pleadings.79 This left the Plaintiffs in the position of
having defaulted on Defendant Counterclaimant Corporation’s counterclaim
so that Defendant Counterclaimant did not need to establish liability on the
part of the Plaintiffs.80 The Plaintiffs argued that, notwithstanding the
default, Defendant Counterclaimant Corporation was still required to prove a
causal connection between the Plaintiffs’ conduct and Defendant
Counterclaimant Corporation’s lost profits.81 The trial judge disagreed,
ruling that the default had established the element of causation as to all of the
Plaintiffs.82 The jury awarded substantial damages—totaling almost $10
million—to Defendant Counterclaimant Corporation based on expert
testimony, although the expert did not consider the issue of causation.83 The
Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s imposition of the
sanction striking Plaintiffs’ pleadings.84 The conduct of the Plaintiffs
justified the trial court’s exercise of discretion in this fashion and the
imposition of the sanction.85 However, when it came to the issue of
damages, the district court did not approve of the pre-trial ruling that the
default on the question of liability was enough to establish the nexus and
causation between the Plaintiffs’ tortious acts and Defendant
The damages were
Counterclaimant Corporation’s lost profits.86
unliquidated and the Plaintiffs had the right to contest “the causal
relationship between the damages claimed and the liability established by the
default.”87 The district court reversed on the award of damages for lost
profits and prejudgment interest and remanded for trial on only the issue of
Defendant Counterclaimant Corporation’s lost profits.88
B.

Claims of Shareholders, Members, and Partners
1.

Statutory Appraisal Right: Valuation of Corporate Stock

The issue on appeal in this case was the proper fair market valuation
of shares of a corporation (“Corporation”) that was to be merged with

79.
Id. at 6–7.
80.
Id. at 7.
81.
Id. at 7–8.
82.
See ICMfg & Assocs., slip op. at 8.
83.
Id. at 9–10, 12.
84.
Id. at 22.
85.
See id. at 13.
86.
Id. at 18.
87.
ICMfg & Assocs., slip op. at 16 (quoting Talucci v. Matthews, 960 So. 2d
9, 10 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (per curiam)).
88.
Id. at 22.
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another corporation.89 Corporation estimated the value of the dissenting
shareholder’s (“Dissenting Shareholder”) 25% interest at $420 per share,
while Dissenting Shareholder’s proposed estimate was $5,066.67 per share,
which would translate into a value for her interest in the corporation of $1.9
million.90 At trial, two expert witnesses testified as to the value of
Dissenting Shareholder’s stock, one on behalf of Corporation and one on
behalf of Dissenting Shareholder, but the judge adopted the opinion of
neither.91 Instead, the trial judge found that the fair market value of the
shares was $1.9 million, the same amount claimed by the Dissenting
Shareholder—which was more than her trial expert witness’s valuation.92
Dissenting Shareholder based her fair market value estimate “on an
independent accountant’s valuation,” but no documentation of this valuation
was produced at trial.93 The judge entered an order using the $1.9 million
amount and Corporation appealed.94 On appeal, the Fifth District Court of
Appeal stated that the trial court has discretion to: (1) appoint independent
appraisers to make a recommendation as to the fair market value,95 which the
trial judge did not do; (2) has discretion to accept one party’s expert’s
opinions, or even portions of more than one expert opinion,96 which the
judge did not do; or (3) the trial judge may “formulate an independent
valuation based on the evidence presented,” but the judge’s valuation must
be supported by substantial competent evidence.97 The appellate court said
the judge did not adopt the opinion of either appraiser, did not appoint an
independent appraiser, and did not provide an explanation as to how the
judge arrived at the $1.9 million fair market value.98 The Fifth District Court
reversed and remanded with instructions.99

89.
Lally Orange Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc. v. Sandhu, 207 So. 3d 981, 983
(Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2016) (per curiam).
90.
Id. Dissenting Shareholder was the former spouse of one of the individual
defendants sued by Dissenting Shareholder. Id. The judgment dissolving their marriage
granted each spouse a one-half interest in the individual defendant’s one-half interest, with the
merger plan and appraisal proceeding being the outgrowth of the equitable distribution. Id.
91.
Id. at 983–84.
92.
Lally Orange Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc., 207 So. 3d at 984.
93.
Id. at 985.
94.
Id. at 984.
95.
Id. at 985 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 607.1330(4) (2013)).
96.
Id. at 986 n.7.
97.
Lally Orange Buick Pontiac GMC, Inc., 207 So. 3d at 986.
98.
Id.
99.
Id.
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No Personal Liability for Repayment of Contribution to Limited
Liability Corporation

Georg Schollmeier (“Schollmeier”) agreed to a capital contribution
of $400,000 in Avrupa, LLC (“LLC”) in exchange for a 20% interest in
LLC.100 The members of LLC—Tulga Demir (“Demir”), Tugend Demir
(“Tugend”), and Schollmeier—entered into an agreement entitled Avrupa,
LLC Contribution Agreement (“Agreement”) that provided that, if
Schollmeier decided to withdraw from LLC, he would be repaid his
contribution.101 When Schollmeier requested repayment of his contribution,
and it was not forthcoming, he sued Demir and Tugend and alleged that they
breached their Agreement.102 On December 12, 2014, after hearing a motion
for summary judgment,103 the trial court held Demir personally liable on
Schollmeier’s breach of contract claim, and Demir appealed.104 The Third
District Court said that “[t]he final judgment against Demir individually as it
relates to Schollmeier’s financial contribution to Avrupa is based on the trial
court’s determination that the Agreement . . . was not a limited liability
company operating agreement, . . . but instead a personal contract solely
governing the terms of Schollmeier’s contribution.”105 The Third District
Court of Appeal disagreed and found that the agreement was tantamount to a
limited liability company operating agreement.106 The Third District
reversed and remanded,107 and cited to its decision in Dinuro Investments,
LLC v. Camacho,108 stated that a principal reason for forming a limited

100.
Demir v. Schollmeier, 199 So. 3d 442, 443 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2016).
LLC was formed by Tulga Demir to run a Miami Beach night club. Id. The club was open
from early February of 2007 until March 29, 2007. Id. at 444.
101.
Id. at 443–44.
102.
Id. at 444. Schollmeier’s complaint contained counts that sought damages
for alleged “breach of fiduciary duty, . . . breach of statutory duty of loyalty and care” and a
count seeking an accounting, but there were proposals for settlement of these counts, and the
proposals were later accepted by Schollmeier. Demir, 199 So. 3d at 444.
103.
Id. Schollmeier stated that he asked for only $375,000 of the amount on
his motion for summary judgment because there was a dispute as to whether the other $25,000
was actually contributed. Id. at 444 n.2.
104.
Id. at 444.
105.
Id. at 445.
106.
Demir, 199 So. 3d at 445. Section 1 of the Agreement recited that it was
“a limited liability company agreement under and as provided in the Act.” Id. The definition
of Act in the Agreement was “the Limited Liability Company Act of the State of Florida.” Id.
at 444 n.1.
107.
Id. at 447.
108.
141 So. 3d 731 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
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liability company is to obtain protection from personal liability.109
court, quoting from Dinuro Investments, LLC stated that:

13

The

Conspicuously missing from the operating agreement is any
provision stating that the members shall be directly liable to each
other for breaches of the terms of the operating agreement . . . .
Section 608.4227 of the Florida Statutes specifically provides that
members are typically shielded from individual liability for their
involvement with an LLC unless the terms of the articles of
110
organization or the operating agreement provide otherwise.

The court then quoted section 608.4227(1) of the 2011 Florida Statutes as
additional support.111 That subsection provided that:
Except as provided in this chapter, the members, managers, and
managing members of a limited liability company are not liable,
solely by reason of being a member or serving as a manager or
managing member, under a judgment, decree, or order of a court,
or in any other manner, for a debt, obligation, or liability of the
112
limited liability company.

The Avrupa agreement “[did] not contain any provision or language
indicating that any Member of Avrupa would be personally liable to any
109.
Demir, 199 So. 3d at 445 (citing Dinuro Invs., LLC, 141 So. 3d at 742).
110.
Id. at 446 (citing Dinuro Invs., LLC, 141 So. 3d at 742).
111.
Id. Section 608.4227 of the Florida Statutes was repealed effective June
11, 2015. Act Effective July 1, 2015, Ch. 2015-148, § 11, 2015 Fla. Laws 1, 9 (amending §
608.4227, FLA. STAT. 2011). Section 605.0304(1) of the Florida Revised Limited Liability
Company Act provides as follows:
A debt, obligation, or other liability of a limited liability
company is solely the debt, obligation, or other liability of
the company. A member or manager is not personally liable,
directly or indirectly, by way of contribution or otherwise,
for a debt, obligation, or other liability of the company solely
by reason of being or acting as a member or manager. This
subsection applies regardless of the dissolution of the
company.

Florida Revised Limited Liability Company Act, Ch. 2013-180, § 2, 2013 Fla. Laws 2105,
2142 (codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 605.0101–1108 (2013)). The Savings Clause provisions are
found in section 605.1106 of the Florida Statutes and its effective dates are under section
605.1108 of the Florida Statutes. Id. § 605.1106, 605.1108(4). A limited liability company
with the name Avrupa, LLC was “Admin Dissolution for Annual Report” on September 14,
2007.
Detail
by
Entity
Name:
Avrupa,
LLC,
SUNBIZ,
http://search.sunbiz.org/inquiry/corporationsearch/Byname (search in search bar for “Avrupa,
LLC”; then follow “Avrupa, LLC” hyperlink under “Entity Name List”) (last visited Dec. 31,
2017).
112.
Demir, 199 So. 3d at 446.
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other Member for the company’s obligations.”113 The court concluded that if
it was the parties’ intent that there would be personal liability for the parties’
capital contributions, “the terms needed to be explicit.”114 Mr. Schollmeier
could only look to the company for reimbursement.115
3.

Limited Partnerships and Corporations: Derivative Actions
Required

In this dispute among siblings, one brother (“Plaintiff”) sued three
brothers (“the Brothers”), over the siblings’ ownership interests in each of
the siblings’ several business entities including two closely held corporations
and two limited partnerships (“the Entities”).116 However, there was one
entity, Biloxi 3, LLC, involved in the litigation that was owned by the
Brothers, not Plaintiff.117 Plaintiff sought relief against the Brothers alleging
breach of fiduciary duty owed to him with respect to actions taken by the
Entities.118 The improper actions alleged were “unearned excessive bonuses
and management fees paid by” one of the Entities to the Brothers, and the
alleged improper diversion by the Brothers of the proceeds of a settlement
agreement away from one of the limited partnerships and to Biloxi 3, LLC.119
The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed, citing its decision in Dinuro
Investments, LLC.120 Plaintiff “failed to show a direct harm and a special
injury separate and distinct from that sustained by the other partners [and
shareholders]” so a derivative action would have been the proper
proceeding.121 The Third District Court of Appeal also affirmed the trial
court’s denial of the Plaintiff’s demand for arbitration under the partnership
and shareholder agreements.122
4.

Tortious Interference Claims: Statute of Limitation

On March 6, 2012, Mr. Eff (“Plaintiff”) brought an action against
Sony Pictures (“Defendant”) and alleged that Defendant tortuously interfered
in a business relationship that Plaintiff had with Mr. Silvera and another
113.
Id.
114.
Id.
115.
See id.
116.
Fritz v. Fritz, 219 So. 3d 234, 235 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2017).
117.
Id. at 236.
118.
Id.
119.
Id.
120.
Id. at 236–39; see also Dinuro Invs., LLC v. Camacho, 141 So. 3d 731,
740 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2014).
121.
Fritz, 219 So. 3d at 238.
122.
Id.
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person.123 Plaintiff alleged that he had a 25% interest in the movie Shottas
(“the Movie”) “pursuant to an oral agreement” made with Mr. Silvera and
another individual—who was not a party to the action—and that Plaintiff and
Mr. Silvera formed Access Pictures, LLC, to produce the Movie.124 He
further alleged that Defendant later made a licensing agreement with others
whereby Defendant acquired “exclusive distribution rights to Shottas” after
Mr. Silvera met with Defendant without Plaintiff.125 The trial court granted
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment based on the applicable four-year
statute of limitations under section 95.11(3)(o) of the Florida Statutes. 126
The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed.127 Under the licensing
agreement with other parties, the Defendant was to make the initial payment
on October 30, 2005 and other payments were alleged to have been made
later.128 In May of 2007, Plaintiff’s lawyer emailed Defendant to advise him
of Plaintiff’s interest in the Movie.129 The trial court ruled that October 30,
2005 was the date on which the Plaintiff’s claim for tortious interference
accrued, and under the delayed discovery doctrine, May 2007 was therefore
the latest that Plaintiff found out about any alleged tortious interference.130
Thus, the lawsuit filed on March 6, 2012 was time barred under the four-year
statute of limitation unless the continuing tort doctrine applied to Plaintiff’s
claim.131 The Third District Court of Appeal described the continuing tort
doctrine as being “established by continual tortious acts, not by continual
harmful effects from an original, completed act.”132 The district court found
“no Florida cases addressing the continuing tort doctrine as it pertains to a
cause of action for tortious interference with a business relationship.”133 The
district court refused to apply the doctrine to Plaintiff’s claim because “the
tort was not continual in nature merely because [Defendant] made
subsequent distribution payments. These additional distribution payments
were merely ‘harmful effects from an original, completed act.’”134

123.
Effs v. Sony Pictures Home Entm’t, Inc., 197 So. 3d 1243, 1244 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 2016).
124.
Id.
125.
Id.
126.
Id.; FLA. STAT. § 95.11(3)(o) (2016).
127.
Effs, 197 So. 3d at 1245.
128.
Id. at 1244.
129.
Id.
130.
Id.
131.
See id. at 1243–44.
132.
Effs, 197 So. 3d at 1245 (quoting Suarez v. City of Tampa, 987 So. 2d
681, 686 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2008)).
133.
Id.
134.
Id. (quoting Suarez, 987 So. 2d at 686).
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Sale of Business
1.

Discovery: Financial Information Provided to Accountant Not
Protected by Accountant-Client Privilege

In PDR Grayson Dental Lab, LLC v. Progressive Dental
Reconstruction, Inc.,135 PDR Grayson Dental Lab, LLC (“Purchaser”) sought
discovery of Progressive Dental Reconstruction’s (“Seller”) business and
financial records given by Seller to Seller’s accountant for income tax
purposes.136 Purchaser alleged that Seller acted fraudulently to accomplish
the sale and that the records were necessary to establish its claim.137 The trial
court denied the discovery request, and Purchaser sought immediate review
of the trial court’s ruling.138 The First District Court of Appeal granted the
petition for certiorari holding that the records were not shielded from the
discovery request by the accountant-client privilege.139 Seller did not
present any evidence that the records possessed by the accountant consisted
of privileged communications or work product.140 The First District Court of
Appeal held that otherwise discoverable records did not become privileged
just because they were sent to Seller’s accountant.141 The trial court order
was quashed and the case was remanded.142
2.

Valid Contract for Sale of Assets of Business Existed: No Unjust
Enrichment Remedy

“The parties were at one point good friends and business associates,”
said the Fourth District Court of Appeal before it explained the events
leading up to the litigation.143 Mr. Brancato and Mrs. Brancato (“Surviving
Spouse Seller”) sold the assets of a business144 to Valerie Fulton’s insurance
agency, Fulton Insurance Agency, Inc. (“Insurance Agency Purchaser”), and
Dean Fulton.145 Payment was to be based on commissions for the twelve135.
203 So. 3d 213 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2016).
136.
Id. at 214.
137.
Id.
138.
Id.
139.
Id.
140.
PDR Grayson Dental Lab, LLC, 203 So. 3d at 214.
141.
Id. at 215.
142.
Id.
143.
Fulton v. Brancato, 189 So. 3d 967, 968 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2016).
144.
Id. The appellate court did not indicate the capacity in which Surviving
Spouse Seller signed the sales agreement or if the agency was a separate entity. Id.
145.
Id. Surviving Spouse Seller sold the business when Mr. Brancato became
ill, but the date of his death is not stated in the appellate opinion. See id.
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month period following the date of [the] [a]greement.146 When payments
were not made as expected, Surviving Spouse Seller sued Valerie Fulton and
Insurance Agency Purchaser alleging breach of contract.147 The jury found
that Insurance Agency Purchaser had breached the contract which was the
legal cause of the damage.148 However, the jury also found that Valerie
Fulton and Insurance Agency Purchaser were unjustly enriched by getting
the assets and not paying “the reasonable value of those assets,” and that they
had converted the assets.149 The jury awarded total damages of $98,000 to
Surviving Spouse Seller.150 On appeal, Valerie Fulton and Insurance Agency
Purchaser contested the unjust enrichment and conversion verdicts, as well as
Surviving Spouse Seller’s efforts to have the court pierce the corporate veil
in order to hold Valerie Fulton personally liable.151 The appellate court said
that a directed verdict should have been entered against Surviving Spouse
Seller on the unjust enrichment count.152 If an express contract exists, as
here, “an equitable theory, such as unjust enrichment or quantum meruit”
cannot be entertained.153 As to the conversion claim and damages, the
appellate court held that the damages were to be confined to the $98,000 jury
award for breach of contract, as “[t]here was no evidence that the seller
sustained any additional damages by the buyer and the buyers’ agency’s
conversion of other assets.”154

146.
Fulton, 189 So. 3d at 968.
147.
Id. at 969.
148.
Id.
149.
Id.
150.
Id.
151.
Fulton, 189 So. 3d at 969–70.
152.
Id. at 970.
153.
Id. at 969 (quoting Ocean Commc’ns, Inc. v. Bubeck, 956 So. 2d 1222,
1225 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2007)).
154.
Id. at 970. Does the such as limit the term equitable theory? Id. at 969.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal in Ocean Communications, Inc. v. Bubeck held that
restitution—which requires the existence of a contract—is available in cases where there has
been a breach of an express contract. Ocean Commc’ns, Inc., 956 So. 2d at 1225; see also
Barbara Landau, 2006–2007 Survey of Florida Law Affecting Business Owners, 32 NOVA L.
REV. 21, 58 (2007). “A court of equity has the power to reform” a contract in the case of
mutual mistake, scrivener’s error or inadvertence, and in cases of unilateral mistake of one
party combined with inequitable conduct by the other party. Goodall v. Whispering Woods
Ctr., 990 So. 2d 695, 699 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2008); Barbara Landau, 2008–2009 Survey
of Florida Law Affecting Business Owners, 34 NOVA L. REV. 71, 97 (2009).
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Non-Compete Agreements
1.

Injunction: Where’s the Bond?

In the next case, the trial court issued a preliminary injunction on
March 29, 2012 in favor of Vital Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“Vital”) and against
two of Vital’s former employees (“Employees”)—in an action against
Employees and their new employer—Vital alleged breaches of non-compete
clauses and tortious interference.155 In May 2012, the circuit court dissolved
the injunction for reasons that are not stated in the court’s order.156
Employees then sought damages and attorneys’ fees in the same action.157
Damages were granted, Vital appealed the trial court’s order and was
successful on appeal.158 This case stands for the proposition that if a
temporary injunction is wrongfully issued, the persons wrongfully enjoined
may sue for damages in the amount of the bond under Rule 1.610(b) of the
Florida Rules of Civil Procedure; but if a bond is not posted, damages cannot
be collected, at least not pursuant to section 60.07 of the Florida Statutes.159
It seems that no bond was required when the preliminary injunction was
granted.160 Thus, the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the trial
court’s award of damages to Vital.161 Of course, in the absence of the bond,
the injunction was not enforceable in the first place.162
2.

Breach During Term of Employment

Telemundo Media, LLC v. Mintz163 was an interesting non-compete
temporary injunction case.164 Joshua Mintz (“Mintz”) was employed by
Telemundo (“Telemundo”).165 The term of employment was from January 1,

155.
Vital Pharm., Inc. v. Prof’l Supplements, LLC, 210 So. 3d 766, 767 (Fla.
4th Dist. Ct. App. 2017); Order on Temporary Injunction at 1, Vital Pharm., Inc. v. Prof’l
Supplements, LLC, No. 12-7083 (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct. 2012).
156.
Order on Motion to Dissolve Temporary Injunction, Vital Pharm., Inc. v.
Prof’l Supplements, LLC, No. 12-7083 (Fla. 17th Cir. Ct. 2012).
157.
Vital Pharm., Inc., 210 So. 3d at 767.
158.
Id.
159.
Id. at 767–69 (citing Hathcock v. Hathcock, 533 So. 2d 802, 804 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1988)); see also FLA. STAT. § 60.07 (2016); FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.610 (b).
160.
See FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.610 (b); Vital Pharm., Inc., 210 So. 3d at 767.
161.
Vital Pharm., Inc., 210 So. 3d at 768–69.
162.
See id. at 767–68.
163.
194 So. 3d 434 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2016).
164.
Id. at 435.
165.
Id.
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2015 through December 27, 2017.166 Mintz signed a non-compete agreement
with Telemundo barring certain employment for six months after Mintz’s
termination of employment with Telemundo.167 That part of the agreement
provided that Mintz agreed he would “not, either directly or indirectly,
provide services—as an employee or in any other status or capacity—to any
Spanish-language media competitor of Telemundo in the news,
entertainment, new media—e.g. the Internet, etc.—and telecommunications
industries, within the United States.”168 The employment agreement
contained an alternative dispute resolution provision in which Mintz agreed
to follow Telemundo’s dispute resolution process.169 Mintz advised
Telemundo that he was leaving to take a job in Mexico with a competitor of
Telemundo.170 Mintz planned to start work at his new job within two months
after he informed Telemundo that he was leaving.171 Telemundo sought
injunctive relief to prevent Mintz from starting his new employment before
the arbitration proceedings were complete.172 The trial court denied the
motion, concluding that Mintz could work in Mexico because the covenant
not to compete provision “only applied within the United States.”173 The
Third District Court of Appeal reversed, directing the trial court to enter an
order granting the temporary injunction.174 The appellate court reviewed the
elements necessary for a temporary injunction175 and concluded that all
elements necessary were present.176 The parties’ agreement provided that
services to be provided by Mintz “were ‘of a special, unique, unusual,
extraordinary, and intellectual character, giving them a peculiar value, the
loss of which the Company cannot be reasonably or adequately compensated
for in damages.’”177 It is apparent from the decision that the district court
166.
Id. Employer had an “irrevocable option to extend the term” for an
additional year. Id.
167.
Telemundo Media, LLC, 194 So. 3d at 435. The allegations in this case
were as follows: In November 2015, Mintz told Telemundo that Mintz planned to accept a
job with one of Telemundo’s major competitors, at which point, Telemundo set the
contractual alternative dispute resolution process in motion in late December. Id. Then, on
January 7, 2016, Mintz told Telemundo that he was planning to leave to start working for the
competitor on June 13, 2016. Id. This action was filed by Telemundo on January 11, 2016.
Id.
168.
Id.
169.
Telemundo Media, LLC, 194 So. 3d at 435.
170.
Id.
171.
See id.
172.
Id.
173.
Id.
174.
Telemundo Media, LLC, 194 So. 3d at 436.
175.
Id. at 435–36.
176.
Id. at 436.
177.
Id. at 435.
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concluded that the within the United States limitation did not apply to a
breach of Mintz’s obligation “to provide his unique personal services
exclusively to Telemundo for the contractually specified period,” as opposed
to after the termination of the employment contract.178
3.

Failure to Establish the Absence of Irreparable Harm

In 2015, Mr. Given (“Employee”), a regional sales manager in
Georgia, while working for Allied Universal Corporation, a Florida
corporation (“Former Employer”), signed a non-compete agreement “as a
Employee, who had been
condition of continued employment.”179
responsible for all of Former Employer’s sales territory north of Florida,
resigned from his position with Former Employer in March 2016, and
accepted a new position as a strategic account manager at a Georgia
company that directly competed with Former Employer.180
Former
Employer sought a temporary injunction to enforce the non-compete
agreement.181 The motion was denied and Former Employer appealed.182
The Third Circuit reversed, directing the trial court to grant the temporary
injunction requested.183
Former Employer presented evidence that
Employee’s new employment would cause Former Employer irreparable
harm in the absence of a temporary injunction.184 This “create[d] a
rebuttable presumption of irreparable injury” supporting the relief requested
under section 542.335(1)(j) of the Florida Statutes.185 Employee provided no
evidence that would establish the absence to the Former Employer of the
injury—contemplated by section 542.335(1)(b) of the Florida Statutes.186 In
178.
Id. at 435–36. The district court stated that “[t]his is notwithstanding the
language in the exclusivity provision that the trial court construed to mean that [Employee]
could provide his services to [Employer’s] competitor outside of the United States.”
Telemundo Media, LLC, 194 So. 3d at 436 n.1.
179.
Allied Universal Corp. v. Given, No. 3D16-1128, slip op. at 2 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. Mar. 15, 2017). Employee was hired in 2010. Id.
180.
Id. The parties did not dispute the existence of a valid agreement not to
compete, Employee had become an employee of Univar, that the new employment happened
within one month after Employee resigned from his job with Former Employer, or that Univar
competed with Former Employer. See id. at 5 n.2. The agreement called for an eighteenmonth non-compete period within 150 miles of any operational facility of Former Employer.
Id. at 2.
181.
Allied Universal Corp., slip op. at 3.
182.
Id. at 1.
183.
Id. at 8.
184.
Id. at 7.
185.
Id. at 6 (discussing FLA. STAT. § 542.335(1)(j) (2016)).
186.
Allied Universal Corp., slip op. at 6 (discussing FLA. STAT. §
542.335(1)(b)).
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fact, Employee admitted that absent an injunction “he would begin managing
a sales territory” for his new employer.187 The Third District Court of
Appeal reminded us that it is not necessary that Former Employer actually
prove irreparable harm before injunctive relief may properly be granted;
quoting the Supreme Court of Florida in Capraro v. Lanier Business
Products, Inc.,188 that “[i]t truly can be said in this type of litigation that
relief delayed is relief denied.”189
III.
A.

ACTIONS BY OR AGAINST THIRD PARTIES

Tax Cases

The constitutional challenge presented in Florida Department of
Revenue v. DIRECTV, Inc.190 arose out of the imposition of a sales tax by the
State of Florida on satellite TV services at 10.8% while cable TV services
were taxed at 6.8%.191 DIRECTV, Inc. and Echostar, LLC (“Satellite
Companies”) sued the Florida Department of Revenue (“DOR”), the Florida
Cable Telecommunications Association (“FCTA”), and others alleging that
the Communications Services Tax (“CST”)192 is unconstitutional under the
[D]ormant Commerce Clause.193 The relief sought, in addition to a
declaratory judgment as to the unconstitutionality of the tax, was a
permanent injunction and a refund of the tax.194 The trial court agreed with
the DOR, thus denying the tax refund and injunctive relief, but the First
District Court of Appeal reversed, finding an as applied violation of the
Commerce Clause; that is, the tax was found to be discriminatory in effect,
although not in purpose.195 In so doing, the district court found that cable
companies and Satellite Companies “were similarly situated because they
both ‘operate in the same market and are direct competitors within that

187.
188.
189.

Id.
466 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 1985).
Allied Universal Corp., slip op. at 7–8 (quoting Capraro, 466 So. 2 at

213).
190.
215 So. 3d 46 (Fla. 2017). As of the date of submission of this Article,
a petition for certiorari is pending before the Supreme Court of the United States. See 28
U.S.C. § 2101(c) (2012).
191.
DIRECTV, Inc., 215 So. 3d at 49; see also FLA. STAT. § 202.12(1) (2006).
This discrepancy began with the enactment of the Communications Services Tax. DIRECTV,
Inc., 215 So. 3d at 49. That statute currently imposes a tax of 9.07% on satellite service, while
cable service is taxed under that statute at a rate of 4.92%. FLA. STAT. § 202.12(1) (2015).
192.
DIRECTV, Inc., 215 So. 3d at 49; see also FLA. STAT. § 202.12.
193.
DIRECTV, Inc., 215 So. 3d at 49.
194.
Id.
195.
Id. at 49–50.
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market.’”196 The district court also concluded that cable companies are instate interests because of the extent of “their local infrastructure and local
employment.”197 The First District Court of Appeal then held that “because
the CST favors communications that use local infrastructure, it has a
discriminatory effect on interstate commerce.”198 The DOR and the FCTA
appealed, and the Supreme Court of Florida reversed, holding that the
Dormant Commerce Clause had not been violated.199
The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution grants to the
United States Congress the authority “[t]o regulate Commerce . . . among the
several [s]tates.”200 In addition, the Supreme Court of the United States has
long recognized that even on matters with respect to which the United States
Congress has not legislated, certain state taxation may be barred by the
[D]ormant Commerce Clause.201 Under the test set forth in Complete Auto
Transit, Inc. v. Brady202 (“Complete Auto test”), a state tax will not offend
the Commerce Clause provided the tax “[(1)] is applied to an activity with a
substantial nexus with the taxing State, [(2)] is fairly apportioned, [(3)] does
not discriminate against interstate commerce, and [(4)] is fairly related to the
services provided by the State.”203 Satellite Companies relied on the third
requirement and claimed that the tax had a discriminatory effect benefiting
in-state commerce versus out-of-state interests.204
The Supreme Court of Florida said that “[s]tatutes that openly
discriminate against out-of-state economic interests in order to protect instate interests are subject to a per se rule of invalidity.”205 However, before
discrimination against interstate commerce may be found, entities subject to
disparate tax treatment must be determined to be similarly situated.206 The
DOR took the position that satellite and cable companies are not similarly
situated, but the Supreme Court of Florida did not agree.207 The Court, after
noting that “[w]hat is required for entities to be considered substantially
similar has not been extensively considered by the courts,” stated that “[i]t
196.
Id. at 49.
197.
Id.
198.
DIRECTV, Inc., 215 So. 3d at 49.
199.
Id. at 50, 55.
200.
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8.
201.
DIRECTV, Inc., 215 So. 3d. at 50 (citing Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson
Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 179 (1995)).
202.
430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
203.
DIRECTV, Inc., 215 So. 3d at 50 (quoting Complete Auto Transit, Inc.,
430 U.S. at 279).
204.
Id. at 51.
205.
Id. (quoting Simmons v. State, 944 So. 2d 317, 330 (Fla. 2006)).
206.
Id.
207.
Id. at 51–52.
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appears that, at the very least, the entities must be in competition with one
another.”208 The Court concluded that cable TV and satellite TV were
substantially similar businesses competing for the same customers.209 The
Court then discussed whether cable companies were in-state entities, as
argued by Satellite Companies.210 The Court found that both were out-ofstate businesses, holding that “[c]able is not a local, in-state interest any
more than satellite.”211
Because both are out-of-state for Dormant
Commerce Clause purposes, the Court said that Satellite Companies’
argument of discriminatory effect could not succeed.212 As to the
discriminatory purpose argument made by Satellite Companies, the Court
concluded that, notwithstanding the difference in tax rates, the applicable
statute was not enacted for a discriminatory purpose and there was no intent
to favor cable TV.213
In the context of its discussion on whether cable companies are instate, the Court noted that “every state and federal court considering [satellite
companies’ Dormant] Commerce Clause challenges brought by the satellite
industry . . . has held that these [tax measures that favor cable] do not violate
the Dormant Commerce Clause.”214 The Court noted that some cases have
done so on the grounds that satellite and cable are not similarly situated,215
while others have found that “cable is not an in-state interest.”216 The Court
said it agreed with the latter group of decisions.217
Florida Department of Revenue v. American Business USA Corp.218
also involved a challenge based on the Dormant Commerce Clause, but in
this case, the taxpayer, American Business USA Corp. (“Internet
Corporation”), operated its business from Wellington, Florida.219 Internet
Corporation was engaged in the online internet business of selling “flowers,
gift baskets, and other items of tangible personal property.”220 Internet
Corporation did not keep an inventory of goods for sale, but would instead
use florists that were located near the place to which the order was to be
208.
DIRECTV, Inc., 215 So. 3d at 51 (quoting Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy,
Tax Comm’r of Ohio, 519 U.S. 278, 298–99 (1997)).
209.
Id.
210.
Id. at 52–53.
211.
Id. at 53.
212.
Id.
213.
DIRECTV, Inc., 215 So. 3d at 54–55.
214.
Id. at 53.
215.
Id. at 53 n.1.
216.
Id. at 53–54, 54 n.2.
217.
Id. at 54.
218.
191 So. 3d 906 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1067 (2017).
219.
Id. at 909 & n.1.
220.
Id. at 909 n.1.
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delivered.221 Internet Corporation charged sales tax when flowers and other
items were to be delivered to Florida customers.222 Internet Corporation did
not charge sales tax on items delivered to customers in other states.223
The statute that was challenged by Internet Corporation, section
212.05(1)(l) of the Florida Statutes provides, in part, that “[f]lorists located
in this state are liable for sales tax on sales to retail customers regardless of
where or by whom the items are to be delivered.”224 Internet Corporation
contested the DOR’s ruling that Internet Corporation was liable under this
statute for tax on sales to non-Florida customers.225 The DOR’s ruling
provided that “the tax required by [the statute was] a tax on the privilege of
engaging in business in Florida and is not a tax on the property sold.”226 On
appeal to the Fourth District Court of Appeal, Internet Corporation alleged
that the imposition of the tax with respect to Internet Corporation’s sales to
out-of-state customers was in violation of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and in violation of
the Dormant Commerce Clause.227 The Fourth District Court of Appeal
ruled that taxing internet “sales to out-of-state customers . . . violate[d] the
[D]ormant Commerce Clause.”228 The DOR appealed to the Supreme Court
of Florida, and the Court quashed the Fourth District Court of Appeal’s
decision.229 The Supreme Court of Florida applied the Complete Auto test to
determine if the imposition of the tax violated the Dormant Commerce
Clause.230 After a lengthy examination of the facts of the case, the Court
determined that the tax passed muster—satisfying the four prongs of the
Complete Auto test—and thus, the tax did not violate the Dormant
Commerce Clause.231
The Supreme Court of Florida acknowledged that if Internet
Corporation did not have any physical presence in Florida, the imposition of
the tax on sales to out-of-state customers would have clearly violated the
Dormant Commerce Clause.232 But, based on Internet Corporation’s
presence in Florida, with its headquarters being located in Wellington,
Florida, and Internet Corporation “doing business in Florida since 2001 . . .
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

Id.
Id. at 909 & n.1.
Am. Bus. USA Corp., 191 So. 3d at 909 n.1.
Id. at 908; see also FLA. STAT. § 212.05(1)(l) (2012).
Am. Bus. USA Corp., 191 So. 3d at 909.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 909.
Id. at 908.
Am. Bus. USA Corp., 191 So. 3d at 912.
Id. at 917.
Id. at 914.
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accept[ing] internet orders” from that location, the Court found that the
substantial nexus prong of the Complete Auto test was satisfied.233 Those
facts also served to defeat Internet Corporation’s due process argument of
lack of minimum contacts.234
In the next case, the First District Court of Appeal certified the
following question to the Supreme Court of Florida as a matter “of great
public importance: Does the ‘Local Option Tourist Development Act,’
Codified at Section 125.0104, [of the] Florida Statutes, impose a tax on the
total amount . . . received by an . . . on-line travel company’s website, or only
on the amount the property owner re[covers] for the rental of the
accommodations?”235
The Supreme Court of Florida rephrased the question as follows:
“Are the total monetary amounts that [online travel companies] charge their
customers to secure reservations for transient accommodation rentals in
Florida . . . subject to taxation under section 125.0104 [of the] Florida
Statutes?”236
The Supreme Court of Florida answered the question in the negative,
holding that the tax can only be imposed on the amount paid to the transient
lessor—the hotel, motel, or other provider of accommodations—and not on
the total amount paid to the online travel company, that difference being
referred to as the mark-up.237 Justices Labarga and Quince concurred with
233.
Id.
234.
Id. at 914, 917. The Court, discussing Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, stated
that “[d]ue process requires only that there be some minimal connection between the state and
the transaction it seeks to tax.” Am. Bus. USA Corp., 191 So. 3d at 917; Quill Corp. v. North
Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 306–07 (1992). The Florida Supreme Court, relying on Quill Corp.
and National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue stated the following with respect to
the alleged due process violation: “We have concluded that American Business’[] activities
have a substantial nexus to Florida. Thus, the minimum connection required to satisfy due
process is also met.” Am. Bus. USA Corp., 191 So. 3d at 917; Quill Corp, 504 U.S. at 307;
Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753, 758 (1967), abrogated by Quill
Corp. v. North Dakota 504 U.S. 298 (1992). Of course, the converse is not necessarily the
case, as the district court pointed out, again, citing Quill Corp. for the proposition that a
violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause may exist even where there is no due process
violation. Am. Bus. USA Corp., 191 So. 3d at 910.
235.
Alachua Cty. v. Expedia, Inc., 175 So. 3d 730, 731 (Fla. 2015) (quoting
Alachua Cty. v. Expedia, Inc., 110 So. 3d 941, 951–52 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2013), reh’g
denied, 2015 Fla. LEXIS 2030 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2015)).
236.
Id. at 733; see also Broward Cty. v. Orbitz, LLC, 135 So. 3d 415 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (per curiam), review denied, 192 So. 3d 35 (Fla. 2015) (unpublished table
decision); Leon Cty. v. Expedia, Inc., 128 So. 3d 81, 82 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2013) (mem.)
(per curiam), review denied, 192 So. 3d 39 (Fla. 2015) (unpublished table decision).
237.
Expedia, Inc., 175 So. 3d at 732, 737. The mark-up was said to be
“between [25%] and [45%].” Id. at 738–39. The Appellate Court of Illinois, First District,
Third Division, in City of Chicago v. Expedia, had before it a controversy regarding the
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the opinion of Justice Perry, Justice Pariente concurred in the result and
wrote a separate opinion, and Justice Canady concurred in the result; while
Justice Lewis dissented with the opinion with Justice Polston concurring in
the dissent.238
The next two cases are district court decisions involving sales
taxes.239 In the first, an agreement was reached during the DOR’s sales tax
audit of Verizon Business Purchasing, LLC (“LLC”), by which the parties
agreed to extend the statute of limitations on the tax assessment until March
31, 2011.240 On February 8, 2011, the DOR sent LLC a Notice of Proposed
Assessment (“NOPA”) for more than $3 million plus interest.241 The DOR
advised LLC that an informal protest could be filed by April 11, 2011,
administrative review could be sought, or judicial proceedings could be
instituted by LLC, but if LLC did not file a protest, the assessment would
become final on April 11, 2011.242 LLC was also informed that in the
absence of an informal protest, “‘an administrative hearing or judicial
proceeding, . . . [had to be brought] no later than [June 8, 2011] or [sixty]
days from the date the assessment’” became final.243 LLC was also advised
that if a protest was not filed, “the proposed assessment [would] become a

Chicago Hotel Accommodations Tax (“CHAT”), under Chicago Municipal Code § 3-24-010
(1990). City of Chi. v. Expedia, Inc., No. 1-15-3402, 2017 WL 1511961, at *1 (Ill. App. Ct.
Apr. 26), withdrawn, May 16, 2017. The court in Illinois stated that “[w]ell after the CHAT
ordinance was enacted, the Internet was invented and, eventually, profitable [online travel
companies] began operating. The [City of Chicago] has joined numerous taxing authorities
who have attempted to apply established tax provisions to [online travel companies’] online
business model.” Id. at *2. The court went to explain that the results from cases in other
jurisdictions may be of limited assistance because of differences in statutory language. Id.
For example, in Orbitz, LLC v. Indiana Department of State Revenue, the Tax Court of
Indiana declined to “rely on [out of state decisions] or find them persuasive” because of statespecific statutory language upon which the case’s resolution was dependent. Orbitz, LLC v.
Ind. Dep’t of State Revenue, 66 N.E. 3d 1012, 1015–16 n.4 (Ind. T.C. 2016). Just a word of
caution—as true today in the age of immediate and magic cite checking as it was in the days
of only paper books and supplements: Orbitz, LLC did not expressly cite Alachua County,
although the parties’ briefs may have, but a cite check of Alachua County disclosed that
Orbitz, LLC declined to follow the Florida Supreme Court’s Alachua County decision. Id. at
1015 n.4; see also Expedia, Inc., 175 So. 3d at 737. But did it? Compare Orbitz, LLC, 66
N.E. 3d at 1018 with Expedia, Inc., 175 So. 3d at 737.
238.
Expedia, Inc., 175 So. 3d at 737.
239.
See Am. Heritage Window Fashions, LLC v. Dep't of Revenue, 191 So.
3d 516, 517 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2016), review denied, No. SC16-967 2016 WL 5407681
(Fla. 2016); Verizon Bus. Purchasing, LLC v. State, 164 So. 3d 806, 807–08 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 2015).
240.
Verizon Bus. Purchasing, LLC, 164 So. 3d at 807–08.
241.
Id. at 808.
242.
Id.
243.
Id.
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FINAL ASSESSMENT on [April 11, 2011].”244 LLC filed suit against the
DOR challenging the NOPA on statute of limitations grounds, asserting that
the DOR had been required to make an assessment before March 31, 2011.245
The DOR successfully moved for summary judgment and LLC appealed.246
The district court concluded that the DOR’s assessment of the tax was barred
by the statute of limitations on assessment.247 The statute of limitations
contained in section 95.091(3)(a)1.b. of the Florida Statutes requires that any
tax due under section 72.011 of the Florida Statutes must be “determine[d]
and assess[ed] . . . within [three] years after the date the tax is due, any return
with respect to tax is due, or such return is filed, whichever occurs later.”248
Thus, the question presented was whether the DOR’s assessment was
timely.249 As noted above, the DOR had, by agreement, until March 31,
2011, to assess the tax.250 The NOPA was issued on February 8, 2011.251
The DOR argued that the date the NOPA was issued, February 8, 2011, was
the date it assessed the tax against LLC.252 Thus, according to the DOR, the
assessment was timely.253 It was conceded by “the parties [that] section
95.091 does not define the [term] assess.”254 LLC pointed out that under
section 213.21(1)(b) of the Florida Statutes, the statute of limitations on
assessments is tolled when informal protests are filed.255 LLC argued, in
effect, and the district court agreed, that there would be no purpose for that
tolling provision if the NOPA was the assessment, as the assessment would
have been made.256 The First District Court of Appeal agreed “that the
assessment contemplated in [section 95.091(3)(a)] is a final assessment.”257
As the district court pointed out, since there is a sixty-day period between the
NOPA and the date the NOPA becomes final, if the taxpayer does not file a
protest, all the DOR would have had to do in this case was to issue the
NOPA at least “sixty days prior to . . . March 31, 2011.”258 In answering the
244.
Id. (alteration in original).
245.
Verizon Bus. Purchasing, LLC, 164 So. 3d at 808.
246.
Id. at 808–09.
247.
Id. at 812–13.
248.
Id. at 809; see also FLA. STAT. § 95.091(3)(a)1.b (2010).
249.
Verizon Bus. Purchasing, LLC, 164 So. 3d at 809.
250.
Id. at 808.
251.
Id.
252.
Id.
253.
Id. at 809–10.
254.
Verizon Bus. Purchasing, LLC, 164 So. 3d at 809; see also FLA. STAT. §
95.091 (2010).
255.
Verizon Bus. Purchasing, LLC, 164 So. 3d at 808; see also FLA. STAT. §
213.21(1)(b) (2010).
256.
Verizon Bus. Purchasing, LLC, 164 So. 3d at 811–12.
257.
Id. at 811; see also FLA. STAT. § 95.091(3)(a).
258.
Verizon Bus. Purchasing, LLC, 164 So. 3d at 812.
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question presented, that is, whether NOPA was the assessment contemplated
by section 95.091(3)(a) of the Florida Statutes, or whether the date the
NOPA became final was the assessment, the district court, as a matter of
statutory interpretation, concluded that the pertinent statute of limitations
referred to a final assessment and the NOPA was not a final assessment.259
American Heritage Window Fashions, LLC v. Department of
Revenue260 involved an assessment of sales tax and interest against American
Heritage Window Fashions, LLC (“LLC”) for more than $220,000.261 On
March 29, 2010, the DOR served a NOPA on LLC, and pursuant to section
72.011(1)(a) and (2)(a) of the Florida Statutes, informed LLC of its options
to contest the assessment.262 LLC did not avail itself of any of the options.263
Collection efforts by the DOR began at the end of 2010, and on April 1,
2013, almost three years after the relevant periods stated in the NOPA
expired, the DOR obtained $7,507.58 from an account that the DOR had
ordered frozen back on May 10, 2011, “of which $6,525.95 was applied to
the . . . deficiency, roughly [3%] of the assessed sum.”264 On July 10, 2013,
LLC requested a refund of the amount applied to the deficiency, alleging
“that it was an audit overpayment.”265 The DOR declined “the request on
August 26, 2013, and [LLC] filed a written protest on September 25, 2013 . .
. [seeking] ‘to appeal the Notice of Proposed Assessment’” based on its
argument regarding the underlying liability.266 The DOR denied the protest
on the merits which “made final the [DOR’s] denial of [the LLC’s] refund
application.”267 LLC sought further administrative review, and eventually
the matter found its way to the Second District Court of Appeal.268 The
district court affirmed the DOR’s determination that LLC’s challenge was
untimely.269 To bring what amounted to an untimely action to contest a tax
assessment through a petition to review a refund denial under circumstances,
like those presented in this case, would, said the court, “render the statute’s
sixty-day limitation on actions brought to contest tax assessments

259.
Id. at 811–12; see also FLA. STAT. § 95.091(3)(a).
260.
191 So. 3d 516 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2016), review denied, No. SC16967 2016 WL 5407681 (Fla. 2016).
261.
Id. at 517.
262.
Id. at 517–18; see also FLA STAT. § 72.011(1)(a), (2)(a) (2010).
263.
Am. Heritage Window Fashions, LLC, 191 So. 3d at 518.
264.
Id.
265.
Id.
266.
Id.
267.
Id.
268.
Am. Heritage Window Fashions, LLC, 191 So. 3d at 518.
269.
Id. at 524.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol42/iss1/1
Published by NSUWorks, 2018

44
45

Nova Law Review,
et al.: Nova
Vol.Law
42, Iss.
Review
1 [2018], Art. 1

2017]

2016-2017 SURVEY OF FLORIDA CASES

29

meaningless.”270 Section 72.011(5) of the Florida Statutes “is the language
of a jurisdictional statute of nonclaim.”271
ValleyCrest Landscape Maintenance, Inc. (“ValleyCrest”) sued the
DOR for a refund of motor fuel tax paid.272 ValleyCrest, which is in the
business of residential and commercial landscaping, uses lawn equipment
that runs on diesel fuel and gas, both purchased by ValleyCrest at retail fuel
stations.273 ValleyCrest argued that the second gas tax authorized under the
Article XII, section 9(c) of the Florida Constitution applies only to motor
vehicles, and the tax under section 206.41(1)(a) of the Florida Statutes
applies only to vehicles operated on public roads and not “to off-road uses of
gasoline.”274 ValleyCrest also argued that not giving it an exemption, and
hence a refund of the taxes, amounts to a violation of the Equal Protection
Clauses of the Florida and United States Constitutions.275 The trial court
ruled in favor of the DOR, and the First District Court of Appeal affirmed.276
Section 206.41(4)(c) of the Florida Statutes exempts from the motor fuel tax
on gasoline anyone “‘who uses any motor fuel for agricultural, aquacultural,
commercial fishing, or commercial aviation purposes,’” provided that the
fuel is not “‘used in any vehicle or equipment driven or operated on public
highways of [Florida],’” and provided that a refund is requested.277
ValleyCrest was being taxed on fuel it used operating its off-road
equipment.278 The district court of appeal first noted that “there is no usebased exemption for landscaping equipment” as there is for the other
enumerated uses.279 The legislature has broad power to create distinctions
and classifications in tax statutes.280 These distinctions can be upheld
without violating the Equal Protection Clause so long as there are nonarbitrary reasons for so doing.281 As an example, in this case, the district
court also noted that the landscaping business did not have the same

270.
Id. at 521.
271.
Id. at 522 (citing Markham v. Neptune Hollywood Beach Club, 527 So.
2d 814, 815 (Fla. 1988) (per curiam)); see also FLA. STAT. § 72.011(5) (2010).
272.
See ValleyCrest Landscape Maint., Inc. v. State, 213 So. 3d 992, 994 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 2016), reh’g denied, 2016 Fla. App. LEXIS 12079 (Fla. 1st. Dist. Ct. App.
2016), and review denied, 2017 WL 192041 (Fla. 2017).
273.
Id.
274.
Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 206.41(1)(a) (2016).
275.
ValleyCrest Landscape Maint., Inc., 213 So. 3d at 994.
276.
Id.
277.
Id.; FLA. STAT. § 206.41(4)(c)1.
278.
See ValleyCrest Landscape Maint., Inc., 213 So. 3d at 994.
279.
Id. at 994–95.
280.
Id. at 995.
281.
See id.
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economic impact on the state as did the agricultural, commercial fishing, and
aviation industries.282
Forest Brooke/Hillsborough, LLC (“LLC”) challenged its 2008 ad
valorem tax assessment by filing suit in the circuit court in 2009 against
Hillsborough County.283 LLC paid the “2008 taxes in an amount . . .
admitted in good faith was due and owing” pursuant to section 194.171(3) of
the Florida Statutes.284 LLC did not timely pay the 2009 real estate tax, but it
did timely pay real estate taxes assessed after 2009.285 The property
appraiser successfully moved to have LLC’s 2009 complaint dismissed based
on section 194.171(5) of the Florida Statutes because the 2009 tax was not
timely paid.286 LLC appealed, and the Second District Court of Appeal
reversed the trial court’s decision.287 The statute requires only that all taxes
assessed for years after the year the taxpayer’s action is brought be timely
paid, not that taxes for the year in which the taxpayer’s action is brought be
timely paid.288
B.
Contracts for the Sale of Real Estate, Deeds, and Landlord-Tenant
Cases
1.

Real Estate Contract: Specific Performance Denied

Real estate developer (“Seller”) entered into an agreement with
Appellees (“Purchaser”) for the sale and purchase of property “adjacent to
the Mardi Gras, a Daytona Beach business”289 having “a minimum of [fifty]
frontage feet on the Boardwalk and [also having] ‘sufficient land to build a

282.
Id. at 995–96.
283.
Forest Brooke/Hillsborough, LLC v. Henriquez, 194 So. 3d 1091, 1091–
92 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2016).
284.
Id. at 1092; see also FLA. STAT. § 194.171(3) (2009).
285.
Forest Brooke/Hillsborough, LLC, 194 So. 3d at 1092.
286.
Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 194.171(5).
287.
Forest Brooke/Hillsborough, LLC, 194 So. 3d at 1092.
288.
Id. at 1093.
289.
Boardwalk at Daytona Dev., LLC v. Paspalakis, 220 So. 3d 457, 459 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 2016), reh’g denied, 212 So. 3d 1063 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2017), review
denied, No. SC17-568, 2017 WL 2438408 (Fla. 2017). This was a “public-private economic
development project,” but the events here apparently predated the amendment of Article X §
6(a) of Florida’s Constitution in 2007. FLA. CONST. art X § 6; Boardwalk at Daytona Dev.
LLC, 220 So. 3d at 459 n.1; see also Eileen Zaffiro-Kean, Daytona Boardwalk Property Fight
Continues, DAYTONA BEACH NEWS-J. (Nov. 26, 2016, 2:57 PM), http://www.newsjournalonline.com/news/20161126/daytona-boardwalk-property-fight-continues. There are no
dates set forth in the district court’s opinion with respect to the transactions or the proceedings
in the trial court. Boardwalk at Daytona Dev., LLC, 220 So. 3d at 459; Zaffiro-Kean, supra.
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7500 square foot, one story building.’”290 As it turned out, three parcels of
real estate potentially fit this description.291 Seller requested declaratory
relief that a parcel of real estate that it tendered to the Purchaser was in
conformance with the parties’ agreement, while Purchaser filed a
counterclaim seeking an order requiring the transfer to Purchaser by Seller of
a different parcel.292 The trial court ordered specific performance as to one
of these parcels and Seller appealed.293 The Fifth District Court of Appeal
reversed, holding that it was error to order specific performance in this case
because “[s]pecific performance is only available to compel the transfer of
land that is specifically described in the parties’ agreement alone or where its
identity is clear from an agreement that is appropriately supplemented by
parol evidence,”294 which was not something that could be satisfied on this
record.295 The appellate court reversed the trial court’s order of specific
performance and Purchaser filed a motion for rehearing.296 On motion for
rehearing, which was denied, the Fifth District Court of Appeal concluded
that Purchaser had chosen to pursue one remedy in its litigation, that is,
specific performance.297 The Fifth District Court of Appeal said that
Purchasers “freely made their choice . . . to not pursue different causes of
action or other remedies, such as money damages, reformation, or
rescission.”298
2.

Arbitration Requirement Contained in Real Estate Contract Not
Waived

The contract for sale to Appellees (“Purchasers”) of an outparcel of
Timber Pine’s (“Seller”) shopping mall contained a binding arbitration
clause, and the amended deed restrictions contained restrictions that gave
Seller certain approval rights over construction on the property it sold to

290.
Boardwalk at Daytona Dev., LLC, 220 So. 3d at 459.
291.
Id. at 459.
292.
Id. at 460. There was a claim for damages exceeding $15,000 contained
in Purchaser’s amended counterclaim, but the appellate court noted that such damages were
not mentioned again in the counterclaim. Id. at 460 n.2. Purchaser’s claim for money
damages becomes the subject of the appellate court’s comments on denial by the court of
Purchaser’s motion for rehearing on the appeal. Boardwalk at Daytona Dev., LLC v.
Paspalakis, 212 So. 3d 1063, 1063–64 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2017).
293.
Boardwalk at Daytona Dev., LLC, 220 So. 3d at 460.
294.
Id. at 459.
295.
Id.
296.
Boardwalk at Daytona Dev., LLC, 212 So. 3d at 1063; Boardwalk at
Daytona Dev., LLC, 220 So. 3d at 459.
297.
Boardwalk at Daytona Dev., LLC, 212 So. 3d at 1063–64.
298.
Id. at 1064.
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Purchasers.299 Purchasers consented in writing to these amendments.300
After the closing, Seller sued Purchasers seeking injunctive relief and
damages based on Purchasers’ alleged violation of Seller’s construction
approval rights.301 The injunction was denied, and the Fifth District Court of
Appeal affirmed the trial court’s denial.302 Purchasers meanwhile answered
the complaint and counterclaimed alleging Seller breached the contract by
failing to provide input on the plans for Purchasers’ building and failure to
provide a cross-parking easement.303 Seller moved to compel arbitration of
Purchasers’ counterclaim.304 The trial judge denied the motion without
explanation; the Seller appealed, and the Fifth District Court of Appeal
reversed and remanded with instructions.305 The right to arbitration can be
waived, and such waiver may be deemed to have occurred if the party
demanding arbitration has resorted to the courts to enforce its claims
otherwise subject to arbitration.306 However, here, there was no significant
relationship between Seller’s rights under the amended deed restrictions and
the arbitration clause in the antecedent contract.307 Therefore, Seller’s suit
against Purchasers did not constitute a waiver of arbitration under the
contract with respect to Purchasers’ counterclaim alleging breach of
contract.308 “[T]he mere coincidence that the parties in dispute have a
contractual relationship will ordinarily not be enough to mandate arbitration
of the dispute.”309
3.

No Merger in Deed

The next case provides a discussion of an exception to the general
rule that “preliminary agreements concerning the sale of [real] property
merge into the deed executed pursuant to the sale.”310 Mr. Harkless, in 2008,
299.
Timber Pines Plaza, LLC v. Zabrzyski, 211 So. 3d 1147, 1149 (Fla. 5th
Dist. Ct. App. 2017).
300.
Id.
301.
Id.
302.
Id. (citing Timber Pines Plaza, LLC v. Zabrzyski, No. 5D16-95, 2016 WL
7405671, at *1 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. Dec. 20, 2016) (per curiam) (unpublished table
decision)).
303.
Id.
304.
Timber Pines Plaza, LLC, 211 So. 3d at 1149.
305.
Id. at 1150–51.
306.
See id.
307.
Id. at 1151.
308.
Id.
309.
Timber Pines Plaza, LLC, 211 So. 3d. at 1150 (alteration in original)
(quoting Seifert v. U.S. Home Corp., 750 So. 2d 633, 638 (Fla. 1999)).
310.
Harkless v. Laubhan, 219 So. 3d 900, 905 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2016),
reh’g denied (Jan. 30, 2017).
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leased part of his real estate to Verizon Wireless and granted it an easement
for the construction of a cell tower, but the construction did not begin until
May 2012.311 In the interim, the property on which the tower was to be
located, and with respect to which the easement was granted, was transferred
twice.312 The first transfer occurred in April 2011 when Mr. Harkless sold to
Mr. and Mrs. Lolly ten acres of his property—including the land leased to
Verizon Wireless and subject to the easement.313 There was an addendum
(“the Addendum”) to the Harkless-Lolly contract that stated, in part, that Mr.
Harkless would continue to own the “easement and Verizon cell tower
lease.”314 No mention was made in the warranty deed to the Lollys from Mr.
Harkless of any right on the part of Mr. Harkless to receive lease payments
from Verizon.315 The Lollys, just three months after the transfer to them,
sold the real estate to Mr. and Mrs. Laubhan.316 The language in the
contract, between the Lollys and the Laubhans, differed from the language in
the Addendum to the Harkless-Lolly contract.317 The Lolly-Laubhan
contract stated, in part, that “[b]uyer is aware of Verizon tower lease and has
received a copy of the survey and lease.”318 By warranty deed in July 2011,
the Lollys transferred the property to the Laubhans—the deed making no
mention of any right of Mr. Harkless to receive lease payments from
Verizon.319 But that was not all that happened in the interim, as Mr.
Harkless, sometime prior to May 2012, gave a third party, Communications
Capital Group, LLC, an “option to purchase his interest in the Lease for
$175,000.”320 Communications Capital Group, LLC then sought signed and
notarized confirmation from the Laubhans that they acknowledged Mr.
Harkless’ rights to continue to receive rent from Verizon Wireless pursuant
to the lease.321 Because the requested response was not forthcoming and the
response instead was that “they owned the Parcel free and clear of Mr.
Harkless’ right to receive rent,” the option was not exercised.322 At this
point, Mr. Harkless sought declaratory relief regarding his right to the rent,

311.
Id. at 902.
312.
Id. at 902–03.
313.
Id.
314.
Id. at 903.
315.
Harkless, 219 So. 3d at 903.
316.
Id.
317.
Id.
318.
Id.
319.
Id. Both deeds did, however, make mention of an easement. Harkless,
219 So. 3d at 903–04.
320.
Id. at 903.
321.
Id.
322.
Id.
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plus reformation of both deeds reflecting his rights under the Verizon
Wireless lease.323
The Laubhans filed a motion for summary judgment, relying on the
deeds and another agreement mentioned in both deeds, and argued that there
was no ambiguity that would permit the consideration of parol evidence.324
They also claimed that they were not aware, prior to the litigation, that there
was a Harkless-Lolly agreement that Mr. Harkless retained his right to the
rent.325 The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the Laubhans,
and Mr. Harkless appealed.326 The appellate court decided that because the
Lollys and Mr. Harkless, being all the parties to the agreement that reserved
the rent to Mr. Harkless, agreed that the Addendum language “was intended
to reserve Mr. Harkless’s right to” the lease payments, that the right did not
merge into the deed to the Lollys “as a matter of law.”327 Mr. Harkless
effectively reserved his right to receive rent, that is, his contract with the
Lollys and the reservation of the right to the rent did not merge into the
deed.328 The district court concluded that summary judgment should not
have been granted because the question remaining on remand as to whether
the Laubhans were bona fide purchasers for value, created a “genuine issue
of material fact.”329 At this point, the Second District Court of Appeal
addressed the issue of whether the Laubhans could be bona fide purchasers
under Florida’s recording statute, section 695.01(1) of the Florida Statutes.330
The court, after noting that the parties had not identified any cases addressing
whether the recording statute applies to the right to receive rent and the court
had found none, held that the plain language of the statute provides that “[n]o
conveyance . . . of real property, or of any interest therein” shall be valid
against bona fide purchasers unless properly recorded.331 The Second
District Court of Appeal concluded that the right to receive rent is covered

323.
Id.
324.
Harkless, 219 So. 3d. at 903–04. The other agreement that was referred to
in both deeds was “the Amended Memorandum of Lease Agreement” which the district court
described as “essentially an abridged version of the Lease” that did not mention any right
retained by Mr. Harkless to receive payments under the Verizon Wireless lease. Id. at 903.
The district court declined to accept any line of decision out of other district courts, citing
cases from the Third District and the Fourth District, that the words subject to in a deed could
result in the deed being rendered generally ambiguous. Id. at 906.
325.
Id. at 903.
326.
Id. at 902, 904.
327.
Harkless, 219 So. 3d at 905.
328.
Id. at 909.
329.
Id. at 902, 909.
330.
Id. at 908–09; see also FLA. STAT. § 695.01(1) (2011).
331.
FLA. STAT. § 695.01(1); Harkless, 219 So. 3d at 908.
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by the statute and remanded for a determination of the Laubhans status as
bona fide purchasers.332
4.

Denial of Temporary Injunction in Suit Based on Deed Restrictions

Planned Parenthood of Greater Orlando, Inc. (“Planned Parenthood”)
bought real property subject to deed restrictions.333 MMB Properties
(“MMB”), a general partnership that runs a cardiology practice in the same
medical complex, is subject to the same deed restrictions.334 Planned
Parenthood intended to offer abortion services at the facility, and MMB—
claiming that performance of such services violated the deed restriction—
sought and obtained from the circuit court a temporary injunction that
enjoined Planned Parenthood from performing abortions at the facility.335
On appeal, the Fifth District Court of Appeal upheld the temporary
injunction, finding that the trial court’s decision was supported by substantial
and competent evidence.336 The district court also found that in order to have
the temporary injunction dissolved, as had been sought by Planned
Parenthood, it “needed to establish changed circumstances which it did not
do.”337 The Supreme Court of Florida quashed the Fifth District Court of
Appeal’s affirmance of the temporary injunction and remanded the case to
the trial court for a hearing on a permanent injunction.338 The Court claimed
conflict jurisdiction involving the standard for modifying or dissolving a
temporary injunction; the Court noting that the First, Second, Third, and
Fifth Districts all require changed circumstances, while the Fourth District
does not.339 The Court adopted the position of the Fourth District, noting
that the purpose of a temporary injunction is to preserve the status quo
pending final injunctive proceedings.340 The principle has developed that a
party seeking to modify or dissolve a temporary injunction must show
changed conditions or changed circumstances to justify modification or
dissolution of the injunction.341 However, there is no such requirement in
Rule 1.610(d) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.342 The Court
332.
Harkless, 219 So. 3d at 908–09.
333.
Planned Parenthood of Greater Orlando, Inc. v. MMB Props., 211 So. 3d
918, 920 (Fla. 2017).
334.
See id.
335.
Id. at 920–22.
336.
Id. at 923–24.
337.
Id. at 923.
338.
Planned Parenthood of Greater Orlando, Inc., 211 So. 3d at 929.
339.
Id. at 924–25.
340.
Id. at 924–26.
341.
Id. at 924.
342.
Id.; see also FLA. R. CIV. P. 1.610(d).
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concluded that it was within the trial court’s discretion “to reconsider, on a
motion to dissolve, a temporary injunction entered after notice and a hearing,
. . . regardless of whether the arguments or evidence could have been brought
to the attention of the court at the hearing on the injunction.”343 In other
words, the changed circumstances rule in this context is no more.344 The
Court went beyond the conflict jurisdiction issue and found that the trial
court’s decision, granting the temporary injunction and declining to dissolve
it, was not supported by competent substantial evidence—particularly with
respect to the likelihood of MMB succeeding on the merits.345
5.

Self-Help Provision in Lease Invalid

The lease between (“Landlord”) and (“Tenant”) gave Landlord
certain self-help authority if an Event of Default occurred, including the
authority “after the continued Tenant default after the expiration of the time
to cure” and “without further written notice to Tenant . . . enter upon and
take possession of the Leased Premises and expel or remove Tenant and any
other occupant therefrom with or without having terminated the lease.”346
The agreement further provided that [l]andlord shall not be deemed to have
violated any right of Tenant and shall not be deemed to be guilty of trespass,
conversion or any other criminal or civil action as a result of such action.” 347
The day came when Landlord found it necessary to lock Tenant out of much
of the leased premises and obtain police help in escorting Tenant’s
employees off the premises.348
343.
Planned Parenthood of Greater Orlando, Inc., 211 So. 3d at 925.
344.
Id. at 926.
345.
See id. at 928. Justice Canady, joined by Justice Polston, dissented. Id. at
929 (Canady, J., dissenting).
346.
Palm Beach Fla. Hotel & Office Bldg. Ltd. P’ship v. Nantucket Enters.,
211 So. 3d 42, 44 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2016), review denied, No. SC17-491, 2017 WL
2774368 (Fla. 2017).
347.
Id. The appellate court did not discuss the introductory provision of the
language quoted in the text above. See id. The provision began as follows: “[I]f and
whenever any Event of Default by Tenant shall occur, Landlord may after the continued
Tenant default after the expiration of the time to cure . . . at its option and without further
written notice to Tenant.” Id. Presumably, the language was deemed not crucial to the court’s
conclusion. See id.
348.
Palm Beach Fla. Hotel & Office Bldg. Ltd. P’ship, 211 So. 3d at 44. The
leased premises included a restaurant and office space. Id. The restaurant was closed by the
City of Palm Beach Gardens based on Tenant not obtaining the right permits. Id. The city
posted “red tags on the doors, which indicated the restaurant was unsafe for occupancy.” Id.
“The same day, Landlord [installed] chains and locks on the . . . kitchen [doors], the
restaurant,” and the office doors. Id. Several days later, the lease was terminated by
Landlord, and the Landlord “had the police escort Tenant’s employees from the restaurant.”
Palm Beach Fla. Hotel & Office Bldg. Ltd. P’ship, 211 So. 3d at 44. It is not clear from the
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Each party filed claims against the other.349 Landlord alleged that
Tenant breached the terms of the lease, and Tenant alleged conversion in
addition to wrongful eviction.350 A directed verdict on the claim of wrongful
eviction was entered by the court against Landlord on Tenant’s motion, and
the jury awarded $8.8 million in damages against Landlord plus found
liability as to the conversion claim and awarded $2 million to Tenant.351 The
jury also ruled against Landlord on its breach of contract claim.352 On
appeal, Landlord challenged the propriety of the directed verdict against it.353
The Fourth District Court of Appeal upheld the directed verdict under the
authority of section 83.05(2) of the Florida Statutes, which sets out the only
methods by which a landlord may repossess, leased premises from a
defaulting tenant.354 The methods are by an action based on section 83.20 or
other civil action that determines the right to possession, or where the tenant
has surrendered or abandoned the rented space.355 Landlord did not employ
any of the approved eviction methods, and the self-help provisions in the
lease agreement availed the Landlord nothing.356 Tenant also challenged the
trial judge’s decision not to award pre-judgment interest on the eviction
damages award.357 The Fourth District held that since Tenant received an
award purely of a fixed amount of money damages, the trial court had no
discretion in the matter and should have awarded pre-judgment interest
“from the date of the loss or the accrual of [the] cause of action.”358 Tenant,
however, did not fare as well on the issue of the $2 million in damages
awarded on its conversion claim.359 Conversion requires the exercise of
control over and acts that are not consistent with “another’s possessory rights
in personal property.”360 There was lack of proof to support the award.361
opinion how Tenant’s employees were still in the restaurant, which was padlocked several
days earlier, but there were other leased areas including an atrium, a ballroom, and two
meeting rooms, which may be where the employees were. See id.
349.
Id.
350.
Id.
351.
Id.
352.
Palm Beach Fla. Hotel & Office Bldg. Ltd. P’ship, 211 So. 3d at 44.
353.
See id.
354.
Id. at 44–45; see also FLA. STAT. § 83.05(2) (2006).
355.
Palm Beach Fla. Hotel & Office Bldg. Ltd. P’ship, 211 So. 3d at 44–45;
see also FLA. STAT. § 83.05(2), 83.20 (2006).
356.
See Palm Beach Fla. Hotel & Office Bldg. Ltd. P’ship, 211 So. 3d at 45.
357.
Id. at 46.
358.
See id. (quoting Bosem v. Musa Holdings, Inc., 46 So. 3d 42, 46 (Fla.
2010) (per curiam)).
359.
See id. at 45–47.
360.
Id. at 45 (quoting Joseph v. Chanin, 940 So. 2d 483, 486 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 2006)).
361.
Palm Beach Fla. Hotel & Office Bldg. Ltd. P’ship, 211 So. 3d at 46.
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Furthermore, the court held that “‘an action in tort is inappropriate where the
basis of the suit is a contract, either express or implied.’”362 The directed
verdict, as to the eviction damages, was affirmed, the conversion damages
award was reversed, and the denial of pre-judgment interest on eviction
award was reversed and remanded.363
Landlord raised an interesting argument in support of its position
that the directed verdict on the wrongful eviction claim was improper.364
The argument was that this was not a total eviction, but rather just a partial[]
evict[ion], since Tenant was not locked out of all of the leased premises. 365
The court responded that “[a]lthough the issue of whether a tenant can be
partially evicted appears to be an issue of first impression in Florida, we
need not address it here.”366 The court then stated that it found “no evidence
to support Landlord’s contention that it intended to allow Tenant to use that
part of the leasehold . . . or that Tenant could still maintain its other business
operations without the restaurant.”367
C.

Torts
1.

Construction Defects: Applicable Statute of Limitation

Almost ten years after the closing on property upon which Lennar
Homes (“Builder”) constructed a home for the homeowner (“Purchaser”),
Builder was served by Purchaser with the required notice pursuant to Section
558 of the Florida Statutes.368 Purchaser subsequently filed suit against
Builder alleging home construction defects.369 When the suit was filed, more
than ten years had elapsed since the date of the closing, and Builder defended
citing section 95.11(3)(c) of the Florida Statutes, the ten-year statute of
repose applicable to construction defect claims.370 Section 95.11(3)(c)
provides, in part, that
362.
Id. (quoting Belford Trucking Co. v. Zagar, 243 So. 2d 646, 648 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1970)).
363.
Id. at 47.
364.
Id. at 45.
365.
Id.
366.
Palm Beach Fla. Hotel & Office Bldg. Ltd. P’ship, 211 So. 3d at 45.
367.
Id.
368.
Busch v. Lennar Homes, LLC, 219 So. 3d 93, 94 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
2017); see also FLA. STAT. § 558.004 (2016). Section 558.004(1) of the Florida Statutes
requires that in cases of construction defect claims not involving personal injury, a claimant,
“at least [sixty] days before filing” suit, is required to serve a “written notice of claim on the
contractor.” FLA. STAT. § 558.004(1).
369.
Busch, 219 So. 3d at 94–95.
370.
Id. at 94; see also FLA. STAT. § 95.11(3)(c) (2016).

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol42/iss1/1
Published by NSUWorks, 2018

54
55

Nova Law Review,
et al.: Nova
Vol.Law
42, Iss.
Review
1 [2018], Art. 1

2017]

2016-2017 SURVEY OF FLORIDA CASES

39

“[i]n any event, the action must be commenced within [ten] years
after the date of actual possession by the owner, the date of the
issuance of a certificate of occupancy, . . . the date of completion
or termination of the contract between the professional engineer,
registered architect, or licensed contractor and his or her employer,
371
whichever date is latest.”

Builder claimed that the contract was complete as of the closing so
the ten-year period started to run at closing of the sale which would mean
that the period had expired.372 The complaint was dismissed, and Purchaser
appealed.373 The Fifth District Court of Appeal reviewed the contract
attached to the complaint that contained language indicating that it was
possible for the contract not to be completed until after closing, and the court
ruled that “[b]ecause the contract expressly contemplated that closing could
occur even if work required by the contract remained incomplete, and the
complaint did not allege that no work was completed after closing, the
allegations of the complaint do not conclusively establish that the contract
was completed upon closing.”374 In other words, the District Court
concluded that the complaint failed to conclusively establish that the ten-year
period started to run at closing.375 Therefore, the complaint should not have
been dismissed, and the appellate court reversed and remanded.376
On a related note, in Altman Contractors, Inc. v. Crum & Forster
Specialty Insurance Co.,377 the United States Court of Appeal for the
Eleventh Circuit certified the following question of first impression to the
Supreme Court of Florida: “Is the notice and repair process set forth in
Chapter 558 of the Florida Statutes a suit within the meaning of the
[commercial general liability] policies issued by [insurance company] to
[contractor]?”378
While it is impossible to predict how the Supreme Court of Florida
will decide Altman Contractors, Inc., or whether that decision dealing with
insurer’s duty to defend will have an impact on construction defect claims
subject to section 95.11(3)(c), or the tolling statute under section 558.004(10)
of the Florida Statutes, remains to be seen.379 The latter section provides that
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.

FLA. STAT. § 95.11(3)(c).
Busch, 219 So. 3d at 95.
Id.
Id. at 95–96 (emphasis added).
See id. at 94.
Id. at 94, 96.
832 F.3d 1318 (11th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 1326.
See id.; FLA. STAT. § 95.11(3)(c) (2016); FLA. STAT. § 558.004(10)

(2016).
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service by a claimant of written notice of claim under section 558.004(1)
“tolls the applicable statute of limitations.”380 It should be noted that there is
no express reference in section 558.004(10) to the statute of repose contained
in section 558.004(1).381
2.

Slip and Fall: Invitee, Uninvited Licensee, or Trespasser

While walking home at about 11:00 P.M., after an evening out, Mrs.
Arp (“Mrs. Arp”) took a cut through shortcut “over a pathway of paver
stones located in the area of a utility easement on property owned by W.E.
Association and operated as a shopping center.”382 Plaintiff stepped on a
cracked stone, turned her ankle, and fell.383 “The [shortcut] did not have a
No Trespassing sign,” and Plaintiff’s testimony was to the effect that she
witnessed other people taking the shortcut regularly.384 She did not go into
any of the shopping center stores that evening, and was using the shortcut
“because she ‘just wanted to get home.’”385 She sued Waterway East
Association, Inc. (“Waterway”), among others, alleging negligence.386 The
trial court granted Waterway’s motion for summary judgment, and the
Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed.387 The appellate court first noted
that under common law, there are three categories of persons who enter onto
private property, specifically, “an invitee, a licensee, or a trespasser.”388
After defining the invitee as “a visitor on the premises by invitation, either
express or reasonably implied, of the owner,” the district court defined “[a]n
uninvited licensee [as] a person who chooses ‘to come upon the premises
solely for [his or her] own convenience without invitation either expressed or
reasonably implied under the circumstances.’”389 The district court defined a
trespasser as one “who enters the premises of another without license,
invitation, or other right, and intrudes for some definite purpose of his own,
or at his convenience, or merely as an idler with no apparent purpose, other

380.
381.
382.

FLA. STAT. § 558.004(1), (10).
See id.
Arp v. Waterway E. Ass’n, 217 So. 3d 117, 119 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.

2017).
383.
Id.
384.
Id.
385.
Id.
386.
Id.
387.
Arp, 217 So. 3d at 119, 122.
388.
Id. at 120.
389.
Id. at 120–21 (alteration in original); see also Wood v. Camp, 284 So. 2d
691, 695 (Fla. 1973) (explaining the difference between licensees by invitation and uninvited
licensee).
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than perhaps to satisfy his curiosity.”390 To the trespasser and uninvited
licensee, the court concluded, “[t]he only duty a [property owner] owes . . . is
‘to avoid willful or wanton harm to him and, upon discovery of his presence,
to warn him of any known dangers which would not be open to his ordinary
observation.’”391 The facts did not show that Waterway breached its duty to
Mrs. Arp, who “was, at best, an uninvited licensee.”392
3.

Slip and Fall: No Notice

Ms. Wilson-Greene (“Plaintiff”) brought a negligence action related
to a fall that occurred in a City of Miami owned building.393 The
maintenance contract for the building was between the City of Miami and
Vista Maintenance Services, Inc.394 Plaintiff testified that she had business
on the second floor, which Plaintiff said took more than fifteen minutes, and
that she used the elevator from the second floor to return to the lobby.395 Her
testimony was to the effect that when she stepped off the elevator, she
slipped on a green substance, fell, hit her head, lost consciousness, and when
she became conscious again, she had a green substance on her body that was
not hot.396 Plaintiff testified that “[s]he did not see any substance on the
floor before she entered the elevator” in the same group of elevators to go up
to the second floor.397 Plaintiff lost on a motion for summary judgment and
she appealed.398 The Third District Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that
the language of the contract between the defendants, the City of Miami and
Vista Maintenance Services, Inc., “did not create a contractual duty on Vista
[Maintenance Services, Inc. to] constantly . . . patrol the building” for
dangerous conditions.399 Neither the City of Miami nor Vista Maintenance
Services, Inc. had actual notice of the dangerous condition, and a permissible
inference of constructive notice was not supported by the facts.400 The

390.

Arp, 217 So. 3d at 121 (quoting Post v. Lunney, 261 So. 2d 146, 147 (Fla.

1972)).
391.
Ct. App. 1980)).
392.
393.
App. 2017).
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.

Id. at 120 (quoting Nolan v. Roberts, 383 So. 2d 945, 946 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Id. at 121–22.
Wilson-Greene v. City of Miami, 208 So. 3d 1271, 1273 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Wilson-Greene, 208 So. 3d at 1273.
Id. at 1274.
Id. at 1275.
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district court distinguished melting substances from hot substances, which
“requires a jury to impermissibly stack inferences,”401 stating:
We conclude that where melting substances are involved,
there is no need to infer the substance was previously frozen.
Logic tells us that is a given. In the instant case, the jury first
would need to infer that the substance was hot prior to spilling on
the floor and infer from this that it was on the floor for a sufficient
402
amount of time for it to have cooled.

The district court held that “[t]he mere presence of soup which is
‘not hot’ on the floor is not enough to establish constructive notice.”403 Nor
was there actual notice.404 The court noted that the contract did not have the
type of language that would have required a heightened duty of care on the
part of Vista Management Services, Inc.405
D.

UCC and Other Debtor-Creditor Disputes
1.

Perfected Security Interest

In Beach Community Bank v. Disposal Services, LLC,406 Beach
Community Bank (“Creditor”) held a perfected security interest under the
Uniform Commercial Code in certain containers that secured a debt owed to
Creditor by Solid Waste Haulers (“Debtor”).407 Debtor sold the containers to
Disposal Services, LLC (“Transferee”), but Debtor did not apply the sales
proceeds to its debt to Creditor.408 Debtor eventually defaulted on payments
to Creditor, and Creditor then made written demand of Transferee that it pay
Debtor’s debt in full or turn over the containers to Creditor.409 Transferee
did neither, and Creditor sued Transferee alleging conversion of the
containers.410 On motion by Transferee, the trial court entered an order
granting summary judgment in favor of Transferee, opining that Creditor
could not sue for conversion because the remedy of replevin was still
available to it.411 Creditor appealed and the First District Court of Appeal
401.
402.
403.
404.
405.
406.
407.
408.
409.
410.
411.

Id. at 1276.
Id.
Wilson-Greene, 208 So. 3d at 1275.
Id.
Id. at 1274.
199 So. 3d 1132 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2016).
Id. at 1133.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1133–34.
Beach Cmty. Bank, 199 So. 3d at 1134.
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reversed.412 Creditor had alleged in its complaint all of the elements
necessary to sustain a cause of action for conversion.413 “When an
unauthorized disposition of collateral occurs, a secured party has numerous
cumulative remedies at its disposal; it is not forced to elect a single
remedy.”414
2.

Assignment of Accounts Receivable

The Florida Department of Transportation (“DOT”) contracted with
Arbor One, Inc. (“Assignor”) for certain work to be done.415 Assignor sold
to United Capital Funding Corp. (“Assignee”) Assignor’s accounts
receivable from the DOT.416 Assignee, pursuant to section 679.4061 of the
Florida Statutes, notified the DOT in writing, of the assignment and the
amount of the receivables and advised the DOT to make contract payments
due to Assignee—not to Assignor.417 The DOT continued to pay
Assignor.418 Assignee sued the DOT and obtained a summary judgment
declaring the DOT to be legally obligated to Assignee for payment of the
Arbor One accounts receivable.419 The Second District Court of Appeal
affirmed, concluding that the DOT was an account debtor like any other
subject to the above cited statute.420 The court also determined that the DOT
did not come within the so-called transfer exception of sections 679.1091 to
679.4061(1).421 Finally, the Second District ruled that the DOT’s claim of
sovereign immunity was barred by section 337.19(1) of the Florida
Statutes.422
3.

Homestead Sales Proceeds

JBK Associates, Inc. v. Sill Bros., Inc.423 involved a judgment
creditor’s claim to the proceeds of the sale of the judgment debtor’s
412.
Id. at 1135.
413.
Id.
414.
Id.
415.
Dep’t of Transp. v. United Capital Funding Corp., 219 So. 3d 126, 128
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2017).
416.
Id.
417.
Id. at 128–29; see also FLA. STAT. § 679.4061 (2012).
418.
United Capital Funding Corp., 219 So. 3d at 129.
419.
Id.
420.
Id. at 130, 136.
421.
Id. at 133, 136; see also FLA. STAT. § 679.1091, .4061(1).
422.
United Capital Funding Corp., 219 So. 3d at 136; see also FLA. STAT. §
337.19(1) (2012).
423.
191 So. 3d 879 (Fla. 2016).
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homestead.424 Creditor obtained a judgment against debtor in 2010.425 In
2013, due to Debtor’s divorce, the marital homestead was sold and Debtor’s
portion of the proceeds was deposited in a [Florida] Homestead Account
(“Account”) at Wells Fargo Advisors, LLC (“Garnishee”).426 The account
was subdivided into a cash portion and two securities portions.427 The
account was kept separate from Debtor’s other assets.428 In 2014, Creditor
served writs of garnishment on Garnishee in an effort to apply the assets of
the account toward satisfaction of its judgment.429 In the trial court, Debtor
successfully moved to have the writs dissolved.430 The trial court’s order
was affirmed by the Fourth District Court of Appeal on the strength of the
Supreme Court of Florida’s decision431 in Orange Brevard Plumbing &
Heating Co. v. La Croix.432 The Fourth District’s decision was affirmed by
the Supreme Court of Florida.433 The Supreme Court reiterated the basic
principle that proceeds from the sale of one’s Florida homestead continues to
enjoy protection from the claims of most creditors and provided:
(1) [T]here must be a good faith intention, prior to and at the time
of the sale, to reinvest the proceeds in another homestead within a
reasonable time; (2) [t]he funds must not be commingled with
other monies; (3) [t]he proceeds must be kept separate and apart
and held for the sole purpose of acquiring another home. 434

The Court found that Debtor had kept faith with the requirements of
Orange Brevard Plumbing and Heating.435

424.
425.
426.
427.
428.
429.
430.
431.
432.
433.
434.
435.

Id. at 880.
Id.
Id.
Id.
JBK Assocs., Inc., 191 So. 3d at 880.
Id.
Id.
Id.
137 So. 2d 201 (Fla 1962).
JBK Assocs., Inc., 191 So. 3d at 882.
Id. at 881.
Id.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol42/iss1/1
Published by NSUWorks, 2018

60
61

Nova Law Review,
et al.: Nova
Vol.Law
42, Iss.
Review
1 [2018], Art. 1

GOING UNDER THE HOOD: THE WINNERS AND LOSERS OF
FLORIDA’S TRANSPORTATION NETWORK COMPANIES LAW
CARLOS IBARCENA*

I.
II.
III.

IV.

V.
VI.

INTRODUCTION ........................................................................... 45
THE ARRIVAL OF FLORIDA’S TNC LAW .......................................... 47
A.
Background: The Road to State Law ................................. 47
B.
Florida Joins the Ninety Percent ........................................ 49
FLORIDA’S TNC LAW ...................................................................... 50
A.
TNC Drivers as Independent Contractors .......................... 50
B.
Minimum Insurance Requirements ..................................... 52
C.
Reporting Requirements...................................................... 53
D.
Pay to Operate: Fees and Tailor-Made Taxes................... 53
1.
The Regulatory Cost to Operate for TNCs ............ 53
2.
Custom Made TNC Taxes ..................................... 54
AIRPORTS & TNCS: A LOVE-HATE RELATIONSHIP ........................ 55
A.
Background: Airports and Revenue ................................... 55
B.
The Arrival of TNCs at Airports ......................................... 57
C.
Landscape of TNC Laws at Airports ................................... 60
D.
Florida’s Airports & TNCs ................................................. 61
1.
Florida’s Valuable Airport Opportunity ................ 61
2.
Airport Authorities Under Florida’s TNC Law ..... 61
WHY FLORIDA’S TNC LAW GIVES TNCS A FREE RIDE .................. 55
A.
Potential Issues: Oversight ................................................ 65
B.
Lack of Economic Support .................................................. 66
CONCLUSION .................................................................................... 68
I.

INTRODUCTION

Florida House Bill 221 was signed into law on May 9, 2017.1 With
the enactment of the Bill, Florida joins forty-six other states, and the District
*
Carlos Ibarcena, J.D. candidate, 2019, Nova Southeastern University,
Shepard Broad College of Law; B.S. Finance, Bentley University. Carlos dedicates this
Comment in loving memory of his mother Karina Klee. He would like to give a special thank
you to his family and loving fiancée, Lillian, for always blessing him with support and
motivation. He would also like to thank his colleagues of the Nova Law Review for the hard
work and effort they dedicated to this Comment and Volume 42. Lastly, he would like to
thank Professor Joseph Hnylka for his guidance and critique in refining this Comment.
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of Columbia, in enacting statewide legislation to legalize and regulate
transportation network companies (“TNC”), such as Uber and Lyft.2 The
law will provide these companies with a uniform set of operating standards
throughout the state.3 The new law contains provisions addressing key
policy arguments, which include the classification of TNC drivers, insurance
requirements, background check requirements, administrative and reporting
requirements, and the regulatory authority under the new regulatory scheme.4
The law, which preempts all local regulations enacted before the law’s
effective date and puts TNCs exclusively under state regulation going
forward, carves out a small, but significant, exception allowing the operating
authorities of airports and seaports to retain control over setting pickup fees
and logistics within such locations.5
This Comment will provide an overview of Florida’s TNC law and
the current landscape of TNC regulations in Florida’s airports.6 Part II will
provide background on the local regulatory landscape before the arrival of
the state’s law and will give a brief background on statewide laws in the
United States.7 Part III will provide a brief overview on key policy issues in
Florida law.8 Part IV will analyze the operation and the impact of TNCs at
airports.9 Part V will discuss potential gaps in Florida’s law.10 Lastly, Part
VI will present a conclusion.11

1.
Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 2, 2017 Fla. Laws 11 (codified
at FLA. STAT. § 627.748).
2.
GINGER GOODIN & MAARIT MORAN, TRANSPORTATION NETWORK
COMPANIES 1 (2016), http://policy.tti.tamu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/TTI-PRC-TNCsSBC-031417.pdf; Transportation Network Company (TNC) Legislation, TEXAS A&M
TRANSP. INST., http://www.tti.tamu.edu/policy/technology/tnc-legislation/ (last visited Dec.
31, 2017).
3.
See Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(15), 2017 Fla. Laws.
4.
See id. § 1(7)–(11).
5.
See id. § 1(15)(a)–(b).
6.
See infra Parts II–VI.
7.
See infra Part II.
8.
See infra Part III.
9.
See infra Part IV.
10.
See infra Part V.
11.
See infra Part VI.
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THE ARRIVAL OF FLORIDA’S TNC LAW

Background: The Road to State Law

The regulation of TNCs has been a hotly contested subject, not only
in Florida, but also throughout the United States and the world.12 The arrival
of TNCs in Florida created a political storm for local politicians and
regulators.13 Uber, the largest of the TNCs, and its close rival, Lyft, arrived
first in Miami, Florida around 2014.14 When they arrived, there were no
transportation or for-hire regulations that fit the operating model of TNCs.15
For-hire regulations, those applicable to taxicabs, appeared to be the closest
fit, and thus were applied.16 However, TNCs did not conform to these
regulations and continued to operate illegally.17 In willfully choosing to not
abide by for-hire regulations, the TNCs gained a competitive advantage over
12.
See GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2, at 1; Brian O’Keefe & Marty Jones,
Uber’s Tax Shell Game, FORTUNE, Nov. 1, 2015, at 115, 117.
13.
See Editorial, What Tallahassee Should Do on Uber, SUN SENTINEL (Fla.),
Jan. 29, 2016, at 18A; Douglas Hanks, In Email Blitz, Uber Threatens to Pull Out of MiamiDade,
MIAMI
HERALD
(Jan.
14,
2016,
2:26
PM),
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-dade/article54698295.html.
14.
Douglas Hanks, Miami-Dade Chairman Backs Off in Uber Fight, But
Sticking
Points
Remain,
MIAMI HERALD
(Jan.
15,
2016,
5:46
PM),
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-dade/article54953260.html; Brian
Solomon, Lyft Rides Tripled Last Year, but Remains Far Behind Uber, FORBES: TECH (Jan. 5,
2017, 3:05 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/briansolomon/2017/01/05/lyft-rides-tripled-lastyear-but-remains-far-behind-uber/. Because both Lyft and Uber are privately held companies,
there is limited information on their financials and operations:
Lyft remains a distant second place to Uber. In the month of December, Uber
completed 78 million rides in the U.S. compared with Lyft’s 18.7 million. That
means Uber is more than four times bigger than Lyft in each company’s home
market. Abroad, Uber has tens of millions of more rides. FORBES estimates Uber
completed more rides globally in the first two months of 2016 than Lyft did all
year.

Solomon, supra; see also Harriet Taylor, Uber and Lyft Are Getting Pushback from
Municipalities All over the US, CNBC: TECH (Sept. 2, 2016, 1:32 PM),
http://www.cnbc.com/2016/09/02/uber-and-lyft-are-getting-pushback-from-municipalities-allover-the-us.html.
15.
See GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2, at 1; Patricia Mazzei, Miami-Dade
Looks to Other Cities in Struggle to Deal with Lyft, Uber, MIAMI HERALD (June 21, 2014, 6:16
PM), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-dade/article1967467.html.
Lyft’s director of government relations stated that local regulations did not address the
business model of TNCs. Mazzei, supra.
16.
See Mazzei, supra note 15. “Miami-Dade has treated the companies as
unlicensed taxi services — and [it is] hardly the only government to do so.” Id.
17.
See Benjamin Edelman, Uber Can’t Be Fixed-It’s Time for Regulators to
Shut It Down, HARV. BUS. REV.: BUS. L. (June 21, 2017), http://www.hbr.org/2017/06/ubercant-be-fixed-its-time-for-regulators-to-shut-it-down; Mazzei, supra note 15.
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the local for-hire transportation industry, in part, through the cost-savings
The
derived from their non-compliance with regulatory costs.18
management-led rebellion against the application of local regulations to TNC
drivers, promoted by the payment of fines for drivers, appeared to be the predetermined and highly criticized strategy behind the entry to all new
markets.19 Pushing local regulations aside, TNCs aimed to hook their users
with low fares and better service.20 Once hooked, TNCs would supplement
their regulatory crusade by mobilizing their loyal user to demand regulatory
change from lawmakers.21 Grassroots lobbying was effective and led to the
creation of local TNC regulations; these regulations allowed TNCs to operate
legally, if they met the requirements.22
The enactment of local ordinances was not widespread and some
Florida counties refused to provide TNCs a pathway to operate legally.23
Even within the municipalities that enacted local TNC regulations, the
regulations varied significantly; in 2016, state legislators sought to put an
end to the chaos by suggesting the first proposals for the statewide regulation
of TNCs24. However, the Senate struck it down after the bill passed the
House.25 Undeterred, and with a new pro-TNC Senate President, the Florida
Legislature was able to pass House Bill 221 and bring the TNC regulatory
landscape to its current form.26 The Bill was signed into law on May 9,
2017.27

18.
See Edelman, supra note 17.
19.
See id. (speaking on Uber’s fight against regulators); Patricia Mazzei,
Miami-Dade Escalates Penalties Against Renegade Lyft Drivers, MIAMI HERALD (June 6,
2014,
12:01
PM),
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miamidade/article1965588.html; Alyson Shontell, Cops in Miami Are Running a Sting to Catch Lyft
Drivers, BUS. INSIDER (June 7, 2014, 11:36 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/miamicops-are-running-a-sting-to-catch-lyft-drivers-2014-6.
20.
See Hanks, supra note 14.
21.
See id.
22.
Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 9, Miadeco Corp. v.
Miami-Dade Cty., No. 16-21976-CIV (S.D. Fla. Apr. 10, 2017). “In response to lobbying and
changes in the for-hire transportation market, the County exercised its legislative prerogative
to create a separate system of regulations for TNEs.” Id.
23.
See Michael Auslen et al., It’s Up to Rick Scott Now: Should Local
Governments Be Allowed to Regulate Uber?, MIAMI HERALD (Apr. 19, 2017, 4:36 PM),
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/business/article145556644.html.
24.
See Michael Auslen, Uber Bill Easily Clears First Hurdle, BRADENTON
HERALD: ST. POL. (Feb. 8, 2017, 5:26 PM), http://www.bradenton.com/news/politicsgovernment/state-politics/article131538319.html.
25.
Id.
26.
Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 2, 2017 Fla. Laws 11 (codified
at FLA. STAT. § 627.748); see also Daniel Ducassi, Brandes: ‘This Is the Year for RideSharing
in
Florida’,
POLITICO:
FLA.
(Jan.
11,
2017,
4:38
PM),
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Florida Joins the Ninety Percent

In 2013, the California Public Utilities Commission used its
authority to legalize TNCs statewide “and define[d] the term transportation
network company,” now commonly used to define ride-sharing companies
such as Uber and Lyft.28 Soon after, in 2014, Colorado became the first state
to enact state-level legislation authorizing and regulating TNCs.29 Statewide
TNC legislation grew from thirty-three in May 2016 to forty-three in March
2017.30 As of October 2017, forty-eight states, and the District of Columbia,
have enacted some level of TNC legislation.31 The lonely hold-out states are
Oregon and Vermont.32 No two TNC state laws are the same; some laws
have similar or equivalent provisions while others differ, but the key policies
in all legislative efforts involve the level of regulation, power of local
authorities, the taxicab industry, and public safety.33 State lawmakers faced a
challenging task in writing a comprehensive law that did not overly interfere
with a free-market economy.34
Florida’s TNC law established a uniform set of regulations for TNCs
across the state.35 The key policies addressed in the law include the
classification of TNC drivers as independent contractors and minimum
insurance requirements.36 Notably, the law does not require TNCs or TNC
drivers to obtain an initial or annual permit fee before beginning to operate;
lawmakers only mandated a bi-annual submission of a compliance report
prepared by an independent auditor.37 In addition, the law expressly
preempts all existing and future local law, with the exception of airports and
seaports, which have the authority to set reasonable pickup fees.38

http://www.politico.com/states/florida/story/2017/01/brandes-this-is-the-year-for-ride-sharingin-florida-108663.
27.
Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 2, 2017 Fla. Laws 11.
28.
GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2, at 4.
29.
Id. at 9.
30.
See id. at 1, 5.
31.
Transportation Network Company (TNC) Legislation, supra note 2.
32.
See id.
33.
See GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2, at 6–8.
34.
See Editorial, supra note 13.
35.
Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 2, 2017 Fla. Laws 11.
36.
Id. § 1(9)(c)–(d); GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2, at 9.
37.
Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(11)(e), 2017 Fla. Laws 9.
38.
Id. § 1(15)(a)–(b).
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FLORIDA’S TNC LAW

TNC Drivers as Independent Contractors

Uber has vehemently stressed that it is a technology company, not a
transportation provider, and Florida lawmakers agree.39 The ramifications,
both legal and financial, between the classification of independent contractor
and employee for the TNCs are tremendous.40 Under Florida’s TNC law,
TNC drivers are classified as independent contractors, if the following four
conditions are satisfied:
(a) The TNC does not unilaterally prescribe specific hours during
which the TNC driver must be logged on to the TNC’s digital
network.
(b) The TNC does not prohibit the TNC driver from using digital
networks from other TNCs.
(c) The TNC does not restrict the TNC driver from engaging in
any other occupation or business.
(d) The TNC and TNC driver agree in writing that the TNC driver
41
is an independent contractor with respect to the TNC.

Two parts of the test, sub-subsections (a) and (c), share TNC’s
marketing efforts towards drivers: the liberty to decide when to drive and to
do so as a supplemental income.42 Furthermore, providing a source of
supplemental income for constituents was one of the purposes behind
enacting the law, enabling TNCs to operate under a set of uniform
regulations.43 Moreover, the liberty of TNC drivers to schedule their driving

39.
See Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(1)(e), 2017 Fla. Laws 2;
GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2, at 3:2; Dick Hogan, Uber Ride Service Would Bring
Controversy, NEWS-PRESS (Sept. 10, 2014, 10:53 PM), http://www.newspress.com/story/money/2014/09/10/uber-ride-service-bringcontroversy/15421511/.
40.
See ZACH SCHILLER & CARL DAVIS, INST. ON TAX’N & ECON. POL’Y,
TAXES AND THE ON-DEMAND ECONOMY 1, 7 (2017), http://www.itep.org/wpcontent/uploads/ondemandeconomytaxes0317.pdf; GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2, at 9.
41.
Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(9)(a)–(d), 2017 Fla. Laws 7–
8.
42.
Id.; see also Hogan, supra note 39; Florida House, Senate Pass Rideshare
Legislation with Overwhelming Support, FLA. TREND (Apr. 19, 2017),
http://www.floridatrend.com/article/21980/florida-house-senate-pass-rideshare-legislationwith-overwhelming-support.
43.
See Florida House, Senate Pass Rideshare Legislation with
Overwhelming Support, supra note 42; Hogan, supra note 39.
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times, as required by the statute, is in line with Florida case law previous to
the passing of law.44
Sub-subsection (b) of the test touches the highly competitive nature
of TNCs.45 TNC rivals, Uber and Lyft, have always looked to gain a
competitive advantage over the other, though the rivalry reached new heights
when it was alleged that the TNCs participated in potentially illicit
recruitment practices.46 It is unknown whether these practices, or similar
ones, remain in effect or, if they are, whether courts would find them to be in
violation of the statute.47
The last sub-subsection, (d), was expressly addressed in McGillis v.
Department of Economic Opportunity,48 where the court affirmed the
decision of Florida’s Department of Economic Opportunity that a former
Uber driver was not an employee for purposes of reemployment assistance
“[b]ecause the parties’ contract explicitly provides that an Uber driver is not
an employee and the nature of the parties’ relationship was consistent with
this classification.”49 Similar agreements between Uber and its drivers have
been upheld by courts to compel arbitration.50 As of now, no court has ruled
TNC drivers as employees, though the issue is being litigated in federal
courts.51 It appears TNC drivers will be categorized as independentcontractors under Florida’s TNC law, although any change in case law or

44.
See Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(9)(a), 2017 Fla. Laws 7;
McGillis v. Dep’t of Econ. Opportunity, 210 So. 3d 220, 222 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2017);
Hogan, supra note 39.
45.
See Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(9)(a)–(d), 2017 Fla. Laws
7–8; Maya Kosoff, Uber Used a Secret Program Called “Hell” to Track Rival Drivers,
VANITY FAIR (Apr. 13, 2017, 8:52 AM), http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2017/04/uber-useda-secret-program-called-hell-to-track-rival-drivers.
46.
See Kosoff, supra note 45.
47.
See Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(9)(a)–(d), 2017 Fla. Laws
7–8; McGillis, 210 So. 3d at 222. It is unknown whether a Florida court, which held that an
Uber driver was not an employee, before the enactment of Florida’s TNC statute, considered
the sabotage allegations against Uber and Lyft. McGillis, 210 So. 3d at 222. “Drivers are free
to switch between using Uber’s driver application and the application of a competitor, such as
Lyft.” Id.; Kossoff, supra note 45; Casey Newton, This Is Uber’s Playbook for Sabotaging
Lyft, VERGE (Aug. 26, 2014, 3:42 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2014/8/26/6067663/this-isubers-playbook-for-sabotaging-lyft (detailing Uber’s Operation SLOG).
48.
210 So. 3d 220 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2017).
49.
Id.; see also Fla. CS for HB 221, § 1(9)(d).
50.
See Suarez v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 16-13263, 2017 WL 2197812, at *1
(11th Cir. Ct. App. May 18, 2017) (per curiam); Richemond v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 16-cv23267, slip op. at 8 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 27, 2017).
51.
Erez Aloni, Pluralizing the “Sharing” Economy, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1397,
1418 (2016).
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federal law could retroactively entitle a TNC driver to rights under state and
federal employment statutes.52
B.

Minimum Insurance Requirements

When it came to regulating TNCs, TNCs and insurance were
inseparable.53 The new law clearly details insurance requirements and both
operational and legal clarifications for insurers.54 The clarification provides
relief to TNC drivers and insurers.55 In the past, insurance issues included
coverage gaps and amounts, and the absence of a regulatory framework led
drivers to commit fraud by omitting information from insurers.56 The law
aims to combat omissions to insurers by mandating that a TNC driver, or the
TNC on behalf of the driver, carry insurance which “[r]ecognizes that the
TNC driver is a TNC driver or otherwise uses a vehicle to transport riders for
compensation.”57 Moreover, the insurance requirement provision of the law
adopts a similar classification of TNC activity to that of the one provided as
guidance by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (“NAIC”)
and mirrors that of other states’ TNC laws.58 The classification of each
activity period corresponds to distinct insurance requirements.59 Florida’s
law establishes the minimum insurance amounts to be maintained during two
distinct TNC activity periods: (1) when “a participating TNC driver is
logged on to the digital network but is not engaged in a prearranged ride”
and (2) when a “TNC driver is engaged in a prearranged ride.”60 The
insurance maintained by either the TNC, the TNC driver, or a combination of
both can satisfy the requirements.61

52.
McGillis, 210 So. 3d at 221, 225–26; see also SCHILLER & DAVIS, supra
note 40, at 4, 7.
53.
See Editorial, supra note 13.
54.
See Act effective July 1. 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(7)(b)(1)–(8)(b)(f), 2017
Fla. Laws 4–6 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 627.748); Ellen Huet, Rideshare Drivers Still
Cornered into Insurance Secrecy, FORBES: TECH (Dec. 18, 2014, 2:45 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenhuet/2014/12/18/uber-lyft-driver-insurance/.
55.
See Ducassi, supra note 26.
56.
See Huet, supra note 54.
57.
Act effective July 1. 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(7)(a)(1), 2017 Fla. Laws 4;
see also Huet, supra note 54.
58.
See GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2, at 8–9.
59.
Id.
60.
Act effective July 1. 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(7)(b)(1)–(2), 2017 Fla. Laws
4.
61.
Id. § 1(7)(c)(2)(a)–(c).
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Reporting Requirements

Florida’s TNC law does not require TNCs to receive approval of
new law.62 The only administrative regulatory compliance required of TNCs
is the submission of “an examination report prepared by an independent
certified public accountant for the sole purpose of verifying that the TNC has
maintained compliance with” two provisions of the law for the preceding two
years of operation, to the Department of Financial Services.63 The first
provision covers insurance disclosures, and the second, exclusions and TNC
driver requirements.64 If the report discloses that the TNC is found to have
been non-compliant during the examination period, the TNC will be fined
$10,000.65 In the case of non-compliance, another report due the following
January, is required.66 A $20,000 fine is imposed for non-compliance
discovered in the additional report.67
D.

Pay to Operate: Fees and Tailor-Made Taxes
1.

The Regulatory Cost to Operate for TNCs

The costs and administrative requirements necessary to begin
operating legally under enacted state TNC laws vary, as does the regulatory
authority assigned to oversee permitting.68 Typically, before a permit to
operate is granted, the TNC must submit to the relevant authority “proof of
compliance with requirements outlined in the legislation, such as insurance
or driver information requirements.”69 In addition, some states require TNCs
to pay a fee as part of the initial application process.70 The fee is referred to,

62.
See id. § 1(2). TNCs do not have to submit the examination report
required by law until January 1, 2019. Id. § 1(11)(e).
63.
Id.
64.
See Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(8), (11), 2017 Fla. Laws
6, 8.
65.
Id. § 1(11)(f).
66.
Id.
67.
Id.
68.
Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-280.3 (2017) ($5000 application fee plus
an annual permit fee of $5000), with COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-10.1-606 (2016) (annual permit
fee of $111,250). Examples of regulatory authorities under TNC state laws include: Virginia
and West Virginia use the Department of Motor Vehicles; Arizona, Delaware, and South
Carolina use the Department of Transportation; California and Ohio use the Public Utilities
Commission; Nevada used the Transportation Authority. GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2, at
8.
69.
GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2 at 8.
70.
See id.
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generally, as a license or permit fee.71 Annual fees range from $500 in
Montana to $111,250 in Colorado.72 Though Colorado’s flat annual fee is
currently the highest, and may be adjusted to cover the direct and indirect
costs associated with implementing the TNC law, the formulation of annual
permit fees prescribed by some states may surpass that figure.73 That is
because “[i]n some states the permit fees are proportional to the size or
extent of a TNC operation.”74 For example, Georgia, Michigan, and
Kentucky base their annual fee on a tier-system categorized by the number of
cars operating under the TNC.75 Of these, Georgia’s master license fee is the
most expensive of the three states, costing $300,000 to register 1001 cars or
more, which is ten times more expensive than the cost to register the same
amount of cars in Michigan, and over thirteen times more expensive than
Kentucky.76
2.

Custom Made TNC Taxes

With only eight states currently applying sales or a gross receipt tax
on taxi fares, TNCs do not have an overwhelming exposure to such tax.77 As
such, some states have taken the initiative to design TNC specific taxes to go
along with TNC laws.78 Nevada and South Carolina levy, on TNCs, an
assessment fee based on their gross revenue.79 South Carolina has set the fee
at 1% of gross trips, while Nevada has set the amount at 3%.80 Some states
and cities have imposed a per-ride fee or a variation thereof on TNCs.81

71.
Id. (license in Georgia and permit in Colorado).
72.
Id.
73.
See id. If a TNC had over 1000 cars in Georgia, the annual license fee
would cost $300,000, surpassing Colorado’s flat annual fee of $111,250. GOODIN & MORAN,
supra note 2, at 8.
74.
Id.
75.
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.2104(3) (2016); 601 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 1:113 §
2(4)(c) (2017); GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2, at 8.
76.
See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 257.2104(3) ($30,000 for more than 1000
vehicles); 601 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 1:113 § 2(4)(c) ($22,500 for 501 or more vehicles); GOODIN
& MORAN, supra note 2, at 8.
77.
See SCHILLER & DAVIS, supra note 40, at 3.
78.
Id. at 4.
79.
See GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2, at 8; SCHILLER & DAVIS, supra note
40, at 4.
80.
See GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2, at 8; SCHILLER& DAVIS, supra note
40, at 4–5.
81.
SCHILLER & DAVIS, supra note 40, at 4–5. Massachusetts imposes a
twenty-cent per-ride fee, while Pennsylvania imposes a 1.4% gross receipt tax only on rides
that originate in Philadelphia; Seattle, which has not been preempted by state law, imposes a
similar fee at twenty-four cents per-ride. See id.; Transportation Network Companies,
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These variable annual fee structures tie fee amounts to the growth and
success of TNCs, thus if the exponential growth of TNCs continues, so will
the fee revenue of these states.82 The regulatory enforcement of TNCs
comes at a cost, hence, states use the fees collected to help cover those
costs.83 In states where annual fees could become significant and surpass
enforcement costs, fee funds are distributed back to municipalities in
proportion to population or TNC trip origination.84
Aside from
administrative and operational enforcement, TNC fees can be applied in
ways that promote the public welfare.85 Seattle has mandated, in addition to
a fourteen-cent share on all TNC rides originating in the city, that TNCs pay
ten cents per-ride for the Wheelchair Accessible Services Fund.86
IV.
A.

AIRPORTS & TNCS: A LOVE-HATE RELATIONSHIP

Background: Airports and Revenue

Local governments, generally, are concerned only with activities that
are in the best interest of the people they represent.87 One such interest is the
establishment, operation, and management of a public airport.88 The
government units, which own and operate public airports across the United
States, vary, but they are essentially cities or counties.89 A popular form of
airport governance has been the creation of subunits of local governments,
commonly known as airport authorities.90 The authority may also possess
the power to raise funds by taxation or the issuance of bonds, if expressly
provided by the statute creating the airport authority.91 Airport authorities
are given wide latitude on their management of day-to-day operations,
SEATTLE.GOV: BUS. REG., http://www.seattle.gov/business-regulations/taxis-for-hires-andtncs/transportation-network-companies/tnc-companies (last visited Dec. 31, 2017).
82.
See GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2, at 8; SOLOMON, supra note 14.
83.
GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2, at 8; see, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS §
257.2104(3)–(4) (2017).
84.
See e.g., GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2, at 8 (South Carolina distributes
surplus TNC funds to municipalities in proportion to trip origination).
85.
See e.g., SCHILLER & DAVIS, supra note 40, at 5 (local government
imposed per-ride fee to be used on local transportation projects and transportation for the
disabled).
86.
Transportation Network Companies, supra note 81.
87.
See e.g., Hunter Bacot & Jack Christine, What’s So “Special” About
Airport Authorities? Assessing the Administrative Structure of U.S. Airports, 66 PUB. ADMIN.
REV. 241, 241 (2006).
88.
See 8A AM. JUR. 2D Aviation § 88, Westlaw (database updated May 2017).
89.
Bacot & Christine, supra note 87, at 241.
90.
Id. at 242.
91.
See 8A AM. JUR. 2D Aviation § 88, supra note 88.
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though “the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) has significant
input into airport operations through regulatory direction.”92 To receive
federal funding, airports must comply with assurances tied to the grants.93 In
the case of FAA grants, the airport must “maintain a schedule of charges for
use of facilities and services at the airport[] that will make the airport as
self-sustaining as possible under the circumstances existing at the airport,
including volume of traffic and economy of collection.”94 In light of all the
applicable restrictions, airport operators have become cost-effective and have
looked to increase non-aeronautical revenue.95
Almost all airports in the United States receive federal funding, but
the majority of “their operational revenue come[s] . . . from rents and fees
paid by . . . aeronautical and non-aeronautical” entities.96 As operators,
airport authorities have the power to impose fees and other operational
directives on commercial businesses operating within the airport facilities.97
Airports receive revenue from two general groups of users: aeronautical
users, which are commercial airlines, and non-aeronautical users.98 Nonaeronautical businesses include car rental companies, parking lots,
restaurants, gift shops, and ground transportation services.99
Non-aeronautical revenue is not regulated as aeronautical revenue,
coming from commercial airlines, is regulated.100 “[F]ees charged to nonaeronautical users are not subject to the [FAA] reasonableness requirement
or the Department of Transportation Policy on airport rates and charges . . .
.”101 The FAA has limited its input regarding non-aeronautical revenues to
interpreting the self-sustaining requirement to mandate that airports charge
non-aeronautical users fair market value for the use of the airport’s
facilities.102 The flexibility and ability of airlines to challenge fees can serve
as a deterrent to airports overcharging since an airport’s non-compliance
with the reasonable fee assurance can result in a breach of the contractual

92.
Bacot & Christine, supra note 87, at 241.
93.
Id.
94.
49 U.S.C. § 47107(a)(13)–(A) (2012).
95.
Maria Z. Nucci, Allocation of Economic Risk in Nonaeronautical Airport
Revenue Contracts, 16 AIR & SPACE LAW., Winter 2002, at 6.
96.
Id.
97.
See id. at 7.
98.
Id. at 6.
99.
See Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Sarasota-Manatee Airport Auth., 825 F.2d
367, 369 (11th Cir. 1987); Bacot & Christine, supra note 87, at 241.
100.
See Policy and Procedures Concerning the Use of Airport Revenue, 64
Fed. Reg. 7696, 7721 (Feb. 16, 1999).
101.
Id.
102.
Id.
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grant.103 Unlike airlines, non-aeronautical businesses do not have the same
recourses available to challenge airport fees, which has resulted in
litigation.104 Courts have given airport regulations great deference, holding
them to be constitutional so long as the authority promulgating them can
point the regulation to being rationally related to a legitimate objective.105
B.

The Arrival of TNCs at Airports

The growth of TNCs, such as Uber and Lyft, has been exponential,
reportedly gathering up “as much as one-fourth of the U.S. ride-hailing
market.”106 One customer segment TNCs have been aggressively pursuing
has been business travelers, successfully beating out taxis in the competition
for the profitable customer segment.107 A component behind the success of
TNCs in capturing the business traveler segment has been their slow, but
persistent, entry into airports.108 Airports represent lucrative opportunities
for TNCs, but airports have been reluctant in opening their doors to TNCs.109
Though it is not a one-way street, airports also look at TNC fees as a
potential significant revenue stream.110 TNC fees provide a new revenue
stream for airports, but it is not always at a net increase to the airport’s
overall revenue.111 More passengers taking TNCs to the airport translates
into fewer parking, taxicab, and car rental fees for airports.112 These fees are
major components of an airport’s non-aeronautical revenue; “[l]ast year, the

103.
See id. at 7720, 7723.
104.
See Alamo, 825 F.2d at 370.
105.
See id. at 373–74; Gannett Satellite Info. Network, Inc. v. Metropolitan
Transp. Auth., 745 F.2d 767, 775 (2d Cir. 1984).
106.
SCHILLER & DAVIS, supra note 40, at 10.
107.
Kerry Close, Why You Can’t Take an Uber Home from the Airport, TIME:
MONEY (July 7, 2016), http://www.time.com/money/4396248/uber-lyft-ban-airport/.
108.
See Jenni Bergal, Airport Parking Takes Hit from Uber, Lyft, PEW
CHARITABLE TR.: STATELINE (July 18, 2017), http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-andanalysis/blogs/stateline/2017/07/18/airport-parking-takes-hit-from-uber-lyft. In the United
States, “Lyft has agreements with nearly 240 airports and Uber has agreements with more than
a hundred.” Id.
109.
Close, supra note 107. Airports represent a key portion of the travel
market that TNCs are aggressively pursuing, in part, by focusing on business travelers because
11% of them use TNCs. Id.
110.
See Andrea Ahles, DFW Won’t Raise Parking Rates Again, and You Can
Thank Uber and Lyft, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM (June 29, 2017, 10:57 AM),
http://www.star-telegram.com/news/business/aviation/sky-talk-blog/article158814344.html
(explaining that revenue from TNC fees will have nearly doubled in three years).
111.
Bergal, supra note 108.
112.
Id.
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$3.5 billion in fees represented 41[%] of the $8.5 billion in U.S. airport
revenue not related to airlines.”113
Parking related fees have been a large revenue stream for airports for
many years, and now make up nearly 20% of non-aeronautical revenue for
airports in the United States.114 In some cases, car rental fees provide an
even larger revenue stream for airports.115 For example, at Fort LauderdaleHollywood International Airport (“FLL”), revenue from car rental fees is
“the largest source of revenue[],” making up about 30% of the airport’s total
operating revenue.116 Likewise, parking fees also provide a significant
revenue stream for airports, “typically represent[ing] between one-fifth and
one-quarter of that revenue category.”117 The impact of TNCs on airport
revenues has not been fully determined because TNCs have only been
operating under formal agreements with airports for a short period of time.118
Nonetheless, the current reduction in fees, whether short or long term, have
airport operators looking to offset the losses with TNC fees.119 In addition,
as airport operators, authorities must ensure that TNCs are abiding by the
regulations of the airport, not only for economic reasons, but also for safety,
security, and general operational matters.120 The enforcement of TNCs
requires “increased staffing costs to oversee ride-hailing operations and
increased curbside congestion, mean[ing] less money for the airport and
other public transportation services that airport revenue subsidizes.”121
Maintaining certain revenue levels for airports is also of critical
importance to maintaining operations, covering debt-servicing, and fulfilling
certain federal grant assurances.122 The reductions in revenue seen from
increases in the use of TNCs have not yet proved to be a financial risk for
airports, in part, because airports are subsidizing the reductions with fees
charged to TNCs.123 For example, the Dallas/Fort Worth Airport faced a
113.
Id.
114.
Id.
115.
See BROWARD CTY. AVIATION DEP’T, FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR THE
YEARS
ENDED
SEPTEMBER
30,
2016
AND
2015
13
(2017),
http://www.broward.org/Airport/About/Documents/Fssigned03272017.pdf.
116.
Id.
117.
Bergal, supra note 108.
118.
Id.
119.
Id.
120.
See Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Sarasota-Manatee Airport Auth., 825 F.2d
367, 371 n.4 (11th Cir. 1987).
121.
Sandra Tan, NFTA Fears $2 Million in Lost Airport Revenue Because of
Uber, Lyft, BUFF. NEWS (July 6, 2017), http://www.buffalonews.com/2017/07/06/nfta-fears-2million-airport-revenue-loss-due-uber-lyft-services/.
122.
See 49 U.S.C. § 47107(b) (2012); Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc., 825 F.2d at
371 n.4.
123.
See Bergal, supra note 108.
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shortfall in parking fee projections, but will not raise parking rates for the
first time in five years thanks to the increase in the airport’s ground
transportation revenue, which has benefitted from TNC fees.124 For airport
authorities looking at the long term coexistence of the economic demands of
their airports and TNC fees, it is “appropriate for the [a]uthority to factor in
future development plans when setting user fees.”125 The relationship
between ground transportation revenue and capital expenditures does not
have to be perfectly aligned since one revenue stream can be used to
complement or subsidize other unrelated revenue streams, like fees charged
to airlines.126 In subsidizing airline fees, the airport becomes more attractive
to airlines.127 For instance, at FLL in Florida:
Non-airline revenues, represented 71.1% of total
operating revenues in fiscal year 2016. The main categories of
non-airline revenues, rental car revenues, parking revenues, and
concessions, have steadily been increasing over the last few years,
due to increases in passenger activity and also increases in sales
per passenger.
This increase in non-airline revenues has
contributed to the ability to maintain low terminal rents and
landing fees that result in a low CPE [Cost Per Enplanement].
This low-cost structure makes the Airport attractive to air carriers,
128
especially low-cost carriers.

Where state laws have not preempted local authorities from setting
TNC airport fees, many airports have reached agreements with the TNCs.129
The agreements vary in structure, such as a flat fee or a per-ride fee, and in
amounts.130 The agreements are products of often tense and lengthy
negotiations between policymakers and the TNCs.131 Airport authorities
bargain for an agreement that considers the effect of TNCs on the airport,
which includes lost revenue from reduced ground transportation, parking,

124.
Ahles, supra note 110.
125.
Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Sarasota-Manatee Airport Auth., 906 F.2d 516,
522 (11th Cir. 1990); Bergal, supra note 108.
126.
BROWARD CTY. AVIATION DEP’T, supra note 115, at 12.
127.
See id.
128.
Id.
129.
See GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2, at 14; e.g., Bergal, supra note 108
(Buffalo Niagara International Airport in New York will charge Lyft a three-dollar fee perride and Uber a flat fee of $180,000); Taylor, supra note 14 (Newark Airport signed a $10
million dollar deal with Uber).
130.
See Bergal, supra note 108. Lyft is charged on a per-ride basis, while
Uber is charged a flat fee, both agreements were for one year. Id.
131.
See GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2, at 4.
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and car rental fees, as well as enforcement costs.132 TNCs look for a fee
structure that best reflects its operation at that airport and, ultimately, as forprofit entities with shareholders, looking for the lowest cost possible.133
C.

Landscape of TNC Laws at Airports

Broad preemption language eliminating or limiting the authority of
local governments to regulate TNCs is not uncommon in enacted state
laws.134 However, a significant amount of states carve out exceptions to the
preemption for airport and seaport authorities.135 Only a small number of
states have left their state’s airport operator without any authority to impose
on TNCs fees or other operational directives.136 Within those states, the
authority left to airport authorities varies.137 The majority of those states
allow the airport to set pickup fees and operational directives.138 In some
instances, states provide parameters under which airport authorities must
abide by when setting TNC fees.139

132.
See Bergal, supra note 108. “[O]fficials estimate they could lose more
than $2 million in revenue a year from parking, taxi, and car rental fees because of TNCs . . .
.” Id.
133.
See Eric Anderson, Uber Balks at Airport Process, TIMES UNION (N.Y.),
July 12, 2017, at A1.
134.
GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2, at 14.
135.
Id. at 7, 14.
136.
Id. at 7. Of the states that have left no authority to airport authorities
under respective TNC laws, Colorado is the only state home to a major airport, Denver
International Airport. See id. at 3; FED. AVIATION ADMIN., CALENDAR YEAR 2016
PRELIMINARY REVENUE ENPLANEMENTS AT COMMERCIAL AIRPORTS 1 (2017),
http://www.FAA.gov/Airports/planning_capacity/passenger_allcargo_stats/passenger/media/p
reliminary-cy-16-commercial-service-enplanements.pdf
[https://web.archive.org/web/20170715205149/https://www.faa.gov/airports/planning_capacit
y/passenger_allcargo_stats/passenger/media/preliminary-cy16-commercial-serviceenplanements.pdf].
137.
Compare Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(15)(b), 2017 Fla.
Laws 11 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 627.748(15)(b)) (authority to set pickup fees that must be
consistent with those charged to taxicabs), with GA. CODE ANN. § 40-1-191 (2016).
138.
See GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2, at 7–14.
139.
See GA. CODE ANN. § 40-1-191. One such state is Georgia, home to the
busiest airport in the world. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., supra note 136, at 1. Georgia limits the
fees charged to TNCs—ride share network services—and taxi services alike, to “not exceed
airport’s approximate cost” of regulating the operation of the entities at the airport. GA. CODE
ANN. § 40-1-191.
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Florida’s Airports & TNCs
1.

Florida’s Valuable Airport Opportunity

Florida recently moved ahead of Texas to the number two spot for
“overall number of passengers boarding airplanes” in the nation.140 Since
Uber’s arrival in Miami, the company’s share of the business travelers
segment increased from 17% to 67% in just two years.141 As an important
and profitable client base for TNCs, the positive trend underlies the
importance of TNCs gaining access to Florida’s airports.142 Florida is home
to four large hub airports—airports that represent at least 1% of total
enplanements in the United States.143 All four airports are within the top
thirty airports, according to total passenger enplanements 2016.144 Since
Miami-Dade—Florida’s most populous county—legalized TNCs in May
2016, the $2 pickup fee imposed on Uber by MIA has translated into over $2
million in revenue for the airport in one year.145
2.

Airport Authorities Under Florida’s TNC Law

Florida is divided by law into sixty-seven political subdivisions
called counties.146 As in the rest of the United States, subunits of local
governments have been created by law to operate airports in Florida.147
Florida’s airport authorities, through the power derived from their
Legislature, “have the right, power, and authority to enter into contracts with
one or more motor carriers for the transportation of passengers for hire
140.
Jim Turner, Florida Passes Texas in Airport Traffic in 2016, ORLANDO
SENTINEL (Fla.), July 18, 2017, at 8A.
141.
Douglas Hanks, Miami Business Travelers Abandon Taxis for Uber,
MIAMI HERALD (Fla.), Feb. 1, 2017, at 8A.
142.
See Close, supra note 107.
143.
See FED. AVIATION ADMIN., supra note 136, at 1. Florida’s Large Hub
Airports listed by total enplanements in 2016: Miami International Airport (“MIA”), Orlando
International Airport (“MCO”), Fort Lauderdale-Hollywood International (“FLL”), and
Tampa International (“TPA”). Id.
144.
Id.
145.
Taylor, supra note 14; Video clip: Univision Report at 2:15–2:25, Uber y
Lyft destronan a los taxistas en el aeropuerto de Miami [Uber and Lyft Dethrone Taxi Drivers
at Miami Airport], UNIVISION COMM., INC.: UNIVISION 23: MIAMI (July 25, 2017, 7:34 PM),
http://www.univision.com/miami/wltv/uber-y-lyft-destronan-a-los-taxistas-en-el-aeropuertode-miami-video.
146.
FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(a) (amended 2014); Auslen et al., supra note
23.
147.
Bacot & Christine, supra note 87, at 243; see, e.g., Alamo Rent-A-Car,
Inc. v. Sarasota-Manatee Airport Auth., 825 F.2d 367, 368–69 (11th Cir. 1987).

Published by NSUWorks, 2018
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol42/iss1/1

77
78

et al.:Nova
NovaLaw
LawReview,
ReviewVol.
Full42,Issue
Iss. Volume
1 [2018],42,
Art.Issue
1 1

62

NOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 42

between such airport or airports and points within such county.”148 Courts
have ruled that airport authorities may charge different fee amounts to
different categories of businesses operating in the airport.149 The airport
authority’s justification for the difference in fees is “based upon its rational
assessment of the relative benefits and the extent of use of each category of
vehicles that enter the airport.”150 The legitimate purposes supporting the
different fees could be many—including the regulation and control of airport
roadway traffic, the protection of the public safety, and the need to generate
revenue from commercial users of the airport to support the provision of the
airport facilities to the public—of which only one is needed to uphold the
regulation.151
In general, the main benefit conferred upon a business operating in
the airport is the client base of travelers using the airport.152 In assessing
extent of use, courts have considered the volume of vehicles that can be
accommodated on the airport’s roadways, the number of passengers the
vehicle can carry, the safety and security costs associated with the increased
traffic congestion, and designated pickup areas as necessary to accommodate
the category of users.153 Overall, the fees assessed on businesses operating
within the airport are formulated by a form of benefit-use analysis.154 The
benefits conferred on each business are not always the same, which typically
gives rise to different fee amounts; in upholding differing fee schedules, the
Court reasoned:
As the district court found, the on-airport companies
receive substantial advantages from their presence in the airport,
including overall customer convenience and access to walk up
customers, i.e., customers who do not have reservations to rent a
car from a particular company. The on-airport companies,
however, pay negotiated rents for the space they lease in the
airport terminal and on the airport grounds. Although these rents
may be below the actual market value of the property, they do
compensate the Authority for the benefits that the on-airport
155
companies receive.
148.

FLA. STAT. § 331.15(2) (2016); Bacot & Christine, supra note 87, at 242,

244.
149.
Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc., 825 F.2d at 372 (upholding different fee
schedules for different airport businesses).
150.
Id. at 371.
151.
Id. at 371 n.3–4.
152.
Id. at 373.
153.
Davis v. Miami-Dade Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 469 F. Supp. 2d 1190,
1195 (S.D. Fla. 2006).
154.
See id.
155.
Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc., 825 F.2d at 373.
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Even though a TNC is “not a common carrier, contract carrier, or
motor carrier,” eliminating the statutory application provided, the TNC law
allows airport and seaport authorities to charge reasonable pickup fees.156
The pickup fees must be “consistent with any pickup fees charged to taxicab
companies at that airport or seaport for their use of the airport’s or seaport’s
facilities.”157 In comparing the benefits conferred to TNCs and taxicabs—
one being the “prime curbside real estate when it comes to picking up
passengers” that taxis and other ground transportation have access to in
comparison to the designated locations that TNCs are limited to—there are
substantial advantages to both.158 Taxicabs, unlike TNCs—which are
solicited via smartphone application—rely on street hails or, in the case of
airport pickups, hails made at the taxicab stand.159 But, TNCs do not have to
wait around in lines to pick up passengers.160 Furthermore, taxicabs do not
pass on the pickup fee to the rider, unlike TNCs; thus, profitability of taxicab
companies are affected whereas TNCs are not.161
It is presumed, by the plain and ordinary meaning of the statute’s
text, that the Legislature intended to give airport authorities leeway in setting
the fee amount because the terms reasonable and consistent with are
imprecise.162 But with the phrase consistent with being used to set the
relationship between two monetary amounts, of which the baseline number is
less than $5, it should not result in too big of a difference.163 However, when
156.
Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(2), (15)(b), 2017 Fla. Laws 3,
11 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 627.748).
157.
Id. § 1(15)(b), at 11. The preemption exception provided in Florida’s law
is as follows:
(b) This subsection does not prohibit an airport or seaport from charging reasonable
pickup fees consistent with any pickup fees charged to taxicab companies at that
airport or seaport for their use of the airport’s or seaport’s facilities or prohibit the
airport or seaport from designating locations for staging, pickup, and other similar
operations at the airport or seaport.

Id.
158.
See Douglas Hanks, Transportation – Uber Getting Special Zone at
Miami International Airport, MIAMI HERALD (Fla.), May 17, 2016, at 6A; Douglas Hanks,
Taxis Suing Miami-Dade for $1 Billion over New Uber Law, MIAMI HERALD (May 4, 2016,
12:41
PM),
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miamidade/article75555187.html [hereinafter Taxis Suing Miami-Dade].
159.
See Taxis Suing Miami-Dade, supra note 158.
160.
Id.
161.
See Will Robinson, Uber and Lyft Expand Statewide, Thanks to New
Florida Law, BIZJOURNALS: JACKSONVILLE BUS. J. (July 10, 2017, 10:38 AM),
http://www.bizjournals.com/jacksonville/news/2017/07/10/uber-and-lyft-expand-statewidethanks-to-new.html.
162.
Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(15)(b), 2017 Fla. Laws 11;
Auslen et al., supra note 23.
163.
See Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(15)(b), 2017 Fla. Laws
11; Robinson, supra note 161 (explaining the airport rates set across some of Florida’s airports
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these nominal amounts are applied to the volume of rides currently given,
and the exponential growth rate of TNC rides at airports, they amount to
large sums of money.164 Ultimately, despite the potential disparity in the
total amount paid, mandating airports to align the fees charged to TNCs with
those of taxicabs, fits squarely into the benefits and extent of use formulation
previously used by the courts.165 Furthermore, in setting different regulatory
frameworks applicable to different users, the airport authorities do not need
to “achieve perfection or mathematical exactitude,” which is in line with the
statutory text in Florida’s TNC law.166
Moreover, the criteria set by Florida’s TNC law on airport pickup
fees is in accordance with the limited input from the FAA on nonThe FAA, in reference to the self-sustaining
aeronautical fees.167
requirement for receipt of grants, has provided that “[f]air market fees for use
of the airport are required for non-aeronautical use of the airport.”168 Though
the FAA guidance is centered more on market fees for rental rates of airport
facilities, it could be construed to have a general application on airport
facilities for non-aeronautical use as a whole.169 For instance, a TNC law
expressly requires that the fees charged at airports must be in line with FAA
regulations.170 In general, the self-sustaining assurance tied to FAA grants
goes hand in hand with airports charging competitive market-based pricing
for all non-aeronautical fees.171 Such fees “can be determined by reference
to negotiated fees charged for similar uses of the airport,” which is precisely
the criteria provided in Florida’s TNC law.172

are as follows: “Miami International Airport currently charges $2, Fort LauderdaleHollywood International Airport charges $3, Palm Beach International charges $2.50, Tampa
International Airport charges $3.”).
164.
See Video clip: Univision Report, supra note 145, at 2:15–2:25.
165.
See Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Sarasota-Manatee Airport Auth., 825 F.2d
367, 371–72 (11th Cir. 1987).
166.
Id. at 371; see also Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(15), 2017
Fla. Laws 11.
167.
See Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(15)(b), 2017 Fla. Laws
11; FED. AVIATION ADMIN., ORDER 5190.6B, FAA AIRPORT COMPLIANCE MANUAL: CHAPTER
17-SELF-SUSTAINABILITY (2009).
168.
FED. AVIATION ADMIN., supra note 167.
169.
Policy and Procedures Concerning the Use of Airport Revenue, 64 Fed.
Reg. 7696, 7721 (Feb. 16, 1999) (explaining that self-sustaining assurance extends to the
airport receiving fair market value for providing non-aeronautical facilities and services).
170.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 58-23-1710(c)(1) (2016); Policy and Procedures
Concerning the Use of Airport Revenue, 64 Fed. Reg. at 7710.
171.
See 49 U.S.C. 47107 (2012); FED. AVIATION ADMIN., supra note 167.
172.
FED. AVIATION ADMIN., supra note 167; see also Act effective July 1,
2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(15), 2017 Fla. Laws 11.
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WHY FLORIDA’S TNC LAW GIVES TNCS A FREE RIDE

Potential Issues: Oversight

The TNC driver requirement provision, included in the bi-annual
research report, is the most important safeguard of the public, because before
the TNC driver can begin driving, the driver must submit: an application
containing basic personal and vehicle information to the TNC, a local and
national background check is conducted by the TNC or third-party, and a
driving history research report is obtained and reviewed.173 The law
prohibits TNCs from authorizing a TNC driver to operate if the information
obtained on the driver through the background check reveals certain
convictions and driving infractions.174 But since the TNC’s compliance with
the provision would not be confirmed until the bi-annual check, the TNC’s
non-compliance could expose riders and other drivers to harm, especially
because the law leaves it up to the TNC or a third-party not specified in the
law’s text, to conduct the criminal and driving check.175 The foregoing state
conducted background checks revealed the degree of confidence state
legislators have in TNCs, which have been shown to be a mistake.176
Furthermore, the law mandates that TNCs retain individual ride records and
driver records for one year after the date of the ride and for one year after the

173.
Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(11), 2017 Fla. Laws 8; see
also Adam Vaccaro & Dan Adams, Thousands of Current Uber, Lyft Drivers Fail New
Background Checks, BOS. GLOBE (Mass.), Apr. 5, 2017, at A1.
174.
Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(11)(d), 2017 Fla. Laws 9. If
an initial or subsequent background check of a prospective driver reveals any of the following,
the TNC may not authorize the driver to operate on the TNC’s platform:
1. Has been convicted, within the past 5 years, of:
a. A felony;
b. A misdemeanor for driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol, for reckless
driving, for hit and run, or for fleeing or attempting to elude a law enforcement
officer; or
c. A misdemeanor for a violent offense or sexual battery, or a crime of lewdness or
indecent exposure under chapter 800;
2. Has been convicted, within the past 3 years, of driving with a suspended or
revoked license;
3. Is a match in the National Sex Offender Public Website maintained by the United
States Department of Justice;
4. Does not possess a valid driver license; or
5. Does not possess proof of registration for the motor vehicle used to provide
prearranged rides.

Id.
175.
See id. § 1(11)(a)(2), (b) at 8–9 (requiring TNCs to conduct background
checks for TNC drivers every three years); Vaccaro & Adams, supra note 173 (stating that
Uber conducts criminal background checks on its drivers twice a year).
176.
See Vaccaro & Adams, supra note 173.
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date that a TNC driver’s relationship with the TNC ends, respectively.177 If a
bi-annual compliance check were to reveal non-compliance regarding driver
authorization one year after a bi-annual check, relevant ride records or driver
records—or both—would not, by law, be required to be maintained by the
TNC.178
B.

Lack of Economic Support

Before Florida enacted its TNC law, most of the local governments
in the state had put together TNC regulations that allowed the companies to
operate legally.179 Though the local regulations had created “a patchwork of
local regulations that were in conflict to each other,” the regulations, in
general, provided the local governments that would be enforcing the
operation of TNCs with funds to defray the administrative and operational
oversight required.180 Miami-Dade County adopted a TNC license fee of $26
per vehicle that generated about $1.8 million for the County.181 Similarly,
Hillsborough County came to an agreement with Uber and Lyft to pay
$250,000 and $125,000 in annual fees, respectively.182 However, Florida’s
TNC law excludes any permit, fee, or license requirements for TNCs to
operate, except for pickup fees at airports.183
The preemption provision in Florida’s TNC law states that “TNCs,
TNC drivers, and TNC vehicles are governed exclusively by state law,
including in any locality or other jurisdiction that enacted a law or created
rules governing TNCs, TNC drivers, or TNC vehicles before July 1, 2017;”
essentially eliminating all local regulations, including licensing requirements
enacted before the law’s effective date.184 The law further prohibits local
governments from imposing any future economic or administrative
regulation on TNCs.185

177.

Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(14)(a)–(b), 2017 Fla. Laws

11.
178.
See id. § 1(11)(d), (14)(a)–(b), at 9, 11.
179.
See Auslen et al., supra note 23.
180.
See id.; e.g., Garin Flowers, Hillsborough Reaches Deal with Uber, Lyft,
WTSP (Nov. 9, 2016, 11:25 PM), http://www.wtsp.com/news/local/hillsborough-reachesdeal-with-uber-lyft/350501652.
181.
CHARLES ANDERSON, OFFICE OF COMM’N AUDITOR, BOARD OF COUNTY
COMMISSIONERS
MEETING
4
(May
3,
2016,
9:30
AM),
http//:www.miamidade.gov/auditor/library/2016-05-03-board-of-county-commissioners.pdf;
Auslen et al., supra note 23.
182.
Flowers, supra note 180.
183.
Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(15)(a), 2017 Fla. Laws 11.
184.
Id.
185.
See id.
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A county, municipality, special district, airport authority, port
authority, or other local governmental entity or subdivision may
not:
1. Impose a tax on, or require a license for, a TNC, a TNC driver,
or a TNC vehicle if such tax or license relates to providing
prearranged rides;
2. Subject a TNC, a TNC driver, or a TNC vehicle to any rate,
entry, operation, or other requirement of the county, municipality,
special district, airport authority, port authority, or other local
governmental entity or subdivision; or
3. Require a TNC or a TNC driver to obtain a business license or
any other type of similar authorization to operate within the local
186
governmental entity’s jurisdiction.

Florida is not the only state that does not charge TNCs an upfront
annual cost to operate, but is one of the few among comparable states not
to.187 The decision to not impose any administrative or operational costs on
TNCs foregoes source funds for local governments that could have been
allocated to defray costs associated with the significant and increasing
presence of TNCs across the state.188 Like airports, local governments must
harmonize capital expenditures with available and potential sources of funds,
but unlike airports, local governments were not afforded the same discretion
under Florida’s TNC law.189 An analysis provided by the House of
Representative Staff concluded that as a result of the revenue elimination
from fees imposed on TNCs by local governments after the law’s
preemption, local governments “will experience an indeterminate, but likely
insignificant, negative fiscal impact.”190 The same report concluded that the
airport preemption exception “may provide a positive fiscal impact to

186.
Id.
187.
See GOODIN & MORAN, supra note 2, at 7–8; BRUCE SCHALLER,
UNFINISHED BUSINESS: A BLUEPRINT FOR UBER, LYFT AND TAXI REGULATIONS 3 (2016),
http://schallerconsult.com/rideservices/blueprint.pdf; Robinson, supra note 161.
188.
See Auslen et al., supra note 23; Tan, supra note 121.
189.
See Auslen et al., supra note 23; Kevin Spear, Orlando Airport Officials
OK $350 Million Price Hike for New Terminal, ORLANDO SENTINEL (June 21, 2017, 4:50
PM),
http://www.orlandosentinel.com/travel/news/os-airport-terminal-cost-vote-20170621story.html. At Orlando International Airport in Florida, airport officials met and approved a
$350 million cost increase in the construction of a new terminal; in that same meeting,
officials set TNC pick up fees at $5.80, which is the highest fee in the United States and
significantly higher than the $3.30 charged to on-demand taxi services. Uber, Lyft Pick Up
Now Allowed at Orlando Airport, CBS MIAMI (June 22, 2017, 2:26 PM),
http://miami.cbslocal.com/2017/06/22/ubert-lyft-pick-up-now-allowed-at-orlando-airport/.
190.
Fla. H.R. Comm. on Transp. & Infrastructure, HB 221 (2017) Staff
Analysis 8 (Feb. 14, 2017).
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airports;” the assertion has proved accurate in 2016, Miami International
Airport received over $2 million from Uber in pickup fees.191
VI.

CONCLUSION

The arrival of TNCs to the Sunshine State has been a blessing for
some; for others, it has been a lesson in how dynamic, technology-driven
business can disrupt and cripple an established player in an established
market.192 For local and state lawmakers, it is only one of the many
regulatory battles to come as technology companies continue to emerge and
disrupt outdated regulations.193 No longer should legislators be reluctant
adopters of new technologies and businesses in an effort to save the old
because “[w]ere the old deemed to have a constitutional right to preclude the
entry of the new into the markets of the old, economic progress might grind
to a halt.”194
Whether Florida’s TNC law will be considered an example of a
successful statewide TNC regulation remains to be seen.195 What the law
provided—much to the satisfaction of the TNCs—was rational insurance
requirements, parameters on TNC driver authorizations that mirrored those
the TNCs currently had in effect, minimal administrative and regulatory
costs, and oversight limited to a bi-annual retroactive compliance check.196
The law is extremely favorable to TNCs, but it ultimately enables thousands
of Floridians to gain a supplemental income, allows millions to continue
utilizing their preferred means of transportation, and injects millions of
dollars into Florida’s airports, but nothing into the municipalities whose
infrastructures and resources feed the exponential growth of TNCs.197

191.
Id. at 9; Video clip: Univision Report, supra note 145, at 2:15–2:25.
192.
See Douglas Hanks & Rene Rodriguez, For Uber, Loyal Drivers and a
New Fight for Benefits, MIAMI HERALD (May 21, 2015, 4:17 PM),
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/business/article21599697.html.
“Since the company
launched in Miami-Dade in June 2014, more than 10,000 active driver-partners have taken
home more than $30 million through more than three million rides the company said this week
— net which [does not] include above the company’s commission, typically less than [twenty]
percent.” Id.; see also Video clip: Univision Report, supra note 145, at 2:08–2:47.
193.
See Ducassi, supra note 26.
194.
Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 16, Miadeco Corp. v.
Miami-Dade Cty. No. 16-21976-CIV (S.D. Fla. Apr. 10, 2017) (quoting Ill. Transp. Trade
Ass’n v. City of Chi., 839 F.3d 594, 597 (7th Cir. 2016).
195.
See SCHALLER, supra note 187, at 18.
196.
Act effective July 1, 2017, ch. 2017-12, § 1(7)–(9), (11)(e) 2017 Fla.
Laws 4–8; Robinson, supra 161.
197.
See Video clip: Univision Report, supra note 145, at 2:20–3:29; Ducassi,
supra note 26.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The State of Florida and the United States of America, by and large,
have experienced significant prison overcrowding, which has led to the
development of various sentencing options.1 The criminal justice system has
become increasingly punitive, but many states have not abandoned the idea
of rehabilitation as an important goal, especially for juvenile and youthful

*
John Patrikis earned his bachelor’s degree in Political Science at Florida
State University and is a current Juris Doctor Candidate for May 2019 at Nova Southeastern
University, Shepard Broad College of Law. John would like to thank his family and friends
for their tremendous amount of support during his time pursuing a career in law. He would
also like to thank the Honorable Judge Nushin Sayfie for inspiring him to pick this topic
through his experience as a Judicial Intern. Additionally, John would like to give a special
thanks to his fellow colleagues of the Nova Law Review for their dedication to this Comment.
1.
FLA. STAT. § 958.04(4) (2016); Carol Ann Nix, Boot Camp/Shock
Incarceration — An Alternative to Prison for Young, Non-Violent Offenders in the United
States, 28 PROSECUTOR 15, 15 (1994).
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offenders.2 Some state statutes continue to present a commitment to
rehabilitation by including practices and programs promoting the best
interest of young offenders through services meant to create productive, lawabiding citizens.3 The Supreme Court of the United States has established
that young people uniquely possess an “antithetical—constitutional ‘right to
a meaningful opportunity to be rehabilitated.’”4 “This right is based on the
Court’s identification of adolescents as . . . singularly amenable to
rehabilitation,” which designates them as a separate class from adults.5
“Where punishment entails the purposeful inflict[ing] of suffering upon its
recipient, rehabilitation involves a beneficent response aimed at overcoming
unwelcome aspects of its recipient’s life.”6
Faced with the growing issue of prison overcrowding and juvenile
crime, lawmakers developed intermediate sanctions “to fill the gap between
regular probation and prison.”7 One type of intermediate sanction is boot
camp or shock incarceration.8 Boot camp programs have various names in
different states including: “Special Alternative Incarceration, . . . Basic
Training Program, . . . Regimented Inmate Discipline, . . . and Challenge
Incarceration,” among others.9 Boot camp programs are considered a
“constructive approach to . . . rehabilitation. . . . [and are] modeled after
military basic training.”10 These programs are designed for young offenders
who have been convicted of a felony and would be facing prison time
without this rehabilitative option.11 Studies show that “public support for
intermediate sanctions like boot camps is high when applied to [youthful],
nonviolent offenders.”12 Typically, these programs last between “three to six
months, depending on the state.”13 “Brief confinement in a boot camp”
program serves the purpose of shocking participants and teaching the “harsh
2.
Martin Gardner, Youthful Offenders and the Eighth Amendment Right to
Rehabilitation: Limitations on the Punishment of Juveniles, 83 TENN. L. REV. 455, 504
(2016).
3.
Id. at 504–05.
4.
Id. at 458–59. Supreme Court cases have classified capital punishment
and life sentences without parole for juvenile offenders as cruel and unusual under the Eighth
Amendment, which makes them a distinct class from adults. Id. at 458–60.
5.
Id. at 459–60.
6.
Gardner, supra note 2, at 466.
7.
Nix, supra note 1, at 15.
8.
Id.
9.
Id. at 15–16.
10.
Id. at 16.
11.
Id.
12.
Jamie E. Muscar, Advocating the End of Juvenile Boot Camps: Why the
Military Model Does Not Belong in the Juvenile Justice System, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. &
POL’Y 1, 3 (2008).
13.
Nix, supra note 1, at 16.
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reality of prison life without subjecting them to long prison sentences and
direct contact with hardened criminals.”14 Promising programs across the
country include non-military rehabilitative services, as well as including
forming close relationships with department staff and other participants,
providing “education, vocational training, counseling, . . . drug treatment,
and creating a structured environment.”15 Rehabilitation boot camp
programs give young offenders “one last chance to change his or her
criminal way of life” and puts the offender in the proper state of mind and
body to make a commitment to personal growth.16 Some of the many
objectives are to instill “self-discipline, self-responsibility, self-respect, selfesteem, self-motivation, and . . . work ethic.”17 “Boot camps are not
designed to graduate model citizens. They are designed to provide young
offenders with a sound foundation upon which to build new lives.”18
This Comment will evaluate the history, effectiveness, costs, and
practices of boot camp rehabilitation programs to consider if the State of
Florida should embrace this type of rehabilitation for juvenile and youthful
offenders.19 Furthermore, it will explain the Florida statutory process and
regulations that all programs must abide by within the state.20 Finally, this
Comment will discuss the final standing boot camp rehabilitation program in
Florida to view its progress and determine if Florida should expand the
resources put into rehabilitation boot camp programs for youthful
offenders.21
II.

FLORIDA STATUTES

Florida statutory law provides the standards for the process of
allowing an offender to replace a sentence with an alternative sanction.22
Florida statutes also provide the requirements for an offender to be classified
as a youthful offender, and the process of enrollment in a rehabilitation basic
training program.23 In order to serve the statute’s purpose of alleviating
extreme prison overcrowding, the particular rehabilitative methods and

14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

Id.
Muscar, supra note 12, at 4.
Nix, supra note 1, at 16.
Id.
Id.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part IV.
See FLA. STAT. § 921.0026 (2016); FLA. STAT. § 958.045 (2016).
See FLA. STAT. § 958.04 (2016); FLA. STAT. § 958.045.
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programs are detailed within the statute along with policies used after
successful completion of the program to limit and track recidivism. 24
A.

Downward Departure and Judicial Disposition

According to section 921.0026 of the Florida Statutes, “[a]
downward departure from the lowest permissible sentence . . . is prohibited
unless there are circumstances or factors that reasonably justify the
downward departure.”25 One of the listed mitigating circumstances, that
reasonably justifies “departure from the lowest permissible sentence,” is a
defendant being sentenced as a youthful offender.26 Pursuant to section
958.04 of the Florida Statutes:
The court may sentence [any person] as a youthful
offender . . . [w]ho is at least [eighteen] years of age or who has
been transferred for prosecution to the criminal division of the
circuit court, . . . [any person w]ho is found guilty of or . . .
tendered . . . a plea . . . to a crime that is . . . a felony if the
offender is younger than [twenty-one] years of age at the time [the]
sentence is imposed, and [any person w]ho has not previously been
classified as a youthful offender. . . . [A] person who has been
found guilty of a capital or life felony may not be sentenced as a
27
youthful offender . . . .

Furthermore, the statute allows the court to place a youthful offender
into the custody of the department for a period of less than six years, and the
commitment cannot surpass the maximum sentence for the convicted
offense.28
If an offender successfully participates in the youthful offender
program, the court may modify the sentence or provide “early termination of
probation, community control, or the sentence at any time prior to the
scheduled expiration of [the] term.”29 If the court modifies a sentence and
imposes probation or community control, the duration—including the term of
incarceration—cannot exceed the original sentence.30 According to the
statute, prison overcrowding is an emergency situation and the creation of a

24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

See FLA. STAT. § 958.04; FLA. STAT. § 958.045.
FLA. STAT. § 921.0026(1).
Id. § 921.0026(2).
FLA. STAT. § 958.04(1)(a)–(c).
Id. § 958.04(2)(d).
Id.
Id.
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basic training program is “necessary to aid in alleviating” this extremely
problematic issue.31
B.

Youthful Offender Basic Training Program

Florida Statute section 958.045 gives the department authority to
“implement a basic training program for youthful offenders.”32 Youthful
offenders enrolled in the basic training program must actively participate for
at least 120 days.33 “The program shall include marching drills, calisthenics,
a rigid dress code, manual labor assignments, physical training with obstacle
courses, training in decision making and personal development, high school
equivalency diploma and adult basic education courses, and drug counseling
and other rehabilitation programs.”34 In order to be enrolled into the
program, an offender must be screened to ensure they are capable of
participating in the physically demanding activities of the program and must
not have a prior incarceration.35 During the screening, “the department
[must] consider the offender’s criminal history and the possible rehabilitative
benefits of shock incarceration.”36 “If an offender meets the specified criteria
and space is available, the department [may] request . . . approval for the
offender to participate in the basic training program.”37 According to the
statute:
The program shall provide a short incarceration period of
rigorous training to offenders who require a greater degree of
supervision than community control or probation provides . . . .
The program is not intended to divert offenders away from
probation or community control but to divert them from long
periods of incarceration when a short shock incarceration could
38
produce the same deterrent effect.

After being admitted into the program, each offender is given a full
substance abuse assessment to provide the department with the ability to
decide if substance abuse treatment is necessary for the offender’s
rehabilitation.39 Additionally, “each offender who has not obtained a high
school diploma [will] be enrolled in an adult education program designed to
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. § 958.04(4).
FLA. STAT. § 958.045(1) (2016).
Id.
Id. § 958.045(1)(a).
Id. § 958.045(2).
Id.
FLA. STAT. § 958.045(2).
Id. § 958.045(3).
Id. § 958.045(4).
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aid the offender in improving his or her academic skills and earning a high
school diploma.”40 The progress of each participant is repeatedly evaluated
to track improvements in educational and career skills.41 In the event that an
offender in the “program becomes [problematic and] unmanageable, the
department may revoke the offender’s gain-time and place the offender in
disciplinary confinement for up to [thirty] days.”42 Once the disciplinary
process is completed, the offender may continue to participate in the program
unless they were disciplined for an act or threat of violence.43 In the case of
a termination from the basic training program, the offender is removed and
must complete their original sentence in the general population.44
After completion of the basic training program, successful
participants are sent to a community residential program where they will stay
for a term decided by the department.45 “If the . . . program director
determines that the offender is not suitable for the community residential
program but is suitable for an alternative post release program, . . . within
thirty days prior to program completion the department [may] evaluate the
offender’s needs and determine an alternative post-release program or
plan.”46 During the community residential program, the offender must be
employed and pay restitution to the victim of the offense.47 After they are
released from the community residential program, offenders are put on
probation, or post-release supervision, and must comply with various
conditions.48 Successful offenders may also continue their unfinished
educational programs after their release.49
Furthermore, the statute requires “[t]he department [to] provide a
special training program for staff selected for the basic training program.” 50
The statute also states that the department can incentivize activities to
encourage active participation and dedication to the program.51 Lastly, the
statute requires the department to track recidivism of the offenders after they
are released to compile statistics on rearrests and recommitment.52

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

Id.
Id.
FLA. STAT. § 958.045(5)(a).
Id.
Id.
Id. § 958.045(6)(a).
Id.
FLA. STAT. § 958.045(6)(b).
Id.
Id.
Id. § 958.045(10).
Id. § 958.045(13).
FLA. STAT. § 958.045(14).
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SHOCK INCARCERATION AND BOOT CAMP PROGRAMS

The correctional policies of the last 150 years can be described as a
“proverbial pendulum that swings back and forth” depending on prominent
political ideologies and practices of different time periods.53 An era of
optimism occurred in the 1950s and 1960s involving “a social movement
away from strictly punitive responses” and towards “interventions with
treatment, rehabilitation, and reintegration” practices.54 The Great Society
programs of this time period sought to “prevent and [change] criminal
patterns in early adulthood.”55 A major “goal was to avert and . . . mitigate
unlawful behavior” in young people before they became habituated to
crime.56 Adolescent and youthful offenders were thought to be more
responsive and malleable than adult offenders, which made them “the
primary targets of rehabilitati[on] services.”57 However, a rise in crime
occurred between 1960 and 1975 and consistently high crime rates through
the 1990s changed the country’s perspective.58 The accepted rhetoric was
that “lenient [rehabilitative] sanctions had encouraged more crime and . . . a
tougher response to law-breaking was” sought.59 During this time,
rehabilitation programs and practices were largely abandoned with a few
exceptions.60
The currently fashionable suggestion that society abandon efforts
to find more effective programs to rehabilitate offenders is, we
believe, irresponsible and premature. . . . The promise of the
rehabilitative ideal . . . is so compelling a goal that the strongest
possible efforts should be made to determine whether it can be
61
realized and to seek to realize it.

53.
Brent B. Benda, Introduction: Boot Camps Revisited: Issues, Problems,
Prospects, in REHABILITATION ISSUES, PROBLEMS, AND PROSPECTS IN BOOT CAMP 1, 7 (Brent
B. Benda & Nathaniel J. Pallone eds., Haworth Press, Inc. 2005).
54.
Id.
55.
Id.
56.
Id. at 7–8.
57.
Id. at 8.
58.
See Benda, supra note 53, at 8.
59.
Id. at 8.
60.
See id. at 11.
61.
Id. at 11 (quoting PANEL ON RESEARCH ON REHAB. TECHNIQUES, NAT’L
ACAD. OF SCIS., NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE REHABILITATION OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS 22 (Susan
E. Martin et al. eds., National Academy Press 1981)).
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History of Boot Camp Rehabilitation

The first boot camp program opened in Chester, Georgia in
December of 1983.62 This era was during a time period heavily focused on a
punitive response to crime rather than rehabilitation, however, boot camps
“promised both punishment and rehabilitation in the same sanction.”63
Momentum “for the development of boot camp[] [programs have] generally .
. . come from judges, governors, and legislators.”64 Boot camp programs
“enjoyed extensive favorable media coverage” for years after 1983, because
they portrayed themes that were consistent with the “popular demand for
harsh punishment, discipline, and deterrence.”65 Boot camp programs were
derived from previous correctional programs, including Scared Straight and
Shock Probation programs.66 Both of these programs were specifically
aimed at deterrence of crime, and Scared Straight programs attempted to
accomplish this “by causing juvenile offenders to fear prison through short . .
. performances staged inside [of] a prison by . . . groups of [intimidating]
inmates serving life sentences.”67 The Shock Probation method involved an
offender being confined in the general prison population for short periods of
time to experience the prison lifestyle firsthand.68 These programs were
similar to modern boot camp programs, in that “after serving the term, th[e]
remainder of the offender’s sentence [was] suspended and he [or she was]
placed on probation” or supervision.69
Another correctional program with roots in boot camp rehabilitation
includes Challenge programs for juveniles, which are modeled after Outward
Bound programs.70 Outward Bound programs were created to give offenders
“a physically and emotionally challenging experience,” which is structured
to test and expand the individual’s capabilities.71 The small group of
offenders, consisting of “[nine] to [twelve people] live together, act as a
team, and develop cooperative skills” to aid and motivate them to succeed
later in life.72 Similar to boot camp, physical challenges are not the goals in
themselves, but are used as an instrument through “which personal growth

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Nix, supra note 1, at 16.
Muscar, supra note 12, at 11; see also Benda, supra note 53, at 8.
Nix, supra note 1, at 16.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Nix, supra note 1, at 16.
Id. at 16.
Id.
Id.
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takes place.”73 Furthermore, as the program strives for personal growth,
these programs provide opportunities for offenders “to develop self-reliance
and trust in [their peers].”74 A prominent belief of youthful and juvenile
crime is that “delinquents suffer from deficiencies in problem-solving skills
and from dysfunctional views of self.”75 Due to this, the practice of physical
fitness is especially rehabilitative for youthful offenders because it “has a
significant impact on self-perception.”76 High self-esteem and selfconfidence increases motivation and correlates with performance variables
including academic grades and work responsibility.77 Research indicates that
youthful offenders who have successfully completed rehabilitative programs
have significantly lower recidivism rates than adult offenders.78
1.

Rise and Fall of Florida Boot Camp Programs

“Florida was one of the first states to embrace . . . boot camp[]”
rehabilitation after implementing a statute in 1989 allowing their operation,
and opening of its first juvenile boot camp program in 1992.79 In the mid1990s, Florida operated the most juvenile boot camps in the country with six
programs.80 Even though “criticism of the effectiveness of boot camp”
rehabilitation began around 1999 in Florida, most programs “continued to
operate until 2006.”81
A turning point in Florida’s boot camp programs “was the highly
publicized death of a fourteen-year-old boy at one of the camps.”82 “Martin
Lee Anderson was arrested for stealing his grandmother’s [vehicle and] . . .
was sent to boot camp after violating his probation for trespassing at
school.”83 In January of 2006, Anderson died at the program after he
collapsed while running laps, which led staff members to beat and mistreat
the young offender until he eventually died of suffocation.84 Initially, the
Florida Governor at the time, Jeb Bush, did not move to close the state’s boot

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id.
Nix, supra note 1, at 16.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Muscar, supra note 12, at 21.
Id. at 21–22.
Id. at 22.
Id.
Id.
Muscar, supra note 12, at 22.
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camp program, and instead, called the death one tragic incident.85 Months of
national coverage, and a growing concern about the safety of boot camps,
followed and led the Florida Legislature to terminate the programs. 86 These
highly publicized, but rare, incidents of abuse caused “a national trend to
move away from boot camps.”87 Specifically, because of changing public
opinion and unclear data on the effectiveness of boot camp programs,
legislators sought to reallocate funds used for rehabilitation elsewhere,
causing a lack of rehabilitation programs for youthful offenders throughout
the country.88
B.

Summary of Boot Camp Rehabilitation

In large, the specific methods and practices of boot camp programs
vary from state to state, depending on whether the program is punishment or
rehabilitation-based.89 “Punishment-centered boot camp [programs primarily
focus] on physical tasks and military training,” while rehabilitation-focused
programs place more emphasis on “supportive programs, such as education,
counseling, and drug treatment.”90 Boot camp programs for juvenile and
youthful offenders typically use elements from both.91 Most boot camp
rehabilitation programs begin at intake, and the arrival to the program is
described as a rude awakening for the participants.92 Many military-style
programs begin with a “ceremony where participants shave their heads” and
are organized into squads or platoons.93 During the course of the program,
the “participants engage in a rigid schedule . . . of strict discipline, hard
labor, drills, and physical training, simulating military basic training.”94 The
department staff also creates a “militaristic environment by requiring
participants to address the staff using military titles,” such as sir and ma’am,
and “requiring . . . the staff and participants to wear [appropriate military]
uniforms.”95 Some programs use intimidation and humiliation methods
during the beginning of the course to ensure that the participants take the
program seriously and are vulnerable to change, while others “prohibit[]
85.
Id. at 23 (quoting Parents Want Charges in Boot Camp Death, NBC NEWS
(Feb. 18, 2006, 4:26 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/11396434/#.WdLIX0dOGPsE).
86.
Id.
87.
Id. at 25.
88.
See id. at 20.
89.
Muscar, supra note 12, at 5.
90.
Id.
91.
Id.
92.
Nix, supra note 1, at 20.
93.
Muscar, supra note 12, at 6.
94.
Id. (footnote omitted).
95.
Id.
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verbal abuse and corporal punishment.”96 However, in most of the militarystyle rehabilitation boot camp programs, staff members make sure that they
get the offender’s attention and unambiguously show that they have control
over the participants.97 Intake may be frightening and eye-opening to the
participants, but “it is the only . . . way to strip away the old street attitudes”
that are common amongst the participants.98 Many of the offenders that are
enrolled into boot camp programs have low self-esteem and have few
accomplishments in their lives.99 Most have been raised without a structured
environment and have a lack of positive influences.100 The sometimes harsh
methods used are a last-chance attempt at reforming young criminals into
law abiding citizens by breaking them down to build them back up with
motivation and confidence.101
Rehabilitation programs, that are semi-militaristic and heavily
focused on supportive and positive rehabilitation, are the most successful in
terms of recidivism and impact on the offenders.102 Elements that have been
identified in successful correctional rehabilitation programs are “formal
rules, anti-criminal modeling and reinforcement, problem solving, use of
community resources, quality interpersonal relationships, relapse prevention
and self-efficacy, and therapeutic integrity.”103 Many of the methods used
are focused on psychological behavior modification.104 Some of the defined
target behaviors are “attention to detail, hygiene, attitude, communication,
and physical training.”105 Typically, the relationships formed between the
department staff and the participant plays a large role in offender
rehabilitation.106 Group support and teamwork are taught in all aspects of the
program, including “military drill and . . . group counseling sessions.”107
Other important qualities for rehabilitation, like problem solving, are taught
in an intensive supervision phase where offenders may “work, complete
community service, [take classes toward their education], and abide by a
Historically, offenders who successfully complete these
curfew.”108
programs display a deep loyalty to the program and the individuals who
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

See id. at 3, 5–7.
Nix, supra note 1, at 20.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 16, 20.
See Nix, supra note 1, at 2122.
Id. at 21.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Nix, supra note 1, at 21.
Id.
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aided in their rehabilitation.109 One of the most influential aspects of these
programs is the realization that the staff cares for them because many of the
participants have not experienced caring relationships before.110 It is
imperative that staff members push the offenders to put their full effort into
their progress and motivate them to have something to look forward to when
they graduate.111 The “key question in juvenile [and youthful offender]
justice is how to effectuate lasting psychological and behavioral changes that
will lead to rehabilitation and reduced recidivism.”112
Treatment programs offered by the department staff, as well as an
extensive aftercare phase, are essential for successful rehabilitation and must
not be overlooked.113 According to research on the topic, treatment
programs are successful if they “target offenders who are at risk for
recidivism, are modeled after cognitive-behavior theoretical models and are
sensitive to juveniles’ learning styles and characteristics, and address the
characteristics of youth directly associated with criminal activity.”114
Because of this, participants are most affected by plans that address their
individual history and needs.115 An offender who struggles with drug
addiction or abuse may benefit from supportive programs like drug abuse
counseling more than an offender whose lack of social skills are attributed to
the offense.116 Due to this, it is important that the particular characteristics
and histories of the offenders must be considered to maximize the
rehabilitative effects.117 Furthermore, aftercare and supervision programs are
especially beneficial in reducing recidivism for offenders with drug abuse
problems.118
1.

Importance of Aftercare on Recidivism

A major reason boot camp programs across the country have failed is
due to a lack of follow-up or aftercare for participants when they return to

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 20.
Id.
See id. at 20–21.
Muscar, supra note 12, at 38.
See id.
Id. (quoting DORIS LAYTON MACKENZIE ET AL., NIJ, A NATIONAL STUDY
COMPARING THE ENVIRONMENTS OF BOOT CAMPS WITH TRADITIONAL FACILITIES FOR JUVENILE
OFFENDERS 2 (2001), http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/187680.pdf).
115.
Id.
116.
Id. at 38–39.
117.
See Muscar, supra note 12, at 38–39.
118.
See id.
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the community.119 This conclusion is made from studies that have compared
the criminal activities of boot camp graduates who participated in aftercare
programs to those who have not.120 “[One] study compared the recidivism
[rates] of 337 offenders who received a mandatory [ninety]-day . . . aftercare
program to [the recidivism rate of] 383 offenders . . . who did not receive
[any sort of] aftercare.”121 Both of these groups participated in a six-month
boot camp program “modeled after military basic training but also included
an emphasis on [supportive] rehabilitation” methods and practices.122 This
study concluded that “[t]he offenders who received aftercare had
[significantly] lower recidivism than [the group that] did not.”123 The
statistics displayed that after one year of release, 16% of the group who
received aftercare reoffended, compared to the 21% rate for the group who
did not.124 Two years after the programs were completed, 22% of the
aftercare group reoffended while 33% of the group without aftercare
reoffended.125 These statistical differences emphasize the need for boot
camp programs to include follow-up practices to supervise the offenders and
ensure they stay on the right track.126 However, like most other aspects of
boot camp, aftercare practices can vary greatly between states and
jurisdictions, which lead to varying results.127
The specific aspects of aftercare programs have an impact on their
success in reducing recidivism.128 Supervision in itself may not be
significant enough to have an impact on recidivism; whereas, programs with
close supervision and individually tailored rehabilitation methods have more
success.129 A previous Florida boot camp program, in Pinellas County, had
staff members stay in contact with the participants for at least six months
after graduation to track their behavior and success in school.130 Another
example of an aftercare program that experienced success in recidivism is the
New York shock parole aftercare program.131 This program mainly

119.
See Doris Layton MacKenzie, Aftercare Following a Correctional
Bootcamp May Reduce Recidivism, 5 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 359, 359 (2006).
120.
Id.
121.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
122.
Id.
123.
Id.
124.
MacKenzie, supra note 119, at 359.
125.
Id.
126.
See id.
127.
Id. at 360; Muscar, supra note 12, at 41.
128.
See Muscar, supra note 12, 40–42.
129.
Id. at 41–42; see also Mackenzie, supra note 119, at 360.
130.
Muscar, supra note 12, at 41.
131.
See id.; Nix, supra note 1, at 19.
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consisted of “employment, drug treatment, and counseling opportunities.”132
One factor that likely contributed to this program’s success was the light
caseload of the officers assigned to the program.133 Two officers were
assigned to thirty graduates personally in order to individualize treatment and
more effectively supervise and monitor the graduates.134 While statistics are
often scarce and vary depending on many factors, the consensus is that
aftercare programs are a key aspect of successful rehabilitation, and the
specific practices and methods used by each program play a large role in the
results.135
C.

Goals of Boot Camp Rehabilitation

Besides the primary goal of rehabilitation for youthful offenders to
change their lives and reduce crime, other goals of boot camp rehabilitation
to consider are deterrence, punishment, incapacitation, and cost control.136
Generally, boot camp administrators use “rehabilitation, deterrence, and cost
control” as their primary goals, while the public and policymakers tend to
prioritize deterrence and punishment.137 The goals and purposes of boot
camp rehabilitation are similar to those of a traditional correctional facility,
but supporters believe boot camp programs are a better fit to meet these
goals.138 Legally, deterrence is considered in two ways: General and
specific deterrence.139
Specific deterrence refers to a sanction deterring the particular
individual punished, whereas general deterrence refers to
vicariously learning from seeing other people punished. The
assumption underlying shock incarceration is that the unpleasant
experience per se will be a potent disincentive to further
commission of unlawful behavior. Many boot camps are even
located in close geographical proximity to more traditional prisons
to emphasize the potential for serving hard time.140

A common belief among administrators, legislators, and the public is
that the harsh nature of boot camp will prevent recidivism of the
individual—specifically by providing a life-changing experience, while also
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Muscar, supra note 12, at 41.
Id.
See id. at 39–41.
Id. at 40–42.
Benda, supra note 53, at 4.
Muscar, supra note 12, at 9.
Id.
Benda, supra note 53, at 4.
Id.
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deterring the general public from committing crimes.141 The media coverage
of boot camps involving early wake-up calls, physical conditioning, and
yelling drill sergeants can cause young offenders who know of the possibility
of boot camp or prison to refrain from breaking the law.142
Punishment and incapacitation are also goals viewed favorably by
legislators and the public because of the retribution aspect and keeping
offenders out of the community until their desires for criminal behavior have
decimated.143 Punishment is defined as “impos[ing] unpleasantness upon a
person as a response to his or her commission of a wrongful act.”144 So long
as rehabilitation boot camp programs are successful, they provide a way to
incarcerate and punish young offenders in shorter periods of time, creating a
more effective way to meet the goals of the criminal justice system.145
Furthermore, boot camp programs can reduce prison overcrowding
and result in significant cost savings due to the considerably shorter
sentences of participants in the programs.146 According to the National
Institute of Justice, “[b]oot camps could reduce the number of prison beds
needed in a jurisdiction, which would lead to modest reductions in
correctional costs.”147 Conversely, boot camp programs have the potential to
widen the net, or to confine offenders who would otherwise be given
probation, which could lead to boot camp programs becoming as expensive
as prison.148 The primary reason boot camp numbers have dwindled across
the country is a result of economic concerns—widening the net may be a
reason for this because boot camp rehabilitation is more costly than
probation.149 It is also difficult to analyze the economic impact of these
programs because “states vary in [their budgets and] how they determine
costs.”150 Because of these economic concerns, it is imperative that states are
selective in determining enrollment of offenders, and someone who would
likely be given probation should not be enrolled to prevent unneeded costs.151
Overall, while it may vary from state to state, boot camp programs provide
an opportunity to lower costs on individual offenders and can be a benefit to

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id. at 4–5.
Id. at 5.
See id. at 6.
Gardner, supra note 2, at 464.
See Benda, supra note 53, at 6.
See Nix, supra note 1, at 22.
Benda, supra note 53, at 6–7.
Muscar, supra note 12, at 36–37; Nix, supra note 1, at 18.
See Muscar, supra note 12, at 36.
Benda, supra note 53, at 7.
See Muscar, supra note 12, at 36.
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the economy so long as the programs successfully rehabilitate the
offenders.152
D.

Controversy and Political Climate

The effectiveness and practice of military-style boot camp
rehabilitation has been a topic of debate for years and requires a
multidimensional analysis.153 Proponents of the programs believe that
rehabilitation, especially for youthful offenders, is a necessary and important
aspect of the criminal justice system.154 Most believe that while supportive
programs like drug counseling and education are crucial to their success, the
military aspect of the programs are also important to instill self-control and
discipline in the offenders and to ensure they are dedicated to changing their
way of life.155 Those opposed to the programs view the military aspect as
undermining rehabilitative efforts by putting the participants in an
environment of aggression and intimidation.156 Those against military boot
camp programs believe that the nonmilitary aspects are the reason some
programs have success and the military boot camp itself is inefficient and a
waste of already limited resources.157
The perceived problems facing boot camp programs are largely
based on individual programs rather than the effectiveness of boot camp
programs as a whole.158 Perhaps the most significant reason for the lack of
rehabilitation programs in the United States is inadequate, or lack of,
funding.159 Further, if programs are being questioned for effectiveness, they
often end up on the chopping block of budgets.160 Another cited problem
that has caused a political shift away from these programs is the potential for
abuse.161 Like the incident in Florida, there are cases of staff members
abusing offenders and causing significant injury, leading to the closure of
programs.162 Many citizens view military boot camps unfavorably due to
their perception that the military mentality may not be appropriate as a

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

See Benda, supra note 53, at 7; Nix, supra note 1, at 21–22.
Muscar, supra note 12, at 25.
See Nix, supra note 1, at 20–21.
Id. at 21; Muscar, supra note 12, at 8, 29–30.
Muscar, supra note 12, at 3.
Id. at 3–4.
See id. at 3, 25–26.
See Nix, supra note 1, at 18–19.
Muscar, supra note 12, at 19–20, 25.
Nix, supra note 1, at 18.
Muscar, supra note 12, at 19, 22–23.
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rehabilitation tool for young offenders.163
extreme initiation practice is as follows:

85

One example of a reported

You are nothing and nobody, fools, maggots, dummies . . . and
you have just walked into the worst nightmare you ever dreamed.
I [do not] like you. I have no use for you, and I [do not] give a . . .
who you are on the street. This is my acre, hell’s half acre, and it
matters not one damn to me whether you make it here or get tossed
out into the general prison population, where, I promise you, you
[will not] last three minutes before [you are] somebody’s wife. Do
164
you know what that means, tough guys?

While most programs prohibit the use of intimidation and
humiliation practices, and have become heavily regulated, many believe that
the risk of abuse in a hostile environment, such as this, is too great.165 A
potential problem with these practices is giving the participants a perception
that their environment is unsafe, which could potentially have an impact on
their rehabilitation.166 Furthermore, some critics believe that boot camp
practices and environments may be counterproductive because they could
create a hardened, more disciplined criminal.167 “One critic [stated] that
people go in feeling like Rambo and come out feeling a whole lot like
Another potential issue that must be considered by
Rambo.”168
administrators and legislators debating boot camp rehabilitation is limited
positive interactions with the staff.169 As previously stated, pro-social
interactions with department staff are crucial to a program’s success, and the
nature of these programs may limit this aspect of the rehabilitation.170
“[R]esearch [has] indicate[d] that there is a high rate of staff turnover in boot
camp[] [programs.]”171 In programs where this occurs, it would be difficult
for participants to bond with staff members, which is a rehabilitative aspect
boot camp programs are built on.172
Another perceived psychological issue with boot camp programs for
juvenile and youthful offenders is described by psychologist Dr. Marty Beyer
in her review of a pilot program.173 Dr. Beyer conducted research on
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Nix, supra note 1, at 18.
Muscar, supra note 12, at 30–31.
Id. at 23, 31.
Id. at 31–32.
Nix, supra note 1, at 18.
Id.
Muscar, supra note 12, at 31–32.
Id. at 32.
Id.
Id. at 4, 32.
Id. at 28.
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adolescent development and delinquent juveniles in boot camp programs.174
Her research presented the idea that adolescents “are fairness fanatics and
are ‘very sensitive to anything they perceive as unfair.’”175 Dr. Beyer was
concerned that participants would perceive the program as unfair, which
would lead offenders to be resistant to assistance.176 Her stance is that young
offenders respond to encouragement rather than punishment, and the
underlying attitudes and long-term behaviors are not changed from
punishment.177 There is a risk of offenders temporarily adjusting their
behavior in order to avoid unwanted punishment, but ultimately not being
rehabilitated once they are released from the program.178
While there are some perceived risks, boot camp rehabilitation
programs have, in their nature, a reliable source for the effectiveness of these
programs, the participants, and graduates themselves.179 Studies indicate
past participants strongly support boot camp programs and have a more
positive attitude about their situation than offenders in traditional detention
centers.180 One reason for this perceived satisfaction with boot camp
programs is the structured, safe environment compared to traditional
correctional facilities.181 Current boot camp participants also reported
feeling “less impulsive and less anti-social” than offenders in other
facilities.182 Studies indicate that participants perceive boot camps as caring
and just and more therapeutic.183 For example, a previous Florida boot camp
program that was in operation for twelve years before closing due to
economic reasons, left a lasting impact on many of its graduates.184 Five
years after the program’s closure, one graduate said that “his greatest
memory from the camp [was] the relationships he formed that changed his
life forever.”185 The graduate, Andre Edmonds, also reflected on what his
life would be like without having the opportunity of boot camp

174.
Muscar, supra note 12, at 28.
175.
Id. (quoting Michael Peters et al., BOOT CAMPS FOR JUVENILE OFFENDERS
8 (1997)).
176.
Id.
177.
See id.
178.
See id. at 28–29.
179.
See MACKENZIE ET AL., supra note 114, at 10–11; Christin Erazo, Five
Years After Closing, Martin County Boot Camp Leaves Legacy of Success, TCPALM (June 29,
2011), http://archive.tcpalm.com/news/five-years-after-closing-martin-county-leaves-legacyof-success-ep-385104747-344433722.html#.
180.
See Muscar, supra note 12, at 43; Erazo, supra note 179.
181.
Muscar, supra note 12, at 44–45.
182.
Id. at 44.
183.
Id. at 45.
184.
See Erazo, supra note 179.
185.
Id.
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rehabilitation.186 Edmonds, who is “now a [law-abiding] construction
worker in Coconut Creek,” stated, “[w]ithout the camp, [I would] be dead or
in prison; no doubt . . . . Kids who need that program are missing out.”187
This particular program served the Treasure Coast, Palm Beach, and
Okeechobee counties, and provided its young participants with structure and
education to earn high school diplomas.188 “[The program] was also
successful in [recidivism and] prevent[ed] about [eighty] percent of its
graduates, who were [not always] first-time offenders, from committing
[crimes in their future.]”189
The Martin County Florida program is another example of a
successful rehabilitation boot camp program for juvenile and youthful
offenders that closed for economic reasons.190 “Pam Roebuck, [the] assistant
state attorney in charge of Martin County’s juvenile division,” stated “[there
is] always a danger when the really good programs close . . . . State statistics
show—the boot camps—were the better programs; they were good
accountability partners.”191 Roebuck believes that the key to success of any
rehabilitation program must begin “with dedicated individuals who form
[positive] relationships” with offenders.192 A Martin County Sheriff, Robert
Crowder, commented on the program and stated “[w]e focused on education,
self-improvement and responsibility, and other good qualities we want to see
in young men . . . . People think boot camp is all about screaming and
hollering and doing push-ups; it was much more focused on developing the
individual.”193 Another Martin County Sheriff, Captain Lloyd Jones, worked
with young offenders at the boot camp program and also expressed the
importance of a dedicated staff.194
I just think we need better people working in the system . . . . It [is
not] the [boot camp] program, [it is] the people. To make people
responsible and hold them to those life skills, and care about
children and see these kids become successful, I think [that is] the
key to making any program successful. 195

186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

See id.
Id.
Id.
Erazo, supra note 179.
See id.
Id. (alteration in original).
Id.
Id.
Erazo, supra note 179.
Id.
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Captain Jones’ statement is consistent with the research that the
success of programs is largely based on the personal relationships formed
from the program and the dedication of the staff.196 At the end of the day,
boot camp rehabilitation programs must be viewed individually to determine
their effectiveness, and the now-closed Martin County program emphasized
that there is potential in these programs to meet their objective goals.197
IV.

CURRENT FLORIDA BOOT CAMP PROGRAMS

Currently, the State of Florida is down to one remaining
rehabilitation boot camp program.198 As a state that once embraced
rehabilitation and led the country in its amount of boot camp programs,
economic and budgetary concerns have caused all but one program to cease
operations.199 The last boot camp program in Florida is a county-operated
program in Miami-Dade County that has been successful with regards to
recidivism and public preference.200 However, this program has also been at
risk of closure for economic reasons as well, regardless of its success.201
Recently, this program has been popularized by celebrity endorsements and
published success stories.202 This program involves practices including a
“semi-military training regimen[t], [e]ducation and [j]ob [t]raining,” “[d]rug
[and] [l]ife [s]kills [c]ounseling,” and an extensive aftercare phase to reduce
recidivism.203

196.
See id.; Nix, supra note 1, at 20–21.
197.
See Muscar, supra note 12, at 25–26; Erazo, supra note 179.
198.
Marybel Rodriguez, Miami-Dade Boot Camp Graduation Marks
Reinstatement,
CBS
MIAMI
(Oct.
1,
2014,
6:30
PM),
http://miami.cbslocal.com/2014/10/01/miami-dade-boot-camp-graduation-marksreinstatement/.
199.
Id.; Muscar, supra note 12, at 21–23, 36.
200.
See Rodriguez, supra note 198.
201.
See id.
202.
Douglas Hanks, Miami’s Young Criminals Face Boot Camp—Plus HBO
Cameras and “The Rock”, MIAMI HERALD (Mar. 26, 2017, 4:51 PM),
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-dade/article140905753.html; Ari
Odzer, Miami-Dade Boot Camp Gets the Boot, NBC 6 SOUTH FLA. (Mar. 26, 2010, 6:30 AM),
http://www.nbcmiami.com/news/local/BOOT-CAMP-GETS-THE-BOOT-89175242.html.
203.
Order for Defendant’s Placement in Miami-Dade County Corrections &
Rehabilitation Department Boot Camp Program at 1–2, State v. Kemp, No. F16-12214C (Fla.
11th Cir. Ct. July 20, 2017).
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Miami-Dade Boot Camp Program

The Miami-Dade Boot Camp Program was opened in 1995 and has
enrolled over two thousand youthful offenders into the program ever since.204
Both young men and women can participate in the program if they are
classified as a youthful offender and are between the ages of fourteen and
twenty-four.205 Furthermore, “[t]o be eligible for the program, [participants]
cannot be convicted of rape or murder,” but many cadets “have been
convicted of charges such as resisting officers, possession of a controlled
substance, or grand theft, among others.”206 According to an order form used
to place defendants into the program, “[i]nmates are required to serve a
minimum of . . . 120 days at the camp as an alternative to prison or county
jail time, followed by [a two-month] [w]ork [r]elease” program, then finally
a ten-month aftercare.207 The program description lists the function of the
program and the objective goals the program serves to satisfy.208 These
goals are behavior modification, education and job training, work details, and
drug and life skills counseling.209 Behavior modification is used to “provide
a restructured life style patterned to reorient inmates [mentally] in a way
[that] best conforms to societal needs.”210 The educational programs
provided are “access to Adult Basic Education (“ABE”), General
Educational Diploma (“GED”), computer science training, college
preparation, and the [learning] of basic economic skills necessary for future
employment.”211 The inmates in the program also participate in community
service based activities.212 Finally, the program provides “drug counseling,
psychological counseling and training,” and training “in financial
management, employment applications, job management, and basic social
skills.”213
One component of the Miami-Dade Boot Camp Program “is the
structured semi-military training regimen,” which involves strenuous activity
204.
Odzer, supra note 202.
205.
Rodriguez, supra note 198.
206.
Maria Vizcaino, Boot Camp Program Offers Young Offenders Second
Chance, REPORTER: STUDENT NEWSPAPER MIAMI DADE C. (Jan. 18, 2017),
http://www.mdcthereporter.com/boot-camp-program-offers-young-offenders-second-chance/.
207.
Order for Defendant’s Placement in Miami-Dade County Corrections &
Rehabilitation Department Boot Camp Program, supra note 203, at 1–2.
208.
See id. at 1.
209.
Id.
210.
Id.
211.
Id.
212.
Order for Defendant’s Placement in Miami-Dade County Corrections &
Rehabilitation Department Boot Camp Program, supra note 203, at 1.
213.
Id.
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used to safeguard physical and psychological well-being for the
participants.214 In this phase of the program, the inmates participate in
sixteen weeks of military drills and practices, including push-ups and
“precise sequences for showering, meals, and bedtime.”215 The participants
also have their heads shaved, are woken up at 4 AM for jogs, and refer to the
department staff as sir and ma’am.216 Certain practices during this phase are
harsh and can be perceived as unfair.217 For example, one published practice
of the program is directing the inmates to “spend an hour making their beds, .
. . shining their shoes,” and following other demands of the staff just so drill
instructors can trash the rooms when the cadets leave.218 These practices are
not the focal point of the rehabilitation program, but are completed initially
during this phase as a tool for turnarounds.219 These practices are described
as “an exercise in internalizing injustices rather than acting rashly” and
potentially committing crimes.220 Acknowledging potential issues in the
criminal justice system, these methods can be used to teach emotional
control and how to resist responding in a situation where they are pulled over
by police and are being profiled in an unfair way.221 However, when it
appears that the cadet’s defenses have faded and they start to break down, the
“drill-instructor regime can shift into something softer” and more personal.222
When something like this happens, the staff will pull the participant aside
and ask about the participant’s life and family.223
While the semi-military regimen used during this first phase is
important to ensure the cadets are willing to be rehabilitated, the education
and job training, drug counseling, and aftercare supervision are crucial to the
success of this program.224 “Miami-Dade County is one of the nine sites
[nationally that is] awarded [a] $300,000 three-year grant called Project
Restart: Improved Reentry Education . . . from the U.S. Department of
Education . . . .”225 This grant pays for the cadets’ educational classes at a
local community college and GED classes for younger offenders who have

214.
Id.
215.
Hanks, supra note 202.
216.
Id.
217.
See id.
218.
Id.
219.
Id.
220.
Hanks, supra note 202.
221.
See id.
222.
See id.
223.
See id.
224.
See Order for Defendant’s Placement in Miami-Dade County Corrections
& Rehabilitation Department Boot Camp Program, supra note 203, at 1–2.
225.
Vizcaino, supra note 206.
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not obtained a high school diploma.226 Along with the educational aspect,
the life skills and job training aspects of the program motivate the inmates
and give them the skills needed to have something to look forward to once
they graduate.227 Upon completion of the first phase of the program, the
participants may be released on community control or probation to find
employment or further their education.228 “To ensure a successful probation
period, the boot camp staff holds an orientation where family members are
informed of the . . . conditions [their loved ones] must follow to graduate”
from the program.229
According to an order form, an example of the conditions that must
be completed in the second phase of the program are obtaining a GED at the
end of the term, a substance abuse evaluation, alcohol abuse evaluation, and
an overall health evaluation.230 Once the participant graduates to the third
phase of the program—the ten-month aftercare—they are still in the custody
of the department and must abide by department conditions.231 The cadets
“must call the facility three times a day and stay in school or find a job.”232
When boot camp participants leave the program, many go back into “the
same areas [and have] the same friends,” which can be problematic.233
Supervisors in this final phase of the program help keep the participants on
track and focused.234
Most importantly, the Miami-Dade Boot Camp Program has become
part of the success stories of thousands of Miami youth, and has been
successful in reducing recidivism.235 This program has an 11% recidivism
rate for their graduates, compared to the 27% of regular prison inmates who
reoffend.236 Largely because of the program’s success, it is also highly
regarded amongst local judges, sheriffs, and previous graduates.237 A local
judge and avid supporter of the program, Miami-Dade Circuit Court Chief
Administrative Judge Nushin Sayfie, stated, “[t]he [b]oot [c]amp program is
226.
See id.
227.
See Order for Defendant’s Placement in Miami-Dade County Corrections
& Rehabilitation Department Boot Camp Program, supra note 203, at 1; Nix, supra note 1, at
16.
228.
See Order for Defendant’s Placement in Miami-Dade County Corrections
& Rehabilitation Department Boot Camp Program, supra note 203, at 1, 5.
229.
Vizcaino, supra note 206.
230.
Order for Defendant’s Placement in Miami-Dade County Corrections &
Rehabilitation Department Boot Camp Program, supra note 203 at 1, 5.
231.
Id. at 2.
232.
Vizcaino, supra note 206.
233.
See id.
234.
See id.
235.
See Odzer, supra note 202; Rodriguez, supra note 198.
236.
Rodriguez, supra note 198.
237.
See Rodriguez, supra note 198.
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one of our success stories and a source of enormous pride . . . . When these
young men and women leave [b]oot [c]amp, they are completely new
individuals—respectful, confident, law-abiding, proud of themselves and
thankful for the chance they have been given.” 238 One success story comes
from current Florida Judge Jason Bravo, who owes his success to the MiamiDade Boot Camp Program.239 When Judge Bravo was seventeen-years-old,
he was going down the wrong path and was arrested for armed robbery.240
Bravo stated “[w]hat boot camp gave me was an opportunity . . . to better my
life and move forward from a mistake that happened as opposed to pretty
much rotting away in a jail cell.”241 After his graduation from the program,
Bravo went on to attend college at Florida International University, obtain a
law degree from Florida State University, and become an attorney at the
same office that prosecuted him before becoming a judge.242 Jason Bravo is
also an inspirational speaker at the program’s graduation ceremonies for the
cadets.243 The program is also endorsed by celebrity Dwayne The Rock
Johnson who appears in an HBO documentary on the program. 244 In a
speech to new cadets, Dwayne Johnson stated, “I know this [b]oot [c]amp
program. I believe in it . . . . I want the world to see how powerful this
program is.”245
Notwithstanding the success stories and lowered recidivism rates of
graduates, the Miami-Dade Boot Camp Program was facing closure to cut its
$4 million budget.246 Realizing the success of the last standing boot camp
rehabilitation program for youthful offenders, “Miami-Dade . . . Mayor
Carlos Gimenez found a one-time revenue to save the . . . program” from
closing.247 Regardless of the success of rehabilitation programs, these
programs always face uncertainty and the potential for closure due to limited
budgets.248 However, the Miami-Dade Boot Camp Program saves taxpayers
money over time by lowering expensive prison terms.249 For example, “[a]
five-year prison term costs taxpayers $86,690,” whereas “[t]he [sixteen]-

238.
Id.
239.
Odzer, supra note 202.
240.
Id.
241.
Id.
242.
Id.; Vizcaino, supra note 206.
243.
Vizcaino, supra note 206.
244.
Hanks, supra note 202.
245.
Id.
246.
Rodriguez, supra note 198.
247.
Id.
248.
See id.; Muscar, supra note 12, at 23, 25.
249.
Jim Defede, Last Chance:
Boot Camp, CBS
http://miami.cbslocal.com/last-chance-boot-camp/ (last visited Dec. 31, 2017).
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month boot camp [program] costs . . . $46,453.”250 While it still costs
approximately $4 million a year to operate, the program has the potential to
be cost effective over time, so long as it successfully rehabilitates the
inmates, which it has been proven to do.251
V.

CONCLUSION

Florida is a state that once led the country in rehabilitation boot
camp programs but has recently followed a trend away from rehabilitation
and is down to one remaining program.252 As discussed earlier, the reason
for this is not the lack of success in recidivism, but rather a result of
economic concerns and budget limitations.253 The success of these programs
is dependent on many factors, including pro-social relationships with staff
and peers, aftercare supervision upon release, and supportive programs for
education and job training among others.254 The current Miami-Dade Boot
Camp Program, and the everlasting impact previous Florida boot camp
programs have, left behind show that these programs have the potential to
lower crime rates and make a difference in the lives of thousands of youth.255
The juvenile and youthful offenders who enroll into rehabilitation
boot camp programs often have backgrounds lacking structure and
guidance.256 Many are headed down a life of crime that will only be
accelerated by going to prison and being influenced by hardened
criminals.257 The vicious cycle of crime starts at a young age, but young
people also bare the most potential for change and rehabilitation before their
lives become irreparable.258 With crime rates surging across the State and
country, a significant step in reducing crime can be accomplished through
rehabilitation of young offenders.259 The Miami-Dade Boot Camp Program
is an example of the impact these programs can have on young people by
providing positive influences and mentors, physical and mental conditioning
to improve perceptions of self, and an aftercare program that continues to

250.
251.
252.
253.

Id.
Id.
See Muscar, supra note 12, at 21–23, 25; Rodriguez, supra note 198.
Muscar, supra note 12, at 36; see also Rodriguez, supra note 198; supra

254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

See Nix, supra note 1, at 21; MacKenzie, supra note 119, at 359.
See Rodriguez, supra note 198; Erazo, supra note 179.
Nix, supra note 1, at 20.
See id. at 16.
See Gardner, supra note 2, at 459–60.
See Benda, supra note 53, at 8, 11; Erazo, supra note 179.
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motivate the offenders long after their graduation.260 So long as the
programs are operated similarly to proven programs like Miami-Dade, the
State of Florida should embrace boot camp programs and restart its effort to
lead the country in rehabilitation for juvenile and youthful offenders.261

260.
See MacKenzie, supra note 119, at 359; Nix, supra note 1, at 21;
Rodriguez, supra note 198.
261.
See Nix, supra note 1, at 21; Rodriguez, supra note 198.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol42/iss1/1
Published by NSUWorks, 2018

110
111

Nova Law Review,
et al.: Nova
Vol.Law
42, Iss.
Review
1 [2018], Art. 1

A VIOLATION OF THE ANTI-COMMANDEERING PRINCIPLE
AND SPENDING POWERS JURISPRUDENCE OR A VALID
EXERCISE OF FEDERAL POWERS? EXECUTIVE ORDER
13768 AND ITS EFFECTS ON FLORIDA LOCALITIES
DAVIDE MACELLONI*

I.
II.

III.

IV.

V.

VI.

INTRODUCTION................................................................................. 96
SANCTUARY JURISDICTIONS ............................................................ 98
A.
Historical Development: From Its Biblical Origin . . . ...... 98
B.
. . . To Its Modern American Application . . ..................... 100
C.
. . . And Its Contemporary Version ................................... 101
PRESIDENTIAL PROMISE ................................................................. 105
A.
Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the
United States ..................................................................... 106
B.
Section Nine—The Source of Discord............................... 107
C.
8 U.S.C. § 1373 ................................................................. 108
CONSTITUTIONALITY ISSUES ......................................................... 109
A.
Spending Clause ............................................................... 111
1.
Clarity of Intent .................................................... 113
2.
Nexus Requirement.............................................. 115
3.
Coercion ............................................................... 116
B.
Tenth Amendment Umbrella ............................................. 118
1.
Anti-Commandeering .......................................... 119
a.
ICE Detainers ......................................... 120
b.
Police Powers ......................................... 122
FLORIDA LOCALITIES ..................................................................... 129
A.
Miami-Dade County.......................................................... 132
1.
Lacroix v. Junior .................................................. 133
2.
Creedle v. Gimenez.............................................. 134
B.
What Does Federal Defunding Mean for Florida
Jurisdictions? .................................................................... 135
CONCLUSION .................................................................................. 136

Published by NSUWorks, 2018
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol42/iss1/1

111
112

et al.:Nova
NovaLaw
LawReview,
ReviewVol.
Full42,Issue
Iss. Volume
1 [2018],42,
Art.Issue
1 1

96

NOVA LAW REVIEW

I.

[Vol. 42

INTRODUCTION

On July 1, 2015, Kathryn Steinle was fatally shot on San Francisco’s
Embarcadero.1 The killing was by the hands of Juan Francisco LopezSanchez, an illegal alien convicted of multiple felonies, who had already
been deported from the United States on five different occasions.2 The
murder only added fuel to the fire of the immigration debate, shifting the
general public’s attention to immigration policies and enforcement.3 The
main object of discussion has since been sanctuary jurisdictions—and
sanctuary policies in general.4 An obscure object to most, sanctuary policies
define the relationship between states and local jurisdictions and the federal
government with regards to immigrant residents.5 Specifically, sanctuary
policies often limit cooperation with federal immigration enforcement
actions and are implemented by many of the largest cities in the country.6
However, perception of sanctuary policies varies among different sides of the
political spectrum.7 While some believe sanctuary policies foster criminal
*
Davide Macelloni received his B.A., summa cum laude, in Political
Science from Florida Atlantic University in 2014 and is a J.D. Candidate for May 2018 at
Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad College of Law. The author would like to
thank his wife, Jocelyne, for her unwavering support and unconditional love. He would also
like to thank his parents, Marcello and Giovanna, his sister, Laura, and his grandfather,
Claudio, for always believing in him and encouraging him, even from thousands of miles
away. The author also thanks his fellow associates and board members of the Nova Law
Review for their dedication to this Comment. Lastly, he dedicates this Comment to his
birthplace, Rome, Caput Mundi.
1.
Christina Littlefield, Sanctuary Cities: How Kathryn Steinle’s Death
Intensified the Immigration Debate, L.A. TIMES (July 24, 2015, 5:10 AM),
http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-immigration-sanctuary-kathryn-steinle20150723-htmlstory.html.
2.
Julia Preston, Murder Case Exposes Lapses in Immigration Enforcement,
N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 2015, at A10; David Bier, Kate Steinle and San Francisco’s “Sanctuary
City” Policy, CATO INST.: CATO LIBERTY (Apr. 27, 2017, 4:54 PM),
http://www.cato.org/blog/kate-steinle-san-franciscos-sanctuary-city-policy.
3.
See Jerry Markon, California Killing Inflames Debate on Illegal
Immigrants,
‘Sanctuary
Cities’,
WASH.
POST:
POL.
(July
6,
2015),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/calif-killing-inflames-debate-on-illegal-immigrantssanctuary-cities/2015/07/06/8dc6eb50-241e-11e5-b72c-2b7d516e1e0e_story.html.
4.
See Tal Kopan, What Are Sanctuary Cities, and Can They Be Defunded?,
CNN: POL. (Jan. 25, 2017, 5:09 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/25/politics/sanctuarycities-explained/index.html; Littlefield, supra note 1; Janell Ross, 6 Big Things to Know About
Sanctuary Cities, WASH. POST: FIX (July 8, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/thefix/wp/2015/07/08/4-big-things-to-know-about-sanctuary-cities-and-illegal-immigration/.
5.
See Kopan, supra note 4.
6.
Id.
7.
See Loren Collingwood et al., Sanctuary Cities Do Not Experience an
Increase
in
Crime,
WASH.
POST:
MONKEY
CAGE
(Oct.
3,
2016),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/10/03/sanctuary-cities-do-not-
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activities and hot-beds for gang violence and drug-trafficking, others affirm
the exact opposite, claiming sanctuary jurisdictions to be safer and more
cooperative with law enforcement.8 The Executive Branch of the federal
government interprets the issue in agreement with the former position.9
On January 25, 2017, the newly elected President of the United
States, Donald J. Trump, signed Executive Order 13768 titled “Enhancing
Public Safety in the Interior of the United States” (“Executive Order”).10
The Executive Order targets sanctuary jurisdictions in an attempt to foster
cooperation between federal and state law enforcement agencies in the fight
against illegal immigration.11 Sanctuary jurisdictions have in fact been
accused by the White House of defying United States Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) orders.12 The Executive Order specifically
targets violations of 8 U.S.C. § 1373, which forbids restrictions on the
sharing of information regarding citizenship or immigration status of
individuals with ICE.13
Advocates of the Executive Order argue that implementation of its
policies would improve the safety of citizens throughout the United States
and further allow a more efficient execution of federal laws and statutes
regarding immigration.14 Critics, on the other hand, argue that the Executive
Order infringes upon constitutional rights of state and local jurisdictions by
exercising powers—not constitutionally granted to the Executive Branch of
government—in violation of the fundamental principle of separation of

experience-an-increase-in-crime/; William Lajeunesse, Sessions Says When Cities Protect
Illegal Immigrants, ‘Criminals Take Notice’, FOX NEWS: POL. (July 12, 2017),
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2017/07/12/sessions-says-when-cities-protect-illegalimmigrants-criminals-take-notice.html.
8.
See Michelangelo Landgrave & Alex Nowrasteh, Criminal Immigrants:
Their Numbers, Demographics, and Countries of Origin, 2017 CATO INST.: IMMIGR. RES. &
POL. BRIEF 1–2; Lajeunesse, supra note 7.
9.
See Tami Luhby, Trump Condemns Sanctuary Cities, but What Are They?,
CNN: POL. (Sept. 1, 2016, 10:08 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/09/01/politics/sanctuarycities-donald-trump/.
10.
Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8799, 8803 (Jan. 25, 2017).
11.
See id. at 8799.
12.
See Michelle Ye Hee Lee, The White House’s Claim That ‘Sanctuary’
Cities Are Violating the Law, WASH. POST: FACT CHECKER (April 28, 2017),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2017/04/28/the-white-houses-claimthat-sanctuary-cities-are-violating-the-law/.
13.
8 U.S.C. § 1373 (1996); Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. at 8801.
14.
See Tal Kopan, House Passes ‘Kate’s Law’ and Bill Declaring War on
Sanctuary
Cities,
CNN:
POL.
(June
29,
2017,
6:30
PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2017/06/29/politics/kates-law-sanctuary-cities-house-billimmigration/index.html.
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powers.15 Critics, in fact, affirm that ordering Congress to withhold federal
funding, one aspect of the Executive Order, as punishment for the failure to
comply with federal immigration laws, is an unconstitutional form of
coercion in violation of the Tenth Amendment—which prohibits the federal
government from forcing states and local governments to enforce federal
laws.16
Jurisdictions across the country have responded differently to
President Trump’s Executive Order: Cities like Los Angeles and New York
promised to stand behind their sanctuary policies, while Miami-Dade County
retracted its sanctuary policy.17
Part II of this Comment will illustrate the historical development of
sanctuary jurisdictions from their biblical origin to the most recent
application in the western legal system, specifically in the United States.18
Part III introduces the language of the Executive Order and its connections to
the statute that it is designed to enforce.19 Part IV analyzes, in depth, the
possible constitutional challenges to the Executive Order, and the arguments
both in favor and against its constitutionality.20 Finally, Part V of this
Comment will consider the possible repercussions of the provisions within
the Executive Order in Florida, with particular attention paid to the South
Florida region, historically home to thousands of immigrants.21
II.
A.

SANCTUARY JURISDICTIONS

Historical Development: From Its Biblical Origin . . .

The concept of a sanctuary dates back to at least biblical times, and
was originally rooted in the power of religious authorities to grant protection
within an inviolable religious area or structure to persons fearing for their

15.
See Devin Watkins, 5 Ways Trump’s Anti-Sanctuary City Orders Are
Unconstitutional, TIME: LAW (Mar. 31, 2017), http://www.time.com/4720749/trumpsanctuary-cities-unconstitutional/.
16.
Id.; see also New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992).
17.
See Henry Goldman, Sanctuary-City Mayors Vow to Defy Trump After He
Threatens
Funding,
BLOOMBERG:
POL.
(Jan.
26,
2017,
8:00
AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-01-26/trump-threat-to-deny-funds-drawsdefiance-from-sanctuary-cities. But see Ray Sanchez et al., Florida’s Largest County to
Comply with Trump’s Sanctuary Crackdown, CNN: POL. (Jan. 27, 2017, 6:34 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2017/01/27/politics/miami-dade-mayor-sanctuarycrackdown/index.html.
18.
See infra Part II.
19.
See infra Part III.
20.
See infra Part IV.
21.
See infra Part V.
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lives or liberty.22 Sanctuary practices existed in many Western societies, and
were extensively used by ancient Hebrews after being freed from slavery in
Egypt.23 Sanctuary practices were further used in both ancient Greece and
Rome, with characteristics similar to the concept of asylum.24
While originally granting asylum for all crimes, with many temples
extending what was considered as divine protection, Greeks later reduced the
use of asylum to individuals who had committed unpremeditated crimes. 25
Contrarily, sacred edifices in Rome were not sanctuaries.26 In fact, Romans
only extended asylum to give immunity and protection from violence
throughout the inquisition process.27 Once judgment on the evidence was
rendered, the asylum would be revoked and punishment would be inflicted
on the defendant found guilty of a crime.28 With the emergence of
Christianity, the concept of sanctuary extended to a wider range of
individuals.29 In 303 A.D., Constantine’s Edict of Toleration granted
Christian churches permission to extend protection to fugitives.30 Sanctuary
was later recognized as a legal right through the promulgation of the
Theodosian Code by the emperor Theodosius in 392 A.D.31 Extensively
used in medieval times—enjoying recognition in both Canon law and Saxon
law—sanctuaries suffered as centralized governments increased throughout
Europe, and Church and State clashed over its control.32 Resulting from the

22.
Michael J. Davidson, Sanctuary: A Modern Legal Anachronism, 42 CAP.
U. L. REV. 583, 609 (2014); see also ANN CRITTENDEN, SANCTUARY 62 (1988); Michael Scott
Feeley, Towards the Cathedral: Ancient Sanctuary Represented in the American Context, 27
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 801, 802 (1990). “Sanctuary is the power of guardians of a defined
religious site to grant protections to one who seeks safety out of fear of life or limb.” Feeley,
supra at 802. Most ancient cultures, including Syrians and Phoenicians developed sanctuary
towns and temples. William C. Ryan, The Historical Case for the Right of Sanctuary, 29 J.
CHURCH & ST. 209, 211, 211 n.20 (1987).
23.
Ryan, supra note 22, at 211.
24.
See Jorge L. Carro, Sanctuary: The Resurgence of an Age-Old Right or a
Dangerous Misinterpretation of an Abandoned Ancient Privilege?, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 747,
751 (1986) (analyzing the “[n]on-[b]iblical [o]rigins of [w]estern [s]anctuar[ies]”).
25.
Id. (affirming that sanctuary would also be extended to a person “in
danger of cruel and summary vengeance”).
26.
Ryan, supra note 22, at 213–14.
27.
Carro, supra note 24, at 751.
28.
See id.
29.
Id. at 752.
30.
Davidson, supra note 22, at 587.
31.
Carro, supra note 24, at 752.
32.
Feeley, supra note 22, at 810; see also Ryan, supra note 22, at 216–18
(discussing in depth the rise of the sanctuary privilege in Anglo-Saxon society and its
development in English common law).
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schism between the English Crown and the Catholic Church, the privilege of
sanctuary came to an end in England in 1624.33
B.

. . . To Its Modern American Application . . .

In the United States, sanctuaries by religious authorities against civil
authorities were not invoked for almost 200 years.34 Prior to the American
Civil War, clergymen and members of religious communities offered aid to
slaves escaping bondage through an intricate system of routes known as the
Underground Railroad.35 Although activism in the Underground Railroad
was spread across religious figures and churches, no record exists of any
church invoking the right to sanctuary.36 The first instance of the modern
application of sanctuaries was during the Vietnam War, a military action that
was strongly opposed by the religious community, which offered safe havens
to draftees conscientiously resisting the draft.37 Although participants to the
movement made no claim asserting legal recognition, the renewed concept of
sanctuary was empowered by its characteristics of civil disobedience.38
The current sanctuary movement in the United States developed in
the 1980s when, after the enactment of the Refugee Act, “thousands of
immigrants from El Salvador and Guatemala” applied for asylum.39 As a
consequence of asylum applications being routinely rejected by federal
33.
Davidson, supra note 22, at 593; Feeley, supra note 22, at 810.
34.
IGNATIUS BAU, THIS GROUND IS HOLY: CHURCH SANCTUARY AND
CENTRAL AMERICAN REFUGEES 160 (1985); Davidson, supra note 22, at 594. Early colonial
history of the United States makes no mention of sanctuary privileges. BAU, supra at 159.
The inexistence of sanctuary privileges in the United States at the time was probably due to
the fact that pilgrims considered America as a sanctuary in its entirety, and therefore saw no
reason to formally adopt the privilege. Id. at 158–59; James H. Walsh & Mary Ellen O’Neill,
Sanctuary - A Legal Privilege or Act of Civil Disobedience?, FLA. B.J., Feb. 1987, at 11, 13.
35.
Davidson, supra note 22, at 594–95; see also Kathleen L. Villarruel, Note,
The Underground Railroad and the Sanctuary Movement: A Comparison of History,
Litigation, and Values, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1429, 1436, 1440–41 (1987) (drawing a thorough
comparison between the Underground Railroad movement of the 1840s and 1850s to the
sanctuary movement).
36.
Davidson, supra note 22, at 595.
37.
Id. at 597–98.
38.
Walsh & O’Neill, supra note 34, at 14.
39.
Rose Cuison Villazor, What Is a “Sanctuary”?, 61 SMU L. REV. 133, 139
(2008); see also Douglas L. Colbert, The Motion in Limine: Trial Without Jury—A
Government’s Weapon Against the Sanctuary Movement, 15 HOFSTRA L. REV. 5, 30–31
(1986). The two groundbreaking events igniting the civil war in El Salvador were the
assassination of Archbishop Oscar Romero of San Salvador, murdered while saying mass, and
the rape and murder of four American Catholic missionaries by National guardsmen. Colbert,
supra at 30–31 (explaining the unfolding of the sanctuary movement on behalf of Central
American immigrants in the United States).

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol42/iss1/1
Published by NSUWorks, 2018

116
117

Nova Law Review,
et al.: Nova
Vol.Law
42, Iss.
Review
1 [2018], Art. 1

2017]

A VIOLATION OF THE ANTI-COMMANDEERING PRINCIPLE

101

agencies, many churches across the country declared themselves sanctuaries
to offer refuge to immigrants and protest against the policies of the federal
government.40 In March of 1982, the Southside Presbyterian Church of
Tucson, Arizona, was the first to publicly announce itself as a sanctuary for
Central American immigrants fleeing war.41 In addition to offering
protection, the churches and religious communities involved in the
movement provided food, clothing, and legal services.42
Following the wave of sanctuary initiatives ignited by churches and
religious groups around the country, many local governments established
sanctuary policies.43 Sanctuary laws passed by cities and states generally
declared public places as sanctuaries.44 Jurisdictions that passed sanctuary
laws during the 1980s included cities—Seattle, Los Angeles, Minneapolis,
Chicago, Rochester—and states, including New Mexico, New York, and
Massachusetts.45
C.

. . . And Its Contemporary Version

Dissipating at the same pace as the political turmoil in Central
America, the sanctuary movement regained momentum in the wake of the
attack on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001.46 A few months
40.
Villarruel, supra note 35, at 1433; see also Feeley, supra note 22, at 820.
41.
Davidson, supra note 22, at 603.
42.
Villazor, supra note 39, at 141.
43.
Jennifer L. Gregorin, Comment, Hidden Beneath the Waves of
Immigration Debate: San Francisco’s Sanctuary Ordinance, 6 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 175, 182
(2011).
44.
Villazor, supra note 39, at 142 (affirming that laws were indicative of
political stands against federal immigration policies regarding the Central American crisis);
Huyen Pham, The Constitutional Right Not to Cooperate? Local Sovereignty and the Federal
Immigration Power, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1373, 1383 (2006) (stating that local governments
passed sanctuary laws allowing asylum-seekers to remain within their jurisdictions’
boundaries without threat of arrest for violation of federal immigration laws by local law
enforcement).
45.
Pham, supra note 44, at 1383; see also Jorge L. Carro, Municipal and
State Sanctuary Declarations: Innocuous Symbolism or Improper Dictates?, 16 PEPP. L. REV.
297, 311–12 n.88–97 (1989) (describing the extended implementation of sanctuary policies
across the country and listing, among others, Oakland, San Francisco, San Jose, and
Sacramento, California; Rochester and Ithaca, New York; and Cambridge, Massachusetts as
municipalities which also passed resolutions or city ordinances in favor of sanctuaries); Daniel
D. McMillan, Note, City Sanctuary Resolutions and the Preemption Doctrine: Much Ado
About Nothing, 20 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 513, 516–17 (1987) (affirming that the cities of
Berkeley, California, and Madison, Wisconsin, also passed resolutions establishing
themselves as “cities of refuge for Central American refugees”).
46.
Laura Sullivan, Comment, Enforcing Nonenforcement: Countering the
Threat Posed to Sanctuary Laws by the Inclusion of Immigration Records in the National
Crime Information Center Database, 97 CAL. L. REV. 567, 572 (2009).
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after the attack, answering concerns of the general public regarding national
security and immigration, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) released a
memorandum announcing the inherent authority of local officials to arrest
and detain illegal immigrants for both civil immigration and criminal
violations.47 Disapproving the policies set forth by the memorandum, local
enforcement authorities adopted new sanctuary policies.48 The trend of
implementing favorable sanctuary policies has grown steadily since then,
albeit the heinous crime committed against innocent civilians in New York
on September 11, 2001 would have warranted otherwise.49 By 2008, many
states throughout the country counted sanctuary jurisdictions within their
territorial boundaries.50
The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) responded to local
jurisdictions’ implementation of sanctuary policies by creating “Secure
Communities, [a program requiring] local law enforcement agencies to run
fingerprints through the DHS illegal immigrant database upon booking.”51
When a match occurred, ICE would be alerted and a detainer would be
issued.52 DHS discontinued the program in 2014 due to complications in its
administration arising out of lawsuits for violation of arrestees’ Fourth
Amendment rights.53 DHS substituted Secure Communities with the Priority
Enforcement Program (“PEP”), a program designed to limit the applicability
47.
Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, on Non-Preemption of the Authority of State and Local Law Enforcement Officials to
Arrest Aliens for Immigration Violations 35 (Apr. 3, 2002) (on file with the U.S. Dep’t of
Justice).
48.
Sullivan, supra note 46, at 573; see also Huyen Pham, The Inherent Flaws
in the Inherent Authority Position: Why Inviting Local Enforcement of Immigration Laws
Violates the Constitution, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 965, 966–67 (2004).
49.
Orde F. Kittrie, Federalism, Deportation, and Crime Victims Afraid to
Call the Police, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1449, 1455 (2006); see also Kris W. Kobach, The
Quintessential Force Multiplier: The Inherent Authority of Local Police to Make Immigration
Arrests, 69 ALB. L. REV. 179, 184 (2005). Four different members of the terrorist commando
responsible for the attacks on the World Trade Center on 9/11—Nawaf al Hazmi, Mohammed
Atta, Hani Hanjour, and Ziad Jarrah—had previously violated federal immigration laws, but
state or local law enforcement failed to detain them. Kobach, supra at 184–87.
50.
See Gregorin, supra note 43, at 183; NAT’L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR.,
LAWS, RESOLUTIONS AND POLICIES INSTITUTED ACROSS THE U.S. LIMITING ENFORCEMENT OF
IMMIGRATION LAWS BY STATE AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES 2–7, 9 (2008).
51.
See Bridget Stubblefield, Note, Development in the Executive Branch
Sanctuary Cities: Balancing Between National Security Directives, Local Law Enforcement
Autonomy, and Immigrants’ Rights, 29 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 541, 542 (2015); Secure
Communities, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, http://www.ice.gov/secure-communities (last
updated May 19, 2017).
52.
Stubblefield, supra note 51, at 543; see also Barbara E. Armacost,
“Sanctuary” Laws: The New Immigration Federalism, 2016 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1197, 1209
(2016).
53.
See Stubblefield, supra note 51, at 543.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol42/iss1/1
Published by NSUWorks, 2018

118
119

Nova Law Review,
et al.: Nova
Vol.Law
42, Iss.
Review
1 [2018], Art. 1

2017]

A VIOLATION OF THE ANTI-COMMANDEERING PRINCIPLE

103

of detainers merely to illegal immigrants convicted of a civil immigration
priority offense[].54
The implementation of federal immigration detention mandated by
ICE did not produce the results hoped for, leading cities across the country to
once again implement counter-policies in opposition to the federal
Currently, approximately 400 local
immigration regulations.55
jurisdictions—with New York, San Francisco, and Los Angeles once again
at the forefront of the movement—refuse to comply with federal immigration
mandates and, either officially or unofficially, refuse to apply sanctuary
regulations within their territories.56
Modern sanctuaries do not conceal undocumented aliens nor shelter
them from detection.57 “[W]hen a city says that it is being a sanctuary, it
means that the city will not be an arm of federal immigration authorities.” 58
The lack of intent to physically protect individuals from law enforcement is
what specifically separates modern sanctuaries from the original
movement.59 In an interview released to Politico, the director of special
projects at the New York Immigration Coalition contended that “the term
sanctuary cities is a misnomer.”60 Shifting substantially from their historical
meaning, nowadays sanctuary jurisdictions are considered to be cities,
counties, or states, which limit government employees—specifically local
law enforcement—from inquiring about the immigration status of
immigrants they encounter; with an exception recognized for cases of serious
criminal offense[s].61
54.
Id.
55.
See id. at 542–43.
56.
See Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 4, City & Cty. of
S.F. v. Trump, No. 3:17-cv-00485-WHO (N.D. Cal. filed Jan. 31, 2017); Erwin Chemerinsky,
The Constitutionality of Withholding Federal Funds from Sanctuary Cities, L.A. LAW., Apr.
2017, at 60, 60; Liz Robbins, Angry Mayors Vow to Defy Trump Immigration Order, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 26, 2017, at A.17; Ohio Jobs & Justice PAC, The Original List of Sanctuary
Cities, USA, OJJPAC, http://www.ojjpac.org/sanctuary.asp (last updated July 29, 2017).
57.
Chemerinsky, supra note 56, at 60.
58.
Id.
59.
See id.; Villazor, supra note 39, at 148–49.
60.
Gloria Pazmino et al., Few Guarantees as Local Governments Plot
‘Sanctuary’
Policy,
POLITICO:
CAL.
(Mar.
27,
2017,
5:16
AM),
http://www.politico.com/states/california/story/2017/03/with-sanctuary-cities-in-trumpscrosshairs-local-governments-craft-a-response-110692.
“For people that are anti-immigrant, sanctuary cities are places where anyone can
come and commit a crime and there is no law and order, and we know that is
fiction” . . . . “At the same time, sanctuary cities are not places where we can stop
the federal government from entering and using information they have access to.

Id.
61.
Corrie Bilke, Note, Divided We Stand, United We Fall: A Public Policy
Analysis of Sanctuary Cities’ Role in the “Illegal Immigration” Debate, 42 IND. L. REV. 165,
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Although scholars and local policymakers have traditionally divided
modern sanctuary policies into three major categories, such categories are
often times combined by jurisdictions within one regulation.62 The first
category, the so-called don’t ask policies, limits inquiries as to the nationality
or immigration status of an individual by local law enforcement.63 The
second category, don’t enforce policies, creates limitations on the power of
local law enforcement to arrest or detain violators of immigration laws.64
Don’t tell regulations, the third category, establishes limitations on the
authority by local enforcement agents to report immigration status
information to federal agencies.65
States and municipalities, as well as individual police departments,
have adopted diverse mechanisms to ensure that unauthorized aliens in their
jurisdictions are not turned over to federal immigration authorities.66 For
instance, Cook County, Illinois, home to Chicago, instructs its county jail
system to deny compliance with ICE detainer requests;67 Los Angeles’
Special Order 40, the oldest city sanctuary ordinance, refrains police action
for the mere purpose of determining a person’s immigration status;68 and San

180 (2009) (discussing the historical development of sanctuary cities in the United States and
the potential hazards that nonfederal enforcement of immigration law that sanctuary cities
seek to avert); Villazor, supra note 39, at 147–48 (examining the narrower scope of the
definition of sanctuary cities compared to its original meaning).
62.
Kittrie, supra note 49, at 1455; see also Sullivan, supra note 46, at 574.
63.
Kittrie, supra note 49, at 1455.
64.
Id.; see also Pham, supra note 44, at 1390 (dividing don’t enforce
provisions between “[n]o [e]nforcement of [i]mmigration [l]aws”—often reducing the
resources available to officers to enforce federal immigration laws—and “[n]o [e]nforcement
of [c]ivil [i]mmigration [l]aws”—barring cooperation in immigration law enforcement when
the alleged violation is exclusively a civil violation).
65.
Kittrie, supra note 49, at 1455.
66.
LISA M. SEGHETTI ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32270, ENFORCING
IMMIGRATION LAW: THE ROLE OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 26 (2006).
67.
See Paul Bedard, ICE Chief Lists Worst Sanctuary Cities: Chicago, NYC,
San Francisco, Philadelphia, WASH. EXAMINER (July 24, 2017, 7:27 AM),
http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/ice-chief-lists-worst-sanctuary-cities-chicago-nyc-sanfrancisco-philadelphia/article/2629466.
68.
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF POLICE, SPECIAL ORDER NO. 40, UNDOCUMENTED
ALIENS (1979); Kittrie, supra note 49, at 1469. Los Angeles was one of the first cities in the
United States to promote sanctuary policies. Kittrie, supra note 49, at 1455. The Office of the
Los Angeles Chief of Police promulgated Special Order 40 to stop local enforcement agents
from initiating police action with the sole purpose of discovering the immigration status of a
person. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF POLICE, supra. The Order, however, allowed officers to
communicate to federal agencies arrest records when the person arrested had been previously
convicted of a felony. Id.
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Francisco Sheriff’s Department’s policy is that, absent a court issued warrant
or signed order, contact with ICE representatives should be limited.69
III.

PRESIDENTIAL PROMISE

Since officially entering the presidential race in June of 2015,
President Trump focused his campaign leitmotif on issues of public safety
and threats presented by illegal immigration.70 On several occasions during
his campaign, President Trump vowed to crack down on sanctuary
jurisdictions in an attempt to lower criminal rates and defeat criminal
organizations operating in the United States.71 Highly critical of the federal
immigration policies implemented by former President Barack H. Obama—
his predecessor at the presidential helm—President Trump identified
sanctuary policies as one of the main causes of the proliferation of criminal
organizations.72 Since his election, as the forty-fifth President of the United
States on November 8, 2016, President Trump’s position on immigration has
not changed.73 Faithful to his campaign promises to the electorate, on
January 25, 2017, exactly five days after taking the Oath of Office, President
Trump signed the Executive Order.74

69.
Letter from Ross Mirkarimi, Sheriff, S.F. Sheriff’s Dep’t, to All
Personnel, S.F. Sheriff’s Dep’t (Mar. 13, 2015) (on file with San Francisco Sheriff’s
Department).
70.
Jason Le Miere, Immigrants Are Not ‘Criminals, Drug Dealers and
Rapists,’ ICE Director Says, Contradicting Trump, NEWSWEEK: U.S. EDITION (June 28, 2017,
4:42 PM), http://www.newsweek.com/immigrants-mexico-rapists-ice-immigration-629866.
71.
Amita Kelly & Barbara Sprunt, Here Is What Donald Trump Wants to Do
in
His
First
100
Days,
NPR: POL.
(Nov.
9,
2016,
3:45
PM),
http://www.npr.org/2016/11/09/501451368/here-is-what-donald-trump-wants-to-do-in-hisfirst-100-days.
72.
Tami Luhby, Trump Condemns Sanctuary Cities, but What Are They?,
CNN: POL. (Sept. 1, 2016, 10:08 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/09/01/politics/sanctuarycities-donald-trump/; see also Jose A. DelReal, Trump Blames Obama for Orlando Shooting,
Blasts Clinton on Immigration, WASH. POST: POST POL. (June 13, 2016),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2016/06/13/trump-blames-obama-fororlando-shooting-blasts-clinton-on-immigration/.
73.
Priscilla Alvarez, Trump Cracks Down on Sanctuary Cities, ATLANTIC
(Jan. 25, 2017), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/01/trump-crack-downsanctuary-city/514427/; see also Dan Brekke, Trump: California ‘Out of Control’ and
Defunding Could Be in Store, KQED NEWS: CAL. REP. (Feb. 6, 2017, 11:50 AM),
http://ww2.kqed.org/news/2017/02/06/trump-california-out-of-control-and-defunding-couldbe-in-store/; Kelly & Sprunt, supra note 71. In his interview with Bill O’Reilly, President
Trump stated that defunding sanctuary cities would certainly be a weapon in the hands of the
federal government to ensure compliance with federal directives. Brekke, supra.
74.
Alvarez, supra note 73.
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Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States

Composed of eighteen sections, the Executive Order lays out the
presidential plan against illegal immigration.75 Specified in section one,
“[t]he purpose of [the Executive Order] is to direct executive departments
and agencies . . . to employ all lawful means to enforce immigration laws of
the United States.”76 Further, affirming that aliens illegally entering the
United States—and those aliens overstaying their visas—are a significant
threat to both public safety and national security, the Executive Order asserts
that faithful execution of federal immigration laws is impossible when
exemptions apply to different classes and categories of removable aliens.77
In a direct attack on sanctuary jurisdictions, section one also stresses that
“[s]anctuary jurisdictions across the United States willfully violate [f]ederal
law in an attempt to shield aliens from removal from the United States.
These jurisdictions have caused immeasurable harm to the American people
and to the very fabric of our Republic.”78
In an additional effort to equalize the categories of removable aliens,
section five of the Executive Order lists multiple classes of aliens that fulfill
the federal requirements for removal.79 In its language, the Executive Order
allows the Secretary of Homeland Security to prioritize for removal, in
addition to those recognized by congressional acts, aliens who:
a)
Have been convicted of any criminal offense;
b)
Have been charged with any criminal offense, where such
charge has not been resolved;
c)
Have committed acts that constitute a chargeable criminal
offense;
d)
Have engaged in fraud or willful misrepresentation in
connection with any official matter or application before a
governmental agency;
e)
Have abused any program related to receipt of public
benefits;
f)
Are subject to a final order of removal, but who have not
complied with their legal obligation to depart the United States; or
g)
In the judgment of an immigration officer, otherwise pose
80
a risk to public safety or national security.

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8799–803 (Jan. 25, 2017).
Id. at 8799.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 8800.
Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. at 8800.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol42/iss1/1
Published by NSUWorks, 2018

122
123

Nova Law Review,
et al.: Nova
Vol.Law
42, Iss.
Review
1 [2018], Art. 1

2017]

A VIOLATION OF THE ANTI-COMMANDEERING PRINCIPLE

107

In order to implement the policies laid out in the Executive Order, in
section eight, President Trump states that it is the intent of the Executive
Branch to empower law enforcement agencies at both the state and local
level to perform those functions generally employed by federal immigration
officers.81 Attempting to foster cooperation between federal, state, and local
agencies, the Executive Order further provides that the Secretary of State has
the authority to enter into statutorily regulated agreements with state
governors and local officials to permit local agencies to enforce federal
laws.82 However, in opposition to the constructive language of section eight,
the Executive Order provides punitive language in section nine for those
jurisdictions that fail to enforce federal immigration policies.83
B.

Section Nine—The Source of Discord

Section nine of the Executive Order is titled Sanctuary Jurisdictions,
and affirms that “[i]t is the policy of the [E]xecutive [B]ranch to ensure, to
the fullest extent of the law, that a [s]tate, or a political subdivision of a
[s]tate, shall comply with 8 U.S.C. § 1373.”84 Specifically, subsection 9(a)
establishes that:
In furtherance of this policy, the Attorney General and the
Secretary, in their discretion and to the extent consistent with law,
shall ensure that jurisdictions that willfully refuse to comply with 8
U.S.C. § 1373—sanctuary jurisdictions—are not eligible to receive
[f]ederal grants, except as deemed necessary for law enforcement
purposes by the Attorney General or the Secretary. The Secretary
has the authority to designate, in his discretion and to the extent
consistent with law, a jurisdiction as a sanctuary jurisdiction. The
Attorney General shall take appropriate enforcement action against
any entity that violates 8 U.S.C. § 1373, or which has in effect a
statute, policy, or practice that prevents or hinders the enforcement
85
of [f]ederal law.

The stated goal of section 9(a) of the Executive Order is to take
enforcement actions against any entity or jurisdiction that fails to comply

81.
Id.
82.
Id.; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2012). In 8 U.S.C § 1357(g), this section
allows agreements between federal agencies and state or local agencies within the scope to
permit local law enforcement to enforce federal laws and regulations. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1)–
(2).
83.
See Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. at 8801.
84.
Id.
85.
Id.
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with federal law, specifically 8 U.S.C. § 1373. 86 Stated within the language
of section 9(a), and also confirmed by the language of section two, President
Trump’s objective is to ensure that jurisdictions not in compliance with
federal law do not receive federal funds and grants, with exceptions made for
disbursements mandated by law.87
C.

8 U.S.C. § 1373

Signed into law by President Bill Clinton in September of 1996—
just a few months after another statute with similar language, the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (“PRWORA”),
was signed into law—the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”) contained the provision which was later
codified at Title 8 § 1373 of the United States Code.88 8 U.S.C. § 1373
regulates communications between government agencies, including federal,
state, and local agencies, and the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(“INS”).89 Specifically, the statute prohibits any federal, state, or local
government entity or official from restricting “any government entity or
official[s] from sending to, or receiving from, the [INS] information
regarding the citizenship or immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any
individual.”90 The statutory language further prohibits any person or agency
86.
See id.
87.
See id. at 8799, 8801.
88.
ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION REFORM & IMMIGRANT RESPONSIBILITY ACT OF
1996, H.R. Rep. No. 104-828, at 180 (1996) (Conf. Rep); Bill Ong Hing, Immigration
Sanctuary Policies: Constitutional and Representative of Good Policing and Good Public
Policy, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 247, 263–64, 294 (2012) (affirming the similarities between the
provision of the IIRIRA and the language of the PRWORA, better known as the Welfare
Reform Act, signed into law by President Clinton just a few weeks before the IIRIRA in
August 1996. Codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1644, the Welfare Reform Act contained a provision
regulating communications between state and local government and federal governmental
agencies in a manner similar to the IIRIRA). 8 U.S.C. § 1644 provides that:
Notwithstanding any other provision of [f]ederal, [s]tate, or local law,
no [s]tate or local government entity may be prohibited, or in any way restricted,
from sending to or receiving from the Immigration and Naturalization Service
information regarding the immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of an alien in the
United States.

8 U.S.C. § 1644 (2012).
89.
8 U.S.C. § 1373 (1996).
90.
Id. § 1373(a). The Senate version of the bill noted in its report that the
section:
Prohibits any restriction on the exchange of information between the
[INS] and any [f]ederal, [s]tate, or local agency regarding a person’s immigration
status. . . . The acquisition, maintenance, and exchange of immigration-related
information by [s]tate and local agencies is consistent with, and potentially of
considerable assistance to, the [f]ederal regulation of immigration and the achieving
of the purposes and objectives of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
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to “prohibit, or in any way restrict a [f]ederal, [s]tate, or local government
entity from” sending, requesting, or receiving information regarding the
immigration status, lawful or unlawful, of any individual from the INS;
maintaining such information; and exchanging information with other
government agencies.91 Although prohibiting restrictions on informationsharing between state and federal agencies, neither of these anti-sanctuary
statutes renders cooperation with federal immigration authorities—or sharing
of information—mandatory.92
As some scholars have noted, the
characteristic of 8 U.S.C. § 1373 is to encourage cooperation among
different levels of law enforcement by prohibiting certain conduct instead of
directly requiring local cooperation.93
IV.

CONSTITUTIONALITY ISSUES

The reaction from states and municipalities, to the signing of the
Executive Order, was strong and immediate.94 On January 31, 2017, the City
and County of San Francisco filed a suit in the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California challenging the constitutionality of the
Executive Order.95 The County of Santa Clara, California filed suit shortly
thereafter on February 3, 2017, on similar grounds, seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief against all named defendants, which included President
Trump himself.96 The City of Richmond, California also filed suit
challenging the Executive Order on March 21, 2017, and on March 23, 2017,
moved to relate its case to the suits brought by the Counties of Santa Clara
and San Francisco.97 An additional action seeking declaratory and injunctive
Elizabeth M. McCormick, Federal Anti-Sanctuary Law: A Failed Approach to Immigration
Enforcement and a Poor Substitute for Real Reform, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 165, 177
(2016) (quoting IMMIGRATION CONTROL & FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY ACT OF 1996, S. Rep.
No. 104-249, at 19–20 (1996)).
91.
8 U.S.C. § 1373(b) (1996).
92.
See McCormick, supra note 90, at 169.
93.
Rick Su, Police Discretion and Local Immigration Policymaking, 79
UMKC L. REV. 901, 911 (2011). The statute is enforceable exclusively against so-called
don’t tell policies, while it is silent on the other two major categories of sanctuary policies,
don’t enforce and don’t ask. Id.; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1373.
94.
See Michelle Mark, ‘Sanctuary Cities’ Are Ready to Fight Trump’s
Potentially ‘Unconstitutional’ Executive Order, BUS. INSIDER: POLITICS (Jan. 27, 2017, 10:09
AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/sanctuary-cities-brace-for-trumps-executive-order-onimmigration-2017-1.
95.
Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, supra note 56, at 1–2.
Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief at 14, 4041, Cty. of
96.
Santa Clara v. Trump, No. 3:17-cv-00574-WHO (N.D. Cal. filed Feb. 3, 2017).
97.
Administrative Motion of City of Richmond to Consider Whether Cases
Should Be Related Pursuant to Civil L.R. 3-12(B) & Notice of Related Case Pursuant to Civil
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relief was filed on February 8, 2017, by the City of Lawrence,
Massachusetts, and the City of Chelsea, Massachusetts, in the United States
District Court for the District of Massachusetts.98 The counties and cities
specifically challenged section 9(a), the enforcement provision within the
language of the Executive Order, on several grounds.99
In general, the cities and counties each argue that section 9(a) of the
Executive Order violates the Separation of Powers Doctrine by improperly
seeking to exercise congressional spending powers.100 In addition, even if
President Trump could exercise such spending powers, the cities and
counties contend that the Executive Order would be in violation of those
powers—and thereby unconstitutional under the Tenth Amendment—and,
lastly, that section 9(a) violates the anti-commandeering clause of the Tenth
Amendment.101
On the other hand, support for the Executive Order—and the policies
and objectives stated therein—has come from Patrick Morrissey, the
Attorney General of West Virginia, and Jeff Landry, the Attorney General of
Louisiana.102 In their amici curiae brief—filed in the action brought by the
Local Rule 3-13 at 12, City & Cty. of S.F. v. Trump, No. 3:17-cv-00485-WHO (N.D. Cal.
filed Jan. 31, 2017) [hereinafter Administrative Motion]; see also Complaint for Injunctive &
Declaratory Relief Concerning Federal Executive Order 13768 at 3, 29, City of Richmond v.
Trump, 2017 WL 3605216 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2017) (No. 3:17-cv-01535-WHO). Cty. of
Santa Clara v. Trump and City & Cty. of S.F. v. Trump had already been consolidated in
February pursuant to an order issued by Judge William H. Orrick of the District Court for the
Northern District of California. See Order Granting the County of Santa Clara’s & City &
County of San Francisco’s Motions to Enjoin Section 9(a) of Executive Order 13768 at 29,
Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, No. 3:17-cv-00574-WHO (N.D. Cal. filed Feb. 3, 2017).
98.
Complaint for Declaratory Judgment & Injunctive Relief, supra note 56,
at 2.
99.
Complaint for Declaratory Judgment & Injunctive Relief, supra note 56,
at 15; Thomas Fuller, San Francisco Sues Trump over ‘Sanctuary Cities’ Order, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 1, 2017, at A11; Maura Dolan & James Queally, Santa Clara County Seeks to Block
Trump’s Order to Defund Sanctuary Cities, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 23, 2017, 2:25 PM),
http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-santa-clara-sanctuary-trump-lawsuit-20170223story.html; see also Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8801 (Jan. 25, 2017); Alison
Frankel, Cities Say Trump’s Sanctuary Policy Is Unconstitutional, REUTERS (Mar. 30, 2017,
5:51 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-otc-sanctuary-idUSKBN171361.
100.
Complaint for Declaratory Judgment & Injunctive Relief, supra note 56,
at 1622; Frankel, supra note 99; see also Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. at 8801.
101.
Complaint for Declaratory Judgment & Injunctive Relief, supra note 56,
at 16; see also Frankel, supra note 99; Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. at 8801.
102.
See Proposed Brief of Amici Curiae States of West Virginia, Louisiana,
Alabama, Arkansas, Michigan, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, & Texas at 1, 12,
Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, No. 3:17-cv-00574-WHO (N.D. Cal. filed Feb. 3, 2017)
[hereinafter Proposed Brief of Amici Curiae]. The Amici states supporting the Executive
Order also include the states of “Alabama, Arkansas, Michigan, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma,
South Carolina, and Texas.” Id. at 1 n.1.
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City and County of San Francisco and the County of Santa Clara—both
maintain that the Executive Order is constitutional and challenges the
validity of the action taken by these cities and counties based upon
justiciability grounds.103 Without going into the specific merits of whether
any of the plaintiffs have standing to bring the action, the following analysis
will focus on the constitutionality of the Executive Order, including possible
arguments in favor or against it.104
A.

Spending Clause

Article I, section 8 of the United States Constitution establishes what
has been defined as the Taxing and Spending Clause.105 The Taxing and
Spending Clause textually affirms that “Congress shall have the Power To
lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and
provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States;
but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United
States.”106
Vast jurisprudence has interpreted the language of the Taxing and
Spending Clause, starting with United States v. Butler,107 which defines the
federal spending power broadly to promote the general welfare.108 The
103.
Proposed Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 102, at 2. The first argument
presented by the brief is the lack of standing to bring suit due to the absence of any injury to
the jurisdictions. Id.
104.
See Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. at 8799; Proposed Brief of
Amici Curiae, supra note 102, at 3; State of California’s Administrative Motion for Leave to
File an Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 2,
City & Cty. of S.F. v. Trump, No. 3:17-cv-00485-WHO (N.D. Cal. filed Jan. 31, 2017)
[hereinafter State of California’s Administrative Motion].
105.
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
106.
Id.; Albert J. Rosenthal, Conditional Federal Spending and the
Constitution, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1103, 1111–12 (1987). The Founding Fathers disagreed on the
extent of the General Welfare Clause, with Alexander Hamilton and James Madison
expressing ideas at the opposite end of the spectrum. Compare THE FEDERALIST NO. 34, at
178 (Alexander Hamilton) (American Bar Association ed., 2009), with THE FEDERALIST NO.
41, at 233–34 (James Madison) (American Bar Association ed., 2009). Alexander Hamilton
thought that additional power was provided by the General Welfare Clause to Congress
without limits imposed by other enumerated powers. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 34, supra.
Contrarily, James Madison interpreted the General Welfare Clause as confining Congress’
taxing and spending powers to those fields enumerated by the Constitution. See THE
FEDERALIST NO. 41, supra at 233–34.
107.
297 U.S. 1 (1936).
108.
Id. at 65–66. “[T]he power of Congress to authorize expenditure of public
money[] for public purposes is not limited by the direct grants of legislative power found in
the Constitution.” Id. at 66 (adopting Alexander Hamilton’s interpretation of the General
Welfare Clause); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 34, supra note 106, at 177–78 (Alexander
Hamilton); Jeffrey T. Renz, What Spending Clause? (or the President’s Paramour): An
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Supreme Court of the United States further affirmed in South Dakota v.
Dole109 that “Congress may attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds,
and has repeatedly employed the power ‘to further broad policy objectives by
conditioning receipt of federal moneys upon compliance by the recipient
with federal statutory and administrative directives.’”110 Articulating
limitations to the applicable conditions, Chief Justice Rehnquist announced
in Dole a four-part test stemming from previous, singular rulings of the
Court.111 First, the use of spending power by Congress must be in
furtherance of the general welfare.112 Reaffirming the principle established
in Helvering v. Davis,113 the Chief Justice recognized that courts should
observe some degree of deference to Congress in determining “whether a
particular expenditure is intended to serve general public purposes.” 114
Second, conditions imposed by Congress on grants must be unambiguous.115
Third, there must be a relation between the conditions imposed by Congress

Examination of the Views of Hamilton, Madison, and Story on Article I, Section 8, Clause 1 of
the United States Constitution, 33 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 81, 103 (1999).
109.
483 U.S. 203 (1987).
110.
Id. at 206 (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980)).
South Dakota brought an action challenging the constitutionality of 23 U.S.C. § 158, a federal
statute directing the Secretary of Transportation to withhold otherwise allocable funds from
states in which the drinking age was legally below twenty-one years. Id. at 205. The United
States District Court for the District of South Dakota dismissed the complaint, and the ruling
was later confirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. Id. The Supreme Court
affirmed the ruling of the lower court, finding the statute to be a constitutional exercise of
Congress’ spending power. Id. at 212. “Congress can trade things within its power—like
money, or regulatory authority, or forbearance from preemption—for state assistance that
would otherwise lie beyond its reach.” Spencer E. Amdur, The Right of Refusal: Immigration
Enforcement and the New Cooperative Federalism, 35 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 87, 120 (2016).
111.
Dole, 483 U.S. at 207–08; see also Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981), rev’d, 465 U.S. 89 (1984), superseded by statute, 28
U.S.C. § 1367, as recognized in Raygor v. Univ. of Minn., 604 N.W.2d 128 (Minn. Ct. App.
2000); Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S.
1, 91 (1976), superseded by statute, Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107155, 166 Stat. 81, as recognized in McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93 (2003);
Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640 (1937); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936).
112.
Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (quoting Helvering, 301 U.S. at 640; Butler, 297
U.S. at 65).
113.
301 U.S. 619 (1937).
114.
Dole, 483 U.S. at 207. Changing the terms of an existing funding
agreement would be a breach similar in nature to changing the terms of an existing contract.
Andrew Hanson, “Economic Dragooning”: Limiting Trump’s Ability to Punish Sanctuary
Cities,
HARV.
L.
&
POL’Y
REV.
(Dec.
1,
2016),
http://www.harvardlpr.com/2016/12/01/economic-dragooning-limiting-trumps-ability-topunish-sanctuary-cities/.
115.
Dole, 483 U.S. at 207.
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and the purpose of the federal program—a limitation of germaneness.116
Fourth, congressional intent in establishing the program cannot constitute a
violation of other specific restrictions imposed on the federal government by
the Constitution.117 Chief Justice Rehnquist also interestingly affirmed near
the end of the opinion “that in some circumstances the financial inducement
offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point at which
pressure turns into compulsion.”118 Although no compulsion was found in
Dole, the opinion created a new threshold for congressional legislative acts
to be deemed constitutional—opening the gates to additional challenges.119
Although not all parts of the four-part test are allegedly challenged by the
language of the Executive Order, arguments can be made as to at least three
parts.120
1.

Clarity of Intent

In the specific words of Chief Justice Rehnquist, when “Congress
desires to condition the [s]tates’ receipt of federal funds, it ‘must do so
unambiguously . . . , enabl[ing] the [s]tates to exercise their choice
knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their participation.’”121 The
contractual nature of the Taxing and Spending Clause enables jurisdictions to
know the requirements and expectations set forth by Congress before
accepting their end of the bargain.122 Thus, it is counter-intuitive that
Congress’ legitimate use of its spending power depend on whether
acceptance of conditions on funds by local jurisdictions is made
116.
Craig Eichstadt, Twenty-Year Legacy of South Dakota v. Dole, 52 S.D. L.
REV. 458, 458 (2007); accord Dole, 483 U.S. at 207.
117.
Dole, 483 U.S. at 208. Language in previous rulings of the Supreme
Court of the United States uncontrovertibly affirms the “proposition that the [spending] power
may not be used to induce the [s]tates to engage in activities that would themselves be
unconstitutional.” Id. at 210.
118.
Id. at 211 (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590
(1937)).
119.
See id. at 211–12; e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct.
2566, 2604 (2012).
120.
See Eddie Nasser, President Trump Overstepped His Authority on
Sanctuary
Cities,
HARV.
L.
&
POL’Y
REV.
(Feb.
28,
2017),
http://harvardlpr.com/2017/02/28/president-trump-overstepped-his-authority-on-sanctuarycities/.
121.
Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (alteration in original) (quoting Pennhurst State Sch.
& Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981), rev’d, 465 U.S. 89 (1984), superseded by
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, as recognized in Raygor v. Univ. of Minn., 604 N.W.2d 128 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2000)).
122.
See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2602–03; Pennhurst State
Sch. & Hosp., 451 U.S. at 17.
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voluntarily.123 Voluntary and knowing acceptance of federal funds implies
that no implementation of after-the-fact conditions are permitted.124 In fact,
“[t]hough Congress’ power to legislate under the spending power is broad, it
does not include surprising participating [s]tates with post-acceptance or
retroactive conditions.”125 The Court in National Federation of Independent
Business v. Sebelius126 clearly states that Congress is not free to penalize
States for their choice to not participate in new programs by taking away
existing funding—a decision that resembles less of a constitutional use of
spending powers, and more of an abuse of it.127
The jurisdictions challenging the Executive Order affirmed that the
main purpose of the Executive Order is to retroactively condition all federal
grants to comply with 8 U.S.C. § 1373.128 Doubting the clarity of the
Executive Order, the cities and counties bringing the action claimed that the
conditions, being inexistent at the time federal grants were accepted, could
not be accepted knowingly and willingly—as is required by the Dole test—
thus creating forcible conditions on federal grants in violation of the
Constitution.129 These jurisdictions further contended that the ambiguity of
the Executive Order extends to the exact nature of the grants being
conditioned.130 If the Executive Order applies conditions on federal grants,
both the nature of the grants and the amount of federal funds being
conditioned need to be stated clearly, thus allowing the voluntary choice by
States and municipalities to either accept or reject the federal grants.131
Additionally, the ambiguity of the Executive Order extends to the
conduct being specifically targeted.132 If no clear directions are given by the
federal government on whether a certain conduct would fall under the
umbrella of conduct that the Executive Order is trying to limit, then it
becomes nearly impossible for jurisdictions to avoid penalties through policy
adjustments.133
123.
See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2602.
124.
Id. at 2606.
125.
Id.
126.
132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
127.
See id. at 2607.
128.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (1996); Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive
Relief, supra note 56, at 12.
129.
See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987); Complaint for
Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, supra note 56, at 12.
130.
See Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, supra note 56, at 12.
131.
Cf. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207.
132.
See Eric Levenson, Seattle Challenges Trump over Executive Order on
‘Sanctuary
Cities’,
CNN:
POL.
(Mar.
30,
2017,
12:26
PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2017/03/30/politics/seattle-lawsuit-trump-sanctuary-city/index.html.
133.
See Frankel, supra note 99; cf. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981), rev’d, 465 U.S. 89 (1984), superseded by statute, 28
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On the other hand, although refraining from discussion about
whether any existing grant program meets the Dole criteria—compliance
strongly denied by those jurisdictions bringing the lawsuit—the states in
support of the Executive Order confirm the validity of the Executive
Order.134 According to the filed Amici Brief, an authorization by Congress
allowing the Attorney General and Secretary of State to administer grant
programs, conditioning receipt on compliance with specific federal
immigration laws, is well within constitutional boundaries.135
A
memorandum issued by Attorney General Jeff Sessions also helps further
clarify the essence of federal grants potentially conditioned on compliance
with federal immigration laws, thereby rendering meritless the claims of
ambiguity with regard to the nature of the grants.136 The memorandum
affirms that “section 9(a) of the Executive Order . . . will be applied solely to
federal grants administered by the [DOJ] or the [DHS], and not to other
sources of federal funding.”137 However, the memorandum arguably fails
one of its main objectives—specifying the conduct leading to denial of
federal funds.138 Although limiting the term sanctuary jurisdiction to those
jurisdictions that “willfully refuse to comply with 8 U.S.C. § 1373,” the
memorandum fails to clarify the characteristics of a willful refusal, leaving
states and localities in the dark as to the exactitude of the targeted conduct.139
2.

Nexus Requirement

As a third requirement to achieve constitutionality, Dole affirmed
that a connection must exist between the condition applied to federal grants
and the government interest to be achieved.140 The Dole Court stated that
“conditions on federal grants might be illegitimate if they are unrelated ‘to
the federal interest in particular national projects or programs.’”141 What has
U.S.C. § 1367, as recognized in Raygor v. Univ. of Minn., 604 N.W.2d 128 (Minn. Ct. App.
2000).
134.
See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207; Proposed Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note
102, at 1–2.
135.
See Proposed Brief of Amici Curiae, supra note 102, at 8.
136.
See Memorandum from Jeff Sessions, Attorney Gen., Office of the
Attorney Gen. on Implementation of Executive Order 13768, to All Department GrantMaking Components 1–2 (May 22, 2017) (on file with Office of the Attorney Gen.).
137.
Id. (emphasis added); see also Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. at
8799, 8801 (Jan. 25, 2017).
138.
See Priscilla Alvarez, Sessions’s Climbdown on Sanctuary Cities,
ATLANTIC (May 23, 2017), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/05/sessionssclimbdown-on-sanctuary-cities/527844/.
139.
Id.; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (1996).
140.
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987).
141.
Id. (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978)).
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been recognized as the nexus requirement under the Dole test is only
established when a reasonable relationship between the condition applied by
Congress and the purpose of the federal program exists.142
Thus, a connection must exist between the federal funds being
conditioned by the Attorney General and the Secretary of State, and the
ultimate goal of the Executive Order—compliance with § 1373 of Title 8 of
the United States Code.143 The language of the Executive Order, in
conjunction with the memorandum released by the Attorney General might,
however, frustrate the Executive Order’s intentions.144 In fact, the Attorney
General’s clarification on the identity of the federal grants that could
potentially be affected in the process sheds some light on, but also clashes
with, the express language of the Executive Order.145 The Executive Order
alleges specifically the non-applicability of conditions on grants necessary
for purposes of law enforcement.146 However, since all grants mentioned by
the Attorney General as possible targets are, on different levels, designed for
law enforcement purposes, it becomes unclear what other grants could be
affected.147 The issue is of major relevance, because conditions on grants
unrelated to immigration purposes—thus running afoul of the concept of
germaneness—would be the exact type of federal activity the Dole Court
intended to eliminate.148
3.

Coercion

While not an integral part of the four-prong test developed in Dole,
the anti-coercion requirement is not any less important in establishing
whether conditions on federal grants are constitutional.149 Nevertheless,
although—as noted above—courts recognize that financial inducement

142.
See id. at 213. “I agree that there are four separate types of limitations on
the spending power: [T]he expenditure must be for the general welfare, . . . the conditions
imposed must be unambiguous, . . . they must be reasonably related to the purpose of the
expenditure, . . . and the legislation may not violate any independent constitutional prohibition
. . . .” Id. (O’Conner, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
143.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1373; Dole, 483 U.S. at 207; Letter from Annie Lai,
Assistant Clinical Professor of Law, U.C. Irvine Sch. of Law et al., to Donald J. Trump,
President of the United States of America 3 (Mar. 13, 2017) (on file with the Immigrant Legal
Resource Center).
144.
See Alvarez, supra note 138; Frankel, supra note 99.
145.
See Alvarez, supra note 138; Frankel, supra note 99.
146.
See Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8801 (Jan. 25, 2017).
147.
See id.; Vivian Yee & Rebecca R. Ruiz, Sessions Narrows Order Against
Sanctuary Cities, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 2017, at A18.
148.
See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207–08.
149.
See id. at 207–08, 211.
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offered by Congress can be over-coercive, congressional threats to withhold
money are upheld when they affect a limited amount of funds.150
In Dole, the Supreme Court found the threat of losing 5% of
highway funds was not impermissibly coercive, and the financial inducement
a “relatively mild encouragement to . . . [s]tates” to implement the language
of the statute.151 In similar scenarios, states have the faculty to decide
whether to accept the condition applied by Congress or deny acceptance of
the grant.152 As stated by the Supreme Court of the United States in National
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,153 courts “look to the [s]tates
to defend [its] prerogatives by adopting ‘the simple expedient of not
yielding’ to federal blandishments when they do not want to embrace the
federal policies as their own.”154 When conditions attached to federal funds
resemble a gun to the head, congressional encouragement to state action is
not considered a valid exercise of spending powers.155 If States are not
allowed to practically exercise a choice between acceptance or denial of
conditions, but can only theoretically preserve such power, congressional
actions appear as economic dragooning and are therefore unconstitutional.156
The threat of coercion varies based on the jurisdiction and their
degree of reliance on federal funding for the daily management of duties and
services to the resident population.157 Among the jurisdictions directly
involved in opposing the Executive Order, San Francisco’s yearly budget
gravitates around $10 billion, with approximately $1.2 billion coming
directly from the federal government.158 Santa Clara’s federal funding for
the 2015 to 2016 fiscal year was approximately $1 billion, a staggering 15%

150.
Id. at 211 (citing Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937));
see also Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2604 (2012).
151.
Dole, 483 U.S. at 211.
152.
Id. at 211–12.
153.
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2603 (2012).
154.
Id. (quoting Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 482 (1923)). Being
separate and independent sovereigns, states need to act like it by demonstrating their will. Id.
155.
Id. at 2604–05.
156.
Id. at 2605; see also Chemerinsky, supra note 56, at 60; Hanson, supra
note 114.
157.
See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus., 132 S. Ct. at 2604. “When we consider . .
. that all South Dakota would lose if she adheres to her chosen course as to a suitable
minimum drinking age is 5% of the funds otherwise obtainable under specifi[c] highway grant
programs, the argument as to coercion is . . . more rhetoric than fact.” Dole, 483 U.S. at 211.
158.
Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, supra note 56, at 16; see
CITY & CTY. OF S.F., MAYOR’S OFFICE OF PUB. POLICY & FIN., MAYOR’S 2017–2018 & 2018–
2019
PROPOSED
BUDGET
11
(2017),
http://www.sfmayor.org/sites/default/files/CSF_Budget_Book_2017_Final_CMYK_LowRes.
pdf.
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of the county’s total budget.159 Further, Chicago received $1.08 billion in
federal funding in 2015, with an estimated increase to $1.25 billion for
2016—roughly 13.5% of the yearly city’s budget.160
The outcome of a coercion analysis regarding whether the Executive
Order represents a coercive exercise of federal spending powers depends on
the exact federal grants that would be withheld in case of non-compliance
with the statute by a state or local jurisdiction.161 Therefore, a coercive effect
would likely be an inevitable outcome if more than just federal funds for
policing were affected.162 Contrarily, it is likely that Courts would rule in
accordance with Dole and uphold the conditions on federal grants.163
B.

Tenth Amendment Umbrella

The Tenth Amendment to the Constitution affirms that “[t]he powers
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to
the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”164 In an
effort to shape the relationship between the federal and state governments,
the language of the Tenth Amendment helps define the concept of
federalism.165 The basic principle established by the Tenth Amendment is
that if powers are “delegated to Congress [by] the Constitution, [then] the
Tenth Amendment . . . [refutes] any reservation of that [specific] power to
the [s]tates.”166 Nevertheless, when a power is “not delegated to [Congress]
by the Constitution,” it belongs to the [s]tates.167

159.
Complaint for Declaratory & Injunctive Relief, supra note 96, at 7.
160.
See CITY OF CHICAGO, 2016 BUDGET OVERVIEW 34 (2016),
http://www.cityofchicago.org/content/dam/city/depts/obm/supp_info/2016Budget/2016Budget
OverviewCoC.pdf [hereinafter 2016 BUDGET OVERVIEW].
161.
See Cities Under Siege, ECONOMIST (London), May 6, 2017, at 36. For
example, Chicago would only lose $2 million if “the order would affect only federal funds for
policing” as argued by the Attorney General in his memorandum. Id. However, if more
federal grants will be affected, Chicago would lose, according to some estimates, up to $3.6
billion for the current year. Id.
162.
See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2604 (2012).
163.
See id.
164.
U.S. CONST. amend. X.
165.
See id.
166.
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156 (1992).
167.
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 123–24 (1941) (emphasis added).
“It is in this sense that the Tenth Amendment ‘states but a truism that all is retained which has
not been surrendered.’” New York, 505 U.S. at 156 (quoting Darby, 312 U.S. at 124).
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Anti-Commandeering

The Supreme Court of the United States’ understanding and
interpretation of the Tenth Amendment has been that “[t]he States
unquestionably do retai[n] a significant measure of sovereign authority . . . to
the extent that the Constitution has not divested them of their original powers
and transferred those powers to the federal government.”168
[T]he preservation of the [s]tates, and the maintenance of their
governments, are as much within the design and care of the
Constitution as the preservation of the Union and the maintenance
of the National [G]overnment. The Constitution, in all its
provisions, looks to an indestructible Union, composed of
169
indestructible [s]tates.

New York v. United States,170 solidified the principle of anticommandeering.171 The Supreme Court of the United States held that
Congress does not have the power to “commandee[r] the legislative
processes of the [s]tates by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a
federal regulatory program.”172 Upheld in Printz v. United States,173 the
prohibition extends to federal directives requiring particular problems to be
addressed, and to orders given to states’ officers to administer and enforce
any federal regulatory program.174 Prohibition to compel states to enact and
168.
New York, 505 U.S. at 156 (alterations in original) (quoting Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 549 (1985)); see also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501
U.S. 452, 457 (1991) (noting that the structure of the Constitution reveals the system of dual
sovereignty as a controlling principle).
169.
Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 725 (1868).
170.
505 U.S. 144 (1992).
171.
Id. at 145, 202 (White, J., concurring). The language of the Low-Level
Radioactive Waste Policy Amendment Act of 1985 specified that a state or regional compact
failing to provide disposal of internally generated waste by a particular date must take title and
possession of the waste. Id. at 153–54 (majority opinion). The provision also directed States
to assume liability for internally generated waste if they failed to comply. Id. Writing for the
majority, Justice O’Connor found the provision impermissibly coercive, and thus,
unconstitutional under the Tenth Amendment. Id. at 176, 188.
172.
New York, 505 U.S. at 161 (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981) (affirming that the Surface Mining Control and
Reclamation Act of 1977 was constitutional for the exact reason that it did not commandeer
the States into regulating mining)).
173.
521 U.S. 898 (1997).
174.
Id. at 935. The Supreme Court held the Brady Handgun Violence
Prevention Act of 1968, which required the Attorney General to establish a national system
for instant background checking of prospective handgun purchasers and to command the chief
law enforcement officers nationwide to conduct checks and related police tasks,
unconstitutional. Id. at 933–34.
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administer federal programs applies regardless of whether congressional
commands to regulate are pointed directly to states, or a state is coerced to
implement a federal regulatory system.175 Notwithstanding the principles
enunciated in both New York and Printz, support of state governments and
officials is possible when national security is at stake, therefore authorizing
an exception to anti-commandeering for reasons beyond the general control
of the federal government.176
The Executive Order arguably affects states and local jurisdictions in
two ways: First, compelling jurisdictions to comply with federal detainer
requests in order to avoid being labeled as a sanctuary, thus losing
funding;177 and second, preventing jurisdictions from exercising those police
powers assigned to them under the Tenth Amendment.178
a.

ICE Detainers

The language of section 9(b) of the Executive Order indicates that
jurisdictions failing to comply with any ICE detainer request fall within the
category of sanctuary jurisdictions.179 An ICE civil detainer consists of local
law enforcement agencies requesting local jurisdictions to keep inmates held
for actual or suspected violations of state criminal laws for up to forty-eight
hours after the inmate’s scheduled release—potentially extending detention
up to five days when arrests and custody stretch over a holiday weekend.180
The detainers serve the purpose of giving ICE agents enough time to verify
the information within federal databases and determine whether the
individual should be taken into federal custody.181
In its attempt to enforce ICE detainers, the language of the Executive
Order—perceived as mandatory—runs afoul of constitutional principles
established by judicial interpretation.182 In 2014, the Third Circuit Court of
175.

See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2606–07

(2012).
176.
See Printz, 521 U.S. at 940; Daniel Booth, Note, Federalism on ICE:
State and Local Enforcement of Federal Immigration Law, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1063,
1073 (2006). “Matters such as the enlistment of air raid wardens, the administration of a
military draft . . . or perhaps the threat of an international terrorist, may require a national
response before federal personnel can be made available to respond.” Printz, 521 U.S. at 940
(Stevens, J. dissenting).
177.
See Letter from Annie Lai et al. to Donald J. Trump, supra note 143, at 1.
178.
Id.
179.
Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8801 (Jan. 25, 2017).
180.
Stubblefield, supra note 51, at 546–47.
181.
Id. at 545; see also U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENF’T, 306-112-002B,
ISSUANCE OF IMMIGRATION DETAINERS BY ICE IMMIGRATION OFFICERS 2, 4 (Mar. 24, 2017).
182.
See Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. at 8799. But see Galarza v.
Szalczyk, 745 F.3d 634, 643 (3d Cir. 2014).
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Appeals in Galarza v. Szalczyk,183 affirmed that local governments are not
under any duty to comply with ICE civil detainer requests, which are strictly
voluntary.184 In fact, “settled constitutional law clearly establishes that
[immigration detainers] must be deemed requests” because, under the Tenth
Amendment, any other interpretation would render them unconstitutional.185
Ordering imprisonment of suspected aliens subject to removal would, in fact,
be inconsistent with the essential principles of anti-commandeering.186 The
constitutional violations resulting from mandated imprisonment are not
limited to the Tenth Amendment, but often further extend to violations of the
Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable seizures.187
In Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas County,188 the court found
Clackamas County in violation of Miranda-Olivares’s Fourth Amendment
right against unreasonable seizures.189 Although the county argued that the
seizure was a mere continuation of the original arrest, the court found
otherwise.190 The “prolonged warrantless, post-arrest, pre-arraignment
custody” by the county jail was not justified by the pending detainer request
by ICE.191 A similar ruling was given by the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit in Morales v. Chadbourne,192 where the court found a twenty-fourhour imprisonment pursuant to an ICE detainer a violation of the arrestee’s
Fourth Amendment rights.193 The court stated that, absent a warrant,
immigration officers have the faculty to arrest an alien “only if they have
‘reason to believe that the alien so arrested is in the United States in violation
183.
745 F.3d 634 (3d Cir. 2014).
184.
See id. at 643, 645.
185.
Id. at 643.
186.
Id.
187.
See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas Cty., No.
3:12-CV-02317-ST, 2014 WL 1414305, at *1, 9, 11 (D. Or. Apr. 11, 2014). A wellestablished principle is that “[t]he Fourth Amendment applies to all seizures of the person,
including seizures that involve only a brief detention short of traditional arrest.” United States
v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975).
188.
No. 3:12-CV-02317-ST, 2014 WL 1414305 (D. Or. Apr. 11, 2014).
189.
See id. at *11. “Miranda-Olivares was arrested for violating a . . .
restraining order and booked into the [county] [j]ail.” Id. at *1. According to its policy to
report arrests of foreign-born persons “on a warrant or probable cause charge[s],” the jail
notified ICE, and a detainer request was issued to the jail the following day. Id. In
furtherance of ICE objectives, the jail also honors detainers “even if the underlying state
criminal charges are resolved or bail is posted.” Id. at *2. Arrested on March 14, 2012,
“Miranda-Olivares remained in custody . . . on . . . state charges until March 29, 2012,” but
due to the ICE detainer, remained in custody until the following day, when picked up by DHS
agents. Miranda-Olivares, 2014 WL 1414305, at *2–3.
190.
Id. at *9.
191.
Id.
192.
793 F.3d 208 (1st Cir. 2015).
193.
See id. at 211, 218, 223.
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of any [immigration] law or regulation and is likely to escape before a
warrant can be obtained for his arrest.’”194 The court further affirmed that
reason to believe must be effectively considered equal to probable cause for
the arrest, and that arrests made in its absence are in violation of Fourth
Amendment principles.195 The plethora of lawsuits and consequential
liability for Fourth Amendment violations are some of the reasons why cities
and counties across the United States enact policies restricting compliance
with ICE detainers.196
Given the extensive jurisprudence on the unconstitutionality of
detainer requests, which often lead to prolonged arrest periods for aliens
absent probable cause, it becomes difficult to not justify the decision of local
jurisdictions to refuse compliance to ICE detainers, which is likely a mere
exercise of constitutional police powers.197
b.

Police Powers

The so-called police powers are the states’ reserved constitutional
authority under the Tenth Amendment to promote health, safety, and welfare
of their residents.198 In Sligh v. Kirkwood,199 the Supreme Court of the
United States affirmed that:
The police power, in its broadest sense, includes all legislation and
almost every function of civil government. It is not subject to
definite limitations, but [it] is coextensive with the necessities of
the case and the safeguards of public interest. It embraces
regulations designed to promote public convenience or the general
prosperity or welfare, as well as those specifically intended to
200
promote the public safety or the public health.

Sanctuary policies reflect determination by states and local
jurisdiction to exercise their judgment and promote health and safety of their
194.
Id. at 216 (alteration in original) (emphasis in original) (quoting 8 U.S.C.
§ 1357(a)(2) (2012)).
195.
Id. (citing Tejeda-Mata v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 626 F.2d
721, 725 (9th Cir. 1980)); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2).
196.
See Jennifer Medina, Fearing Lawsuits, Sheriffs Balk at U.S. Request to
Hold Noncitizens for Extra Time, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 2014, at A10.
197.
See Morales, 793 F.3d at 211–12; Miranda-Olivares v. Clackamas Cty.,
No. 3:12-CV-02317-ST, 2014 WL 1414305, at *11 (D. Or. Apr. 11, 2014); Medina, supra
note 196.
198.
U.S. CONST. amend. X; see also Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U.S. 52, 59
(1915).
199.
237 U.S. 52 (1915).
200.
Id. at 59 (citations omitted).
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residents.201 It is undisputed that “[t]he promotion of safety of persons and
property is . . . at the core of the [s]tate’s police power.”202 United States v.
Morrison203 affirms the long recognized principle that states possess a unique
domain of authority over many functions of government.204 In fact, the
Founders “ensured that powers which ‘in the ordinary course of affairs,
concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people’ were held by
governments more local and more accountable than a distant federal
bureaucracy.”205 Moreover, the choice to limit direct involvement in the
enforcement of federal immigration policies is dictated by practical issues of
community management, and is strongly supported by those charged with
patrolling the community to ensure its safety.206 The Executive Order
arguably infringes upon the discretion of local law enforcement authorities to
make the policy judgments deemed necessary, replacing them with federal
preferences.207 Law enforcement agencies throughout the country have
shown support for sanctuary policies.208 Police chiefs and sheriffs, together
with the Major Cities Chiefs Association, sustain that using local law

201.
Letter from Annie Lai et al. to Donald J. Trump, supra note 143, at 1.
202.
Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 247 (1976).
203.
529 U.S. 598 (2000).
204.
Id. at 618.
205.
Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2578 (2012)
(quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 262 (James Madison) (American Bar Association ed.,
2009)). The issue of accountability is a fundamental factor in the jurisprudence of the
Supreme Court. Id. at 2592, 2602. “Accountability is considered a particularly powerful
argument against commandeering . . . .” Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken,
Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256, 1289 (2009); cf. New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144, 169 (1992) (affirming that “where the federal government directs the [s]tates to
regulate, it may be state officials who will bear the brunt of public disapproval, while the
federal officials who devised the regulatory program may remain insulated from the electoral
ramifications of their decision[s].”).
206.
Pham, supra note 48, at 981.
207.
See Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fe. Reg. 8799, 8799-801 (Jan. 25, 2017);
Brief of Amici Curiae California Cities & Counties-Alameda, Berkeley, Davis, East Palo
Alto, Fremont, Marin, Monterey, Mountain View, Oakland, Richmond, Salinas, San Jose,
Santa Cruz, Santa Rosa at 5, 10–11, City & Cty. of S.F. v. Trump, No. 3:17-cv-00485-WHO
(N.D. Cal. filed Jan. 31, 2017) [hereinafter Brief of Amici Curiae California Cities &
Counties]. The argument is based on the Supreme Court’s assertion that the wide discretion
given to the states to determine what is necessary—and what is not—must be respected. East
N.Y. Sav. Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230, 233 (1945).
208.
See Chuck Wexler, Police Chiefs Across the Country Support Sanctuary
Cities Because They Keep Crime Down, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2017, 4:00 AM),
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-wexler-sanctuary-cities-immigration-crime20170306-story.html.
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enforcement agents to further federal immigration laws would be a detriment
to the safety of local communities.209
Police apprehension towards local officers enforcing federal
immigration laws is based upon multiple reasons.210 First, enforcement of
immigration laws risks “[u]ndermin[ing] [the] [t]rust and [c]ooperation of
[i]mmigrant [c]ommunities.”211 Studies have shown that a majority of chiefs
and sheriffs—from both red and blue states—consider maintaining high
levels of trust with the immigrant communities towards police officers a
priority.212 If any sort of trust is lacking, a reasonable consequence to the
legitimate fear for deportation, the process of community policing is halted,
hindering the community.213 Second, “budgets and resources of local police
agencies” are limited when compared to the economic power of the federal
government—making the use of local officers to implement federal
immigration laws financially burdensome for local communities.214 Third,
federal immigration laws present complicated policies, both on the civil and
criminal side of the law, and local agents are not necessarily fit to enforce
them.215 Fourth, local police lack the degree of authority that federal agents
can exercise when enforcing immigration laws, thus increasing the level of
difficulty for local agents to discern whether a particular violation results in
criminal charges or mere civil violations.216 Finally, participation of local
police officers in the enforcement of immigration laws would possibly
expose local agencies to civil litigation and liability.217 “By upending the
independent judgment of local officials responsible for ‘the suppression of
209.
See Tom Jawetz, Trump’s Deportation Rules Will Make America Unsafe
Again, FORTUNE (Feb. 24, 2017), http://www.fortune.com/2017/02/24/donald-trump-publicsafety-executive-order-deportation-immigration-illegal-undocumented/.
210.
See CRAIG E. FERRELL, JR. ET AL., MAJOR CITIES CHIEFS IMMIGRATION
COMM., M.C.C. NINE (9) POINT POSITION STATEMENT: ENFORCEMENT OF IMMIGRATION LAWS
BY LOCAL POLICE AGENCIES 5–8 (2006).
211.
Id. at 5.
212.
See id. at 5–6; Wayne A. Cornelius et al., Giving Sanctuary to
Undocumented Immigrants Doesn’t Threaten Public Safety—It Increases It, L.A. TIMES (Feb.
2, 2017, 4:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-sanctuary-cities-trump20170202-story.html.
213.
Amicus Brief of 34 Cities & Counties in Support of County of Santa
Clara’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 7–8, Cty. of Santa Clara v. Trump, No. 3:17-cv00574-WHO (N.D. Cal. filed Feb. 3, 2017) [hereinafter Amicus Brief]; Brief of Amici Curiae
California Cities & Counties—Alameda, Berkeley, Davis, East Palo Alto, Fremont, Marin,
Monterey, Mountain View, Oakland, Richmond, Salinas, San Jose, Santa Cruz, Santa Rosa at
5, City & Cty. of S.F. v. Trump, No. 3:17-cv-00485-WHO (N.D. Cal. filed Jan. 31, 2017)
[hereinafter Brief of Amici Curiae California Cities & Counties].
214.
FERRELL, JR. ET AL., supra note 210, at 6.
215.
See id. at 7.
216.
See id. at 7–8.
217.
Id. at 8.
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violent crime and vindication of its victims,’ . . . the Executive Order
intrudes upon a power reserved for the states and local governments, and
threatens to undermine the mission of local law enforcement.”218
Data analysis hints to a different reality than the one claimed by
President Trump, and police departments across the country seem to agree
with it.219 The data evidences that sanctuary jurisdictions present a lower
average criminality level when compared to comparably sized non-sanctuary
jurisdictions.220 Although numerically not impressive, researchers point out
results that are statistically important, like lower crime and homicide rates.221
Generally, however, production of conflicting studies and interpretation of
data render an objective analysis of the issue all but simple.222 Taking
Phoenix, Arizona as an example, data shows that crime rates fell by
impressive margins following the city renouncing its sanctuary status.223 A
six-year study from the University of California, Riverside found levels of
violent crimes to be “slightly higher in sanctuary cities.”224 Independent
from the crime rates analysis, it is important to highlight that one of the main
fears of pro-sanctuary police departments across the country—decrease in
crime reports resulting from the distrust towards law enforcement and
immigration agents in non-sanctuary jurisdictions—is legitimate.225 Crime
reports in Latino communities throughout the United States are decreasing,
thus making police officers’ investigating jobs harder while simultaneously
increasing the amount of silent victims.226 Therefore, although conflicting
data exists, it is indisputably within the interest, right, and power of local

218.
Amicus Brief, supra note 213, at 8 (quoting United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598, 618 (2000)).
219.
See Christopher Ingraham, Trump Says Sanctuary Cities Are Hotbeds of
Crime.
Data Say the Opposite., CHI. TRIB.: NEWS (Jan. 27, 2017, 2:37 PM),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-trump-sanctuary-city-crime-data20170127-story.html.
220.
See id.
221.
See id.
222.
See William Lajeunesse, Crime Drops in Phoenix After City Drops
Sanctuary City Status, Former Cops Say, FOX NEWS: POL. (June 30, 2017),
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2017/06/30/crime-drops-in-phoenix-after-city-dropssanctuary-city-status-former-cops-say.html.
223.
See id.
224.
Id.
225.
See James Queally, Latinos Are Reporting Fewer Sexual Assaults Amid a
Climate of Fear in Immigrant Communities, LAPD Says, L.A. TIMES: LOCAL (Mar. 21, 2017,
8:25 PM), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-immigrant-crime-reporting-drops20170321-story.html.
226.
See id.
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jurisdictions to foster participation of all members of the community when it
comes to crime reporting and cooperation.227
2.

Are Sanctuary Policies Targeted by the Executive Order Preempted
by 8 U.S.C. § 1373?

As confirmed by the Attorney General, the intent of the Executive
Order is to enforce 8 U.S.C. § 1373 against jurisdictions deemed to be in
violation of the language of the statute.228 However, it is not clear whether
by implementing their policies, sanctuary jurisdictions are in violation of the
statute, thus triggering federal preemption.229 The relationship between
federal and state law in case of a conflict is regulated by the preemption
doctrine, which provides the superiority of federal law over state law.230 A
classical analysis of preemption principles generally considers whether the
language of the “federal law expressly precludes state and local governments
from passing such a law.”231 De Canas v. Bica232 developed a similar
analysis to determine whether state or local policies are preempted.233 The
three-prong analysis first considers “whether the law is attempting to
regulate immigration;” second, whether it occupies “a field [generally]
occupied by Congress;” and third, whether it is in conflict with federal
law.234 The first and second prongs are easily discernible because they “are
unique to immigration law.”235 It is a widely recognized principle that the
power to regulate immigration matters is retained by the federal
government.236 The third prong is based upon the Supremacy Clause.237
227.
See Jawetz, supra note 209.
228.
Letter from Annie Lai et al. to Donald J. Trump, supra note 143, at 2; see
also 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (1996); Maria Sacchetti & Sari Horwitz, Sessions Memo Defines
Sanctuary Cities — and Hints That the Definition May Widen, WASH. POST: SOC. ISSUE (May
22,
2017),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/social-issues/sessions-memo-definessanctuary-cities--and-hints-that-the-definition-may-widen/2017/05/22/68f8c9ec-3f1a-11e79869-bac8b44829a_story.
229.
See Letter from Annie Lai et al. to Donald J. Trump, supra note 143, at 2,
2 n.7; Yee & Ruiz, supra note 147.
230.
See Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142–43
(1963); Stephen A. Gardbaum, The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 767, 771
(1994).
231.
Pratheepan Gulasekaram & Rose Cuison Villazor, Sanctuary Policies &
Immigration Federalism: A Dialectic Analysis, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1683, 1698 (2009).
232.
424 U.S. 351 (1976).
233.
See id. at 356–63; Gulasekaram & Villazor, supra note 231, at 1699.
234.
Gulasekaram & Villazor, supra note 231, at 1698–99; see also De Canas,
424 U.S. at 35463.
235.
Gulasekaram & Villazor, supra note 231, at 1699.
236.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. “The Congress shall have [the] [p]ower . . .
[t]o establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization . . . .” Id.
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The language of 8 U.S.C. § 1373 primarily targets only one of the
three scholarly-developed categories of sanctuary policies namely the socalled don’t tell policies.238 Summing up the language of the statute
analyzed in Part II of this Comment, the statute “prohibits government
entities, agencies, officials, and persons from preventing the voluntary
reporting of a person’s immigration status by any governmental entity,
officials, or employees to federal immigration authority.”239 Sanctuary
policies have been enacted by jurisdictions throughout the country, however,
did not include, for the most part, any language prohibiting communications
between local and federal authorities.240 For example, Santa Clara
authorities prohibit employees from using County resources to transmit any
information to federal agencies that was collected while providing services to
the community.241 Santa Clara further prohibits employees from initiating
inquiries or enforcement actions based upon the actual or suspected
immigration status of the individual, national origin, race, ethnicity, or
English-speaking ability.242 Another example of a don’t ask policy is given
by the City of Philadelphia, where police officers are required “not [to] ask
about the documentation status of people they encounter,” although
cooperation with federal agencies in “anti-terrorism and drug trafficking task
forces” is encouraged.243 New Orleans also has similar policies.244 The New
Orleans Police Department (“NOPD”) forbids officers from initiating
investigations or taking law enforcement actions due to immigration status,
“including the initiation of a stop, an apprehension, [or] arrest,” a policy

237.

U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.

This Constitution, and the [l]aws of the United States which shall be made in
[p]ursuance thereof; and all [t]reaties made, or which shall be made, under the [a]uthority of
the United States shall be the supreme [l]aw of the [l]and; and the [j]udges in every state shall
be bound thereby, any [t]hing in the Constitution or [l]aws of any [s]tate to the [c]ontrary
notwithstanding.

Id.
238.
Gulasekaram & Villazor, supra note 231, at 1700, 1704; see also 8 U.S.C.
§ 1373 (1996).
239.
Gulasekaram & Villazor, supra note 231, at 1700.
240.
See id. at 1692–93; CITY OF PHILA., OFFICE OF THE MAYOR, IMMIGRATION
& SANCTUARY CITIES:
CITY OF PHILADELPHIA ACTION GUIDE (2017),
http://beta.phila.gov/posts/office-of-immigrant-affairs/2017-02-24-immigration-sanctuarycities-city-of-philadelphia-action-guide/.
241.
See Bd. of Supervisors of the Cty. of Santa Clara Res. 2010-316 (2010).
242.
Id.; see also Morales v. Chadbourne, 793 F.3d 208, 215 (1st Cir. 2015).
Reasonable suspicion is required for police officers to stop individuals and inquire about
“them regarding their immigration status.” Morales, 793 F.3d at 215.
243.
CITY OF PHILA., supra note 240; Kittrie, supra note 49, at 1455.
244.
See NEW ORLEANS POLICE DEP’T, OPERATIONS MANUAL CH. 41.6.1,
IMMIGRATION STATUS 1 (2016).
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fitting the parameters of so-called don’t enforce policies.245 The NOPD also
explicitly states that the activities of police officers must be in compliance
with the statutory requirements, and that communications between federal
Jurisdictions
and local law enforcement agents are welcomed. 246
implementing don’t ask policies also respect judicial doctrines against brief
stops—absent reasonable suspicion—of alien individuals for inquiries on the
alien’s immigration status.247 Detention to inquire about an individual’s
immigration status has in fact been ruled a seizure implicating the Fourth
Amendment.248 Further, “no exception to the Tenth Amendment” permits
federal mandates to the states to disclose private information of residents
gathered by the exercise of sovereign capacity.249 The principle is embedded
in the Supreme Court’s ruling in Reno v. Condon,250 allowing federal
requirements of information sharing only when not requiring states “to enact
any laws or regulations, and it does not require state officials to assist in the
enforcement of federal statutes regulating private individuals.”251
Nothing within the language of 8 U.S.C. § 1373 can be read to
preempt jurisdictions from prohibiting the use of local funds to help federal
agencies in enforcing immigration laws.252 Further, the statute does not
proscribe the implementation of policies designed to prevent police officers
from proactively searching for information that would not be promptly or
inevitably available to them.253 In fact, although an argument could be
presented that the language of the statute impliedly preempts proscriptions of
information-gathering activities by police officers, it appears that the statute
was designed to foster communication between agencies of already available
information.254 It is well established that:
245.
Id.; Kittrie, supra note 49, at 1455. Multiple jurisdictions across the
country implemented policies presenting the same characteristics. Gulasekaram & Villazor,
supra note 231, at 1694.
246.
See NEW ORLEANS POLICE DEP’T, supra note 244, at 1, 3.
247.
CITY OF PHILA., supra note 240; Kittrie, supra note 49, at 1455; Pham,
supra note 48, at 982.
248.
Lopez v. Garriga, 917 F.2d 63, 69 (1st Cir. 1990) (citing Immigration &
Naturalization Serv. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 216–17 (1984)).
249.
Letter from Annie Lai et al. to Donald J. Trump, supra note 143, at 5; see
also U.S. CONST. amend. X.
250.
528 U.S. 141 (2000).
251.
Id. at 151; Letter from Annie Lai et al. to Donald J. Trump, supra note
143, at 5.
252.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1373 (1996).
253.
See id.
254.
See id.; Gulasekaram & Villazor, supra note 231, at 1703.
This Court, in considering the validity of state laws in the light of treaties or federal
laws touching the same subject, has made use of the following expressions:
[C]onflicting; contrary to; occupying the field; repugnance; difference;
irreconcilability; inconsistency; violation; curtailment; and interference. But none
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Congress, in passing 8 U.S.C. § 1373, opted not to require state
and local governments to ask for an individual’s immigration
status or mandate them to report such status to immigration
officials. Congress was well aware of the sanctuary movement
when it passed this law yet it chose not to mandate the gathering or
255
reporting of information.

Realistically, the statute only prohibits jurisdictions from imposing
restrictions on the sharing of collected information.256 An argument under
the Supremacy Clause would likely fail, because no inconsistency with the
language of the statute is created by sanctuary policies.257 Courts may
conclude, and many scholars have agreed, that “sanctuary policies [are] not
[in] violat[ion] [of] 8 U.S.C. § 1373.”258
Albeit this interpretation of the statute is probable, some jurisdictions
opted to accept the request of the federal government and vowed to strictly
implement the statute.259 Under the pressure of the DOJ, the Mayor of
Miami-Dade County ordered jails to comply with detainer requests from
federal officials—a decision later upheld by the county commission.260
V.

FLORIDA LOCALITIES

The State of Florida is no stranger to the debate around sanctuary
jurisdictions and possible defunding from the federal government.261 As a
final destination to many immigrants, both legal and illegal, Florida contains

of these expressions provides an infallible constitutional test or an exclusive
constitutional yardstick.

Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
255.
Gulasekaram & Villazor, supra note 231, at 1703 (emphasis in original).
256.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a)–(b).
257.
See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2; 8 U.S.C. § 1373; Bd. of Supervisors of the
Cty. of Santa Clara Res. 2010-316 (2010). But see Proposed Brief of Amici Curiae, supra
note 102, at 10–12.
258.
Letter from Annie Lai et al. to Donald J. Trump, supra note 143, at 2
(emphasis in original); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1373.
259.
See Skyler Swisher, Crackdown on ‘Sanctuary’ Counties by Trump Spurs
Policy Change in Miami-Dade, SUN-SENTINEL (Fla.), Jan. 27, 2017, at B3; Elise Foley,
Miami-Dade Will Abandon ‘Sanctuary’ Immigration Policies After Trump Order, Mayor
Says, HUFFPOST: POL. (Jan. 26, 2017, 7:33 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/miamidade-sanctuary-city_us_588a887ee4b0230ce61b0476.
260.
See Swisher, supra note 259; Foley, supra note 259; Alan Gomez, MiamiDade Commission Votes to End County’s ‘Sanctuary’ Status, USA TODAY (Feb. 17, 2017,
8:27
PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2017/02/17/miami-dade-countygrapples-sanctuary-city-president-trump-threat/98050976/.
261.
Foley, supra note 259; Swisher, supra note 259.
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one of the highest foreign-born populations in the country.262 In the twentyfive year span between 1990 and 2015, the percentage of foreign-born
residents of Florida grew from 12.9% in 1990 to 20.2% in 2015.263
According to the 2015 census conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau’s
American Community Survey, over four million Florida residents are foreign
born.264 Among them, 75.1% were born in Latin America.265 Online data
sources show that Florida has, within its territory, about two dozen
jurisdictions with sanctuary policies including Broward County, Palm Beach
County, and Miami Beach.266 However, many jurisdictions disagree with the
label of sanctuary that has been given to them.267 Both Broward County and
Palm Beach County affirmed their compliance with federal immigration
laws.268 Nevertheless, actions taken by the Sheriff’s Department in both
counties may be considered otherwise.269 Broward County Sheriff’s Office
stopped honoring ICE detainers after courts ruled them unconstitutional in
2014.270 Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office also enforces similar detainer
procedures.271 Moreover, in an attempt to appease their large immigrant
communities, Broward County passed a resolution defining itself as “an
inclusive county which welcomes, celebrates, and offers refuge to all
residents and visitors irrespective of race, religion, ethnicity, or national
262.
See State Immigration Data Profiles: California, MIGRATION POL’Y INST.,
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/data/state-profiles/state/demographics/CA (last visited Dec.
31, 2017); State Immigration Data Profiles: Florida, MIGRATION POL’Y INST.,
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/data/state-profiles/state/demographics/FL (last visited Dec.
31, 2017); State Immigration Data Profiles: New York, MIGRATION POL’Y INST.,
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/data/state-profiles/state/demographics/NY (last visited Dec.
31, 2017); State Immigration Data Profiles: Texas, MIGRATION POL’Y INST.,
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/data/state-profiles/state/demographics/TX (last visited Dec.
31, 2017).
263.
State Immigration Data Profiles: Florida, supra note 262.
264.
Id.
265.
Id.
266.
See Ohio Jobs & Justice PAC, The Original List of Sanctuary Cities, USA,
OJJPAC, http://www.ojjpac.org/sanctuary.asp (last updated July 29, 2017).
267.
See Swisher, supra note 259.
268.
See id.
269.
See Rebecca Sharpless, Dade, Broward Lead the Way, MIAMI HERALD
(July 24, 2014, 6:09 PM), http://www.miamiherald.com/opinion/op-ed/article1976943.html.
270.
Larry Barszewski, Broward Seeks Sanctuary from ‘Sanctuary’ Label, SUN
SENTINAL: BROWARD POL. (Mar. 14, 2017, 7:40 PM), http://www.sunsentinel.com/local/broward/broward-politics-blog/fl-blog-broward-sanctuary-city-20170314story.html.
271.
See Am. Civil Liberties Union of Fla., Report Shows Law Enforcement
Agencies in at Least 30 Florida Counties Would be Punished by Proposed Anti-Immigrant
Law (Jan. 26, 2016), http://www.aclufl.org/en/press-releases/report-shows-law-enforcementagencies-least-30-florida-counties-would-be-punished.
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origin.”272 Parallel efforts were also made by the City of West Palm Beach,
which declared itself “a welcoming city for immigrants.”273 Although noncompliance with ICE detainers is among the types of conduct that the
Executive Order is trying to eliminate, it is not established whether friendly
relationships with immigrant communities risk labeling Florida jurisdictions
as sanctuaries.274 However, one thing is clear: Some degree of confusion
exists regarding the conduct targeted by the Executive Order and the possible
consequences for non-complying jurisdictions.275
Florida State Legislators, however, are trying to solve some of the
issues and to untie the Gordian Knot.276
The Florida House of
Representatives approved a bill “prohibiting local law enforcement from
resisting compliance with federal immigration laws and [detainer] requests”
from ICE.277 Although the bill will unlikely become law—because no
discussion has occurred yet on the floor of the Senate—legislators are
showing anxiety regarding the possible consequences of the Executive
Order.278 However, the Florida House of Representatives is not the first
legislating body within state boundaries to adopt policies in compliance with
federal requests.279

272.
Broward Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs 2017–030, § 1 (2017); Chris Persaud,
Six Federal Grants to South Florida That Trump Could Threaten Under Sanctuary Cities
Order, WLRN (Mar. 16, 2017), http://www.wlrn.org/post/six-federal-grants-south-floridatrump-could-threaten-under-sanctuary-cities-order.
273.
See Peter Haden, West Palm Beach Declares Itself ‘Welcoming City’ for
Immigrants, WGCU (Mar. 28, 2017, 9:05 PM), http://news.wgcu.org/post/west-palm-beachdeclares-itself-welcoming-city-immigrants.
274.
See Exec. Order No. 13768, 82 Fed. Reg. 8799, 8801 (Jan. 25, 2017);
Garrett Epps, Trump’s Sloppy, Unconstitutional Order on ‘Sanctuary Cities’, ATLANTIC (Jan.
30,
2017),
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/01/trumps-sloppyunconstitutional-order-on-sanctuary-cities/514883/; Persaud, supra note 272.
275.
See Barszewski, supra note 270; Sacchetti & Horwitz, supra note 228.
276.
See Kristen M. Clark, Florida House Approves Ban—and Penalties—on
‘Sanctuary’
Cities,
MIAMI
HERALD,
(Apr.
28,
2017,
4:56
PM),
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/politics-government/state-politics/article147453654.html.
277.
Id.
278.
Id.; see also Daniel Ducassi, Bill Cracking Down on ‘Sanctuary Cities’
Clears First Committee Stop, POLITICO: FLA. (Mar. 13, 2017, 7:01 PM),
http://www.politico.com/states/florida/story/2017/03/bill-cracking-down-on-sanctuary-citiesclears-first-committee-stop-110339. The bill, later affirmed by the Florida House, compels
state and local governments to support enforcement of federal immigration law, barring the
creation and implementation of any law or practice hindering the operations of federal
officers. Ducassi, supra; see also Clark, supra note 276. The bill is a response to judicial
injunctions of the Executive Order, and bypasses constitutional challenges to the Executive
Order through state action. See Ducassi, supra.
279.
See Memorandum from Carlos A. Gimenez, Mayor, Miami-Dade Cty., to
Daniel Junior, Interim Dir., Corrections & Rehab. Dep’t (Jan. 26, 2017).
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Miami-Dade County

Miami-Dade is the only county in the United States where foreignborn residents constitute the majority.280 According to the latest census data
from the United States Census Bureau, 51.7% of Miami-Dade County’s
population is foreign-born, with a heavy majority being of Hispanic or
Latino heritage.281 Yet, on January 26, 2017, the day after President Trump
signed the Executive Order, Miami-Dade County Mayor Carlos Gimenez
announced his agreement with the new policies.282 The Mayor released a
memorandum to all county jails, directing them to observe federal detainer
requests.283 The memorandum stated that, “[i]n light of the provisions of the
Executive Order, I direct . . . to honor all immigration detainer requests
received from the Department of Homeland Security. Miami-Dade County
complies with federal law and intends to fully cooperate with the [F]ederal
[G]overnment.”284 In an effort to avoid the label of sanctuary city, thus
risking sanctions in the form of cuts in federal funding, Miami-Dade County
Commissioners voted in favor of the mayoral policy.285 The decision
reversed a previous county policy, approved in 2013, opposing detention as a
result of detainer requests from federal agencies.286
The 2013 policy created a two-fold threshold to allow detainers.287
First, for the county to allow ICE detainers, the federal government had to
agree to reimburse all costs associated with the detention—an agreement
which had to be in writing.288 Second, once the reimbursement was agreed
280.
See State Immigration Data Profiles: Florida, supra note 262; U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU, Quick Facts: Miami-Dade County, Florida, CENSUS.GOV,
http://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/miamidadecountyflorida/POP060210 (last visited
Dec. 31, 2017).
281.
U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 280.
282.
Jonathan Levin, Miami’s Mayor Climbs Aboard the Trump Train,
BLOOMBERG:
BUSINESSWEEK
(Feb.
16,
2017,
11:00
AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-02-16/miami-s-mayor-climbs-aboard-thetrump-train; Kate Samuelson, Miami-Dade Is No Longer a ‘Sanctuary’ for Undocumented
Immigrants, TIME: MIAMI (Jan. 27, 2017), http://www.time.com/4651518/miami-dade-mayorsanctuary-city-donald-trump/.
283.
Memorandum from Carlos A. Gimenez to Daniel Junior, supra note 279.
284.
Id.
285.
Patricia Mazzei & Douglas Hanks, Fearing Trump, Commission Drops
Miami-Dade’s ‘Sanctuary’ Protections, MIAMI HERALD (Feb. 17, 2017, 4:05 PM)
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-dade/article133413384.html.
286.
See id.; Patricia Mazzei, Miami-Dade Plans to Stop Paying for Federal
Immigration
Detentions,
MIAMI
HERALD
(Dec.
18,
2013,
6:22
PM),
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-dade/article1958627.html.
287.
See Letter from Howard Simon, Exec. Dir., ACLU of Florida et al., to
Miami-Dade Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs 3–4 (Feb. 6, 2017) (on file with ACLU of Florida).
288.
Id. at 4.
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upon, detainers would be implemented only against individuals charged or
convicted of certain enumerated offenses—principally felonies.289 Although
the Board of County Commissioners passed a resolution upholding the antidetainer policies in December of 2013, the tide changed quickly after
President Trump signed the Executive Order, and a February vote by the
same body reinstated full cooperation for detainers.290 The county’s
decisions have already presented legal consequences.291
1.

Lacroix v. Junior

On March 3, 2017, Judge Milton Hirsch of the Eleventh Judicial
Circuit in and for Miami-Dade County ruled the detention of James Lacroix,
a Haitian national, unconstitutional.292 Judge Hirsch found the coercive
conduct of ICE, pushing the Miami-Dade County jail to continue to
incarcerate Lacroix, a violation of the Tenth Amendment.293 Questioning the
constitutionality of the detainer, and denying the Miami-Dade County
alleged sanctuary city status, Judge Hirsch affirmed that: “[T]he issue raised
. . . has nothing to do with affording sanctuary to those unlawfully in this
country. It has everything to do with the separation of powers between the
state and federal governments as reflected in the Tenth Amendment to, and
in the very structure of, the United States Constitution.”294
The jail’s decision to comply with ICE’s demands to detain Lacroix
is, in the words of Judge Hirsch, “a demand with which the local government
is constitutionally prohibited from complying.”295 The beneficiaries of the
289.
Id.
290.
See Alan Gomez, Miami-Dade Commission Votes to End County’s
‘Sanctuary’
Status,
USA
TODAY
(Feb.
17,
2017,
8:27
PM),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2017/02/17/miami-dade-county-grapplessanctuary-city-president-trump-threat/98050976/; Mazzei & Hanks, supra note 285.
291.
See Elise Foley & Cristian Farias, Judge Rebukes Miami-Dade County for
Appeasing Trump on ‘Sanctuary City’ Crackdown, HUFFPOST: POL. (Mar. 3, 2017, 6:09 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/miami-dade-sanctuarytrump_us_58b9d325e4b05cf0f4008a46; Mazzei & Hanks, supra note 285.
292.
Order on Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 10, 15, Lacroix v. Junior,
No. F17-376, 2017 WL 1037453, at *1 (Fla. 11th Cir. Ct. Mar. 3, 2017); David Ovalle, Judge
Shoots Down Miami-Dade Detention Policy Adopted to Follow Trump Deportation Order,
MIAMI
HERALD
(Mar.
3,
2017,
10:06
AM),
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-dade/article136179733.html;
Kalhan Rosenblatt, Miami-Dade’s Policy of Holding Inmates for ICE Is Unconstitutional:
Florida Judge, NBC: NEWS (Mar. 3, 2017, 4:59 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/usnews/miami-s-policy-holding-inmates-ice-unconstitutional-florida-judge-n728786.
293.
See Order on Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 292, at 9–11.
294.
Id. at 5 (emphasis in original).
295.
Id. at 8. “It might well be deemed an unconstitutional exercise . . . to
insist that the states are bound to provide means to carry into effect the duties of the national
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constitutional structure are the people, whose rights and liberties are
protected through a strong-willed local government in opposition to a heavyhanded federal government.296
Judge Hirsch’s ruling lends way to the fact that, regardless of
whether or not a jurisdiction is a sanctuary—and regardless of the fact that
local agencies and officials support President Trump’s crackdown on
immigration—there are constitutional rights afforded to every person in this
country, legal or illegal, which simply cannot be infringed upon.297
2.

Creedle v. Gimenez

Tenth Amendment violations, however, are not the only claims that
have been raised against Miami-Dade County as a result of the new
policies.298 The American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) of Florida, in
conjunction with the University of Miami School of Law’s Immigration
Clinic, filed a federal suit against the county for violation of the Fourth
Amendment right against unreasonable seizures.299 In Creedle v. Gimenez,300
the action was filed on behalf of Garland Creedle, an American citizen
voluntarily detained by Miami-Dade County in response to an ICE
detainer.301 After being arrested on the evening of March 12, 2017, Creedle
was fingerprinted by county correctional officials.302 After receiving an
immigration detainer from ICE, correctional officers refused to release
Creedle upon bond being posted.303 Although notified that Creedle was an
American citizen by Creedle himself, county correctional officers did not
release him until the next day.304
The Fourth Amendment violation, alleged by the ACLU, is a direct
result of the nature of the ICE detainers implemented by Miami-Dade.305
government, nowhere delegated or [e]ntrusted . . . to them by the Constitution.” Id. (quoting
Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539, 541 (1842)).
296.
See id. at 8–9.
297.
See Order on Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 292, at 14.
298.
See Caitlin Dickerson, U.S. Citizen Detained by Mistake Sues MiamiDade
Over
Immigration
Enforcement,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
5,
2017),
http://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/05/us/immigration-sanctuary-lawsuit-miami.html.
299.
Complaint for Damages & Declaratory Relief at 12, 15, Creedle v.
Gimenez, No. 1:17-cv-22477-KMW (S.D. Fla. filed July 5, 2017); Dickerson, supra note 298.
300.
Complaint for Damages & Declaratory Relief, Creedle v. Gimenez, No.
1:17-cv-22477-KMW (S.D. Fla. filed July 5, 2017).
301.
Id. at 1.
302.
Id. at 9.
303.
Id. at 11.
304.
Id. at 1011.
305.
See Complaint for Damages & Declaratory Relief, supra note 299, at
1112.
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Since detainers are issued by immigration officers, the procedure lacks the
necessary “probable cause determination by a detached and neutral”
magistrate.306 It is indeed only logical that an immigration officer, due to the
basic nature of his position, can hardly be a neutral and detached
adjudicator.307 For the alleged violations perpetrated against him, Creedle is
seeking compensatory damages, attorneys’ fees and costs, and any additional
equitable relief deemed appropriate by the court.308 The absence of probable
cause, added to the often nonexistent presence of an arrest warrant, exposes
Miami-Dade County and its correctional agencies to hypothetically infinite
legal liability, with the costs taken on by taxpayers.309
B.

What Does Federal Defunding Mean for Florida Jurisdictions?

Cities throughout the state risk losing “hundreds of millions of
dollars” in federal funding if found not in compliance with the directives of
the Executive Order.310 However, the exact amount will depend on the
interpretation of the language of the Executive Order and the exact nature of
the targeted grants.311 Summed together, the counties of Palm Beach,
Broward, Miami-Dade, and Monroe received a total of $565 million in grants
from the federal government in 2016 alone.312 The funds are used for
programs in different areas, from education and public health, to
transportation and housing.313 Mayor Gimenez’s choice to retract previous
county policies regarding detainers is likely a response to the threat of losing
hundreds of millions of dollars in federal funding.314 In fact, “Miami-Dade
County is due to receive $355 million” in federal government money that the
county cannot afford to lose.315 In an effort to explain the rationale behind
the choice made, Gimenez affirmed that losing federal funding to keep
implementing restrictions on detainer requests is not worth the risk.316 And
although Mayor Gimenez’s choice to retract county policies is
306.
Id. at 10, 12.
307.
Id. at 10.
308.
Id. at 14.
309.
Id. at 5, 7–8.
310.
Persaud, supra note 272.
311.
See id.
312.
Id.
313.
Id.
314.
See Serafin Gomez, Miami-Dade Mayor Orders Jails to Comply with
Detention Requests After Trump’s ‘Sanctuary City’ Crackdown, FOX NEWS: POL. (Jan. 27,
2017),
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2017/01/27/miami-dade-mayor-orders-jails-tocomply-with-detention-requests-after-trumps-sanctuary-city-crackdown.html; Sanchez et al.,
supra note 17.
315.
See Gomez, supra note 314.
316.
See Pazmino et al., supra note 60; Sanchez et al., supra note 17.
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understandable under the circumstances, it is exactly the type of coerced
reaction the Constitution protects against.317
VI.

CONCLUSION

Judge William H. Orrick III of the United States District Court for
the Northern District of California issued a court order granting a motion for
nationwide injunction of section 9(a) of the Executive Order.318 After being
requested to revisit the Order in light of the Attorney General’s
memorandum clarifying the language of the Executive Order, Judge Orrick
confirmed the injunction, leaving President Trump with a difficult task:
Solve immigration problems and appease the electorate without infringing
upon constitutional rights and principles.319 The power of states to
implement and enforce their own laws is one of the cornerstones of
American democracy.320 Compelling states, counties, municipalities, and
other local jurisdictions into enforcing federal immigration laws threatens the
system’s balance, and violates the Constitution so dear to most.321
The independence of state and local jurisdictions has been
established by the Founding Fathers in hopes of a new, better world,
distinguishing itself from the crooked, corrupted, oppressive Motherland.322
Centralization of power is a dangerous threat to democracy, and risks
shifting constitutional balances to a direction of no return.323 The question
that should be asked is whether we, as a democracy, prefer independent,
empowered, knowledgeable, competent, engaged, and accountable local
governments and representatives ruling over us, or a distant, centralized,
controlling federal government.324 In promoting the ratification of the
Constitution, James Madison affirmed that:
The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the
[F]ederal [G]overnment are few and defined. Those which are to
remain in the State [G]overnments are numerous and indefinite.
317.
See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997); Sanchez et al.,
supra note 17.
318.
Order Granting the County of Santa Clara’s & City & County of San
Francisco’s Motions, supra note 97, at 1, 29–30.
319.
Id. at 25, 30; see also Dan Levine, Judge Refuses to Remove Block on
Trump Sanctuary City Order, REUTERS: POL. (July 20, 2017, 7:15 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-ruling-idUSKBN1A531K.
320.
See Printz, 521 U.S. at 928.
321.
See id. at 920–21.
322.
See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2578 (2012);
Printz, 521 U.S. at 920–21.
323.
See Printz, 521 U.S. at 928–29.
324.
See id.
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The former will be exercised principally on external objects, as
war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce . . . . The powers
reserved to the several States will extend to all the objects which,
in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and
properties of the people, and the internal order, improvement, and
prosperity of the State.325

The right answer may have indeed been given by James Madison in
his promotion of the Constitution, on January 26, 1788.326 Although an
injunction is currently in place, there still exists a real possibility that the
Attorney General, Secretary of State, and President Trump may enforce the
stated intent of the Executive Order to the detriment of states and localities
around the country, including within Florida.327 “[H]undreds of millions of
dollars” in federal grants could be taken away, to the disadvantage of the
people in communities that rely upon the funding.328 Clarification—by the
courts or the President himself—of the federal funds involved and the
sanctuary jurisdictions that will be impacted needs to be made clear, so that
states can make rational and knowledgeable decisions as to whether to
comply with the Executive Order.329

325.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, supra note 205, at 262 (James Madison).
326.
See id.; THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 293 (James Madison) (Project
Gutenberg ed.).
327.
See Complaint for Damages & Declaratory Relief, supra note 299, at 1;
Order on Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, supra note 292, at 9; Levine, supra note 319.
328.
See Persaud, supra note 272.
329.
See Letter from Annie Lai et al. to Donald J. Trump, supra note 143, at 1,
3.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

On May 11, 2017, the Supreme Court of Florida held in Doe v.
State1 that a judicial officer must be physically present at hearings that
involuntarily commit individuals to mental health facilities pursuant to
section 394.467 of the 2016 Florida Statutes,2 otherwise known as the Baker
Act.3 Fifteen mental health patients brought this case through their public
defenders in response to an email sent on behalf of a judge and magistrate
from Lee County, Florida, announcing that Baker Act hearings would be
held by teleconference from the courthouse, instead of in-person.4
Patient advocates and patients argued that holding Baker Act
hearings through teleconferences created a myriad of problems that violated
*
Clarisa Mondéjar earned her bachelor’s degree at the University of
Chicago, her master’s degree at the University of Miami, and continued her graduate studies
as a Ph.D. Candidate at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, before becoming a Juris
Doctoral Candidate at Nova Southeastern University’s Shepard Broad College of Law.
Clarisa would like to thank her mother for always providing her with constant guidance and
support. Clarisa also thanks her best friend, who inspired her to choose this topic and was
present in spirit as she wrote during the summer months of 2017. Lastly, Clarisa would like to
express her gratitude to all Nova Law Review members for their time, effort, and dedication
while editing this Comment.
1.
217 So. 3d 1020 (Fla. 2017).
2.
FLA. STAT. § 394.467 (2016). Throughout this paper, this statute will be
referred to as (“The Baker Act”) for uniformity.
3.
Doe, 217 So. 3d at 1022, 1032.
4.
Id. at 1023.
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patients’ procedural and substantive due process rights.5 These violations
would affect the fairness of these hearings and could create, or perpetuate,
abuses sought to be remedied by costly reforms that had been implemented
by the legislature since the late 1990s.6 Adversely, the respondents, judges,
and court personnel in favor of holding Baker Acts via teleconferences
argued that involuntary commitment is a civil process—as opposed to a
criminal process—which means that “no rule, statute, or constitutional
prohibition” exists banning the use of teleconferences in Baker Act
hearings.7 Respondents also argued that trial court judges had the discretion
to administer hearings, as they feel most appropriate and effective in the
absence of an express legal right or constitutional prohibition.8 The
respondents claimed—given the funding limitations of an already indebted
system—only conducting in-person Baker Act hearings was excessively
arduous, inefficient, and hindered patients’ treatment and reintroduction into
society.9 The use of teleconferences in Baker Act proceedings provides a
judge to work within a failing mental health reform system by limiting costs,
lessening wait time, improving services to the community, and increasing
efficiency in the rehabilitation and treatment of mental health patients.10
This Comment will examine the public policy and historical
development of the Baker Act,11 the debate over the Act’s constitutionality,
practicability, and the cost-benefits of the Baker Act’s community-based
treatment programs for the mentally ill.12 This Comment will also examine
calls to reform the Baker Act and the effectiveness of those reforms.13 Part
IV will analyze the practical and procedural repercussions of the holding in
Doe v. State that prohibited the use of teleconferencing in Baker Act
hearings.14 Finally, this Comment will conclude with recommendations that
acknowledge the legitimacy of the judges’ concerns within an underfunded,
short-sighted, reactionary—rather than proactive—mental health care
system.15

5.
Id. at 1026.
6.
See infra Parts IV–V.
7.
Brief for the Chief Judge of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Respondent at 2, 4, Doe v. State, 217 So. 3d 1020 (Fla. 2017) (No. SC161852).
8.
Id. at 2.
9.
See id. at 9, 20.
10.
Id. at 9–10, 14–15.
11.
See infra Part I.
12.
See infra Parts I–II.
13.
See infra Parts II–III.
14.
See infra Part IV.
15.
See infra Part V.
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The Public Policy Behind the Baker Act

The Baker Act was named after State Representative Maxine Baker,
who served as chairperson on the House Committee on Mental Health in the
1960s and into the early 1970s.16 The Florida Legislature passed the act into
law as the Florida Mental Health Act in 1971.17 The Act was an overhaul
revision of the standing mental health laws that had been in existence for
ninety-seven years.18 The Baker Act came of age when government officials
began to consider patients’ civil rights and protect patients’ rights, while also
submitting to the necessity and authority of states’ parens patriae.19 The
intent was to provide mental health patients with the choice to voluntarily
seek treatment and to provide them with their constitutional rights to liberty
and due process.20
Before the Baker Act passed, the statutes governing mental illness
could place a patient into an institution for an undetermined amount of
time.21 Patients could easily be institutionalized into a state hospital
arbitrarily if “three people signed affidavits and secured the approval of a
county judge.”22 Children could be placed with adults in these institutions,
hospitals could request and require payments from the friends or families of
the patients, and patients were limited to corresponding with only one person
while institutionalized.23

16.
STATE OF FLA. DEP’T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES MENTAL HEALTH
PROGRAM OFFICE, HISTORY OF THE BAKER ACT: IT’S DEVELOPMENT & INTENT 1 (2002),
http://www.dcf.state.fl.us/programs/samh/mentalhealth/laws/histba.pdf; see also Jim Abbott,
Maxine E. Baker, Originator of State’s Baker Act, Dies, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Fla.), Feb. 1,
1994, at C3; MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAM OFFICE & DEP’T OF MENTAL HEALTH LAW & POLICY,
2014 BAKER ACT USER REFERENCE GUIDE: THE FLA. MENTAL HEALTH ACT i, ix,
http://www.dcf.state.fl.us/programs/samh/mentalhealth/laws/BakerActManual.pdf.
17.
STATE OF FLA. DEP’T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES MENTAL HEALTH
PROGRAM OFFICE, supra note 16, at 1.
18.
Id.
19.
See id.; Parens Patriae, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
Black’s Law Dictionary defines parens patriae as the “state in its capacity as provider of
protection to those unable to care for themselves.” Parens Patriae, supra.
20.
STATE OF FLA. DEP’T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES MENTAL HEALTH
PROGRAM OFFICE, supra note 16, at 1; see also MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAM OFFICE & DEP’T OF
MENTAL HEALTH LAW & POLICY, supra note 16, at 22 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 394.459)
(explaining that patients must be accorded individual dignity, and it provides that “[a] person
who is receiving treatment for mental illness shall not be deprived of any constitutional
rights.”).
21.
STATE OF FLA. DEP’T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES MENTAL HEALTH
PROGRAM OFFICE, supra note 16, at 1.
22.
Id.
23.
Id.
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Emblematic of the deprivations and abuses of the mental health
system in Florida before the Baker Act, is the United States Supreme Court
decision in O’Connor v. Donaldson.24 Respondent, Kenneth Donaldson,
brought his original action against J.B. O’Connor, the superintendent of the
Florida State Hospital at Chattahoochee in 1957.25 Donaldson was
institutionalized by his father, who believed he was suffering from
delusions.26 After a court proceeding in Pinellas County, Donaldson was
confined for fifteen years for care, maintenance, and treatment against his
will after he “was found to be suffering from paranoid schizophrenia.”27
Throughout the fifteen years, Donaldson repeatedly demanded his release
without success.28 While the superintendent denied Donaldson’s demands
and claimed it was because he was a danger to society, Donaldson stated that
the hospital was not providing him treatment for his illness.29 Testimony at
the trial court level provided no evidence that Donaldson posed a danger to
others while he was confined.30 Donaldson never showed he was suicidal or
thought of committing an injury against himself.31 Further, Donaldson’s
demands for relief were supported by responsible individuals who were
willing to care for him and help him after his release.32 Donaldson’s college
classmate, John Lembcke, wrote the superintendent requesting Donaldson’s
release, and stated he would take care of the patient, but was refused.33 Even
a representative of the Helping Hands, a halfway house, wrote on behalf of
Donaldson in 1963 and said they would take on his care upon release.34 The
Supreme Court stated that, at the trial level, “[t]he evidence showed that
Donaldson’s confinement was a simple regime of enforced custodial care,
not a program designed to alleviate or cure his supposed illness.”35
“O’Connor described Donaldson’s treatment as milieu therapy,” which the
24.
422 U.S. 563 (1975).
25.
Id. at 564.
26.
Id. at 565.
27.
Id. at 565–66. The Mayo Clinic defines paranoid schizophrenia as “a
severe mental disorder in which people interpret reality abnormally.” Schizophrenia, MAYO
CLINIC,
http://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/schizophrenia/home/ovc20253194?p=1 (last visited Dec. 31, 2017). “Schizophrenia may result in some combination
of hallucinations, delusions, and extremely disordered thinking and behavior that impairs daily
functioning, and can be disabling.” Id. “Schizophrenia is a chronic condition, requiring
lifelong treatment.” Id.
28.
O’Connor, 422 U.S. at 565, 567–68.
29.
Id. at 565.
30.
Id. at 568.
31.
Id.
32.
Id. at 569.
33.
O’Connor, 422 U.S. at 569.
34.
Id. at 568.
35.
Id. at 569.
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hospital staff later described as a polite way of describing Donaldson’s
unstructured confinement within the hospital.36 Hospital staff confirmed that
his treatment consisted of being kept in a large room with sixty other
patients, including many who were criminally committed.37
B.

The Historical and Systematic Overhaul of the Mental Health
System: Deinstitutionalizing the Mentally Ill

As previously mentioned, the Baker Act was a product of an
evolving philosophy regarding the treatment of the mentally ill.38 Ninetyseven years came and went where mentally ill patients were locked up in
hospitals and watched over, as described in Donaldson’s case.39 Patients
who were perhaps arbitrarily institutionalized by friends, family, or doctors
could be placed with other patients who were ostensibly ill and those who
were criminally and homicidally insane.40 The mentally ill were not
considered patients who could be rehabilitated.41 Individualized treatment
with a goal of recovery was overlooked and, instead, public safety was
prioritized.42
Deinstitutionalization was introduced in the mid-1950s as a response
to an outcry by mental health advocates and politicians; they argued that
patients’ civil rights were being violated and that the system was both
ineffective and a heavy cost burden on the federal and state governments. 43
The primary goal of deinstitutionalization was to move treatment out of
commitments in hospitals and provide treatment through community-based
outpatient treatment centers.44 This movement gained steam because state
mental hospitals were extremely underfunded, outdated, and excessively
crowded.45 The Baker Act encourages patients to voluntarily admit
36.
Id.
37.
Id.
38.
See STATE OF FLA. DEP’T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES MENTAL HEALTH
PROGRAM OFFICE, supra note 16, at 1, 3.
39.
See id. at 1.
40.
See Jennifer Gutterman, Note, Waging a War on Drugs: Administering a
Lethal Dose to Kendra’s Law, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 2401, 2405 (2000); STATE OF FLA. DEP’T
OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAM OFFICE, supra note 16, at 1.
41.
Cristina Bianchi, America’s Mental Health System: Closing the Revolving
Door Between Hospitals, Correctional Facilities & the Streets, 28 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 99,
102 (2015).
42.
See Gutterman, supra note 40, at 2402.
43.
Steven Strang, Note, Assisted Outpatient Treatment in Ohio: Is Jason’s
Law Life-Saving Legislation or a Rash Response?, 19 HEALTH MATRIX: J.L. MED. 247, 250–
51 (2009); see also Bianchi, supra note 41, at 102–03.
44.
Gutterman, supra note 40, at 2406–07; Strang, supra note 43, at 250–51.
45.
Gutterman, supra note 40, at 2407; Strang, supra note 43, at 251.
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themselves into psychiatric care if they are competent, but also allows
individuals to be involuntarily committed and examined if specific criteria
are met.46 The revolution of new medications and newly created monetary
incentives by the federal government also promoted this shift.47
In 1955, Smith, Kline, and French Laboratories developed the first
antipsychotic medication to land on the market, Thorazine.48 Before the
introduction of Thorazine, the treatment of diseases, “such as schizophrenia,
[was] long-term confinement” because no medication proved effective.49
Thorazine led to mentally ill patients being prone to less violent episodes
because it relieved mental health symptoms, such as psychosis, delusion,
paranoia, hallucinations, and irritability.50 Mentally ill patients were now
considered capable of being reintroduced and integrated into society because
there was a possibility they could function within their communities.51 In
that year, an estimated 560,000 mentally ill patients from state-run hospitals
were released with no follow-up care provided.52 These new medicines,
coupled with the political environment of the 1960s and its specific focus on
civil rights, provided patients a voice.53 Concerns grew throughout the
mental health community that patients’ rights to seek and refuse treatment
were being violated.54
But the most effective and influential push away from
institutionalization of mental health patients towards deinstitutionalization
came in 1965.55 The federal government began Medicaid in 1965 and
hospitals could receive payments from patients who had Medicaid.56
However, hospitals realized that discharging mentally ill patients had
monetary benefits because patients institutionalized in state psychiatric
46.
FLA. STAT. § 394.467(1)–(2) (2016); STATE OF FLA. DEP’T OF CHILDREN &
FAMILIES MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAM OFFICE, BAKER ACT INVOLUNTARY EXAMINATION:
CRITERIA,
PROCESSES
AND
TIMEFRAMES
1
(2002),
http://www.dcf.state.fl.us/programs/samh/MentalHealth/laws/bainvex.pdf.
47.
See Bianchi, supra note 41, at 103–04; Gutterman, supra note 40, at 2406;
Strang, supra note 43, at 251.
48.
Strang, supra note 43, at 250.
49.
Id.
50.
Id.
51.
Id. at 250–51.
52.
Bianchi, supra note 41, at 103.
53.
See Gutterman, supra note 40, at 2406–07; Strang, supra note 43, at 251.
54.
Strang, supra note 43, at 251.
55.
See Ilissa L. Watnik, Comment, A Constitutional Analysis of Kendra’s
Law: New York’s Solution for Treatment of the Chronically Mentally Ill, 149 U. PA. L. REV.
1181, 1184–85 (2001) (explaining that Thorazine is also known as chlorpromazine); Bianchi,
supra note 41, at 103–04; Candice T. Player, Involuntary Outpatient Commitment: The Limits
of Prevention, 26 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 159, 168 (2015).
56.
See Watnik, supra note 55, at 1184–85.
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hospitals were excluded from the Medicaid payment system. 57 This was not
an accidental outcome of the changes made to mental health laws and its
funding made by the legislature; excluding mentally ill patients from the
Medicaid payment system was done to shift the burden and costs of
individualized medical care for patients from the federal government to the
individual states.58 By discharging patients out of state hospitals and into
community-based treatment programs, the states were able to receive
Medicaid reimbursements.59
C.
The Supreme Court’s Historical Declarations Regarding the
Constitutionality of the Baker Act and the Current Law
Florida does not specifically prohibit the use of teleconferencing to
conduct Baker Act hearings.60 However, the use of teleconferences during
these proceedings arguably works in direct opposition to case law precedent
that aims to ensure that the mentally ill are provided their constitutional right
of liberty when not dangerous to themselves or others.61 In order to commit
an individual under the Baker Act to a state mental health facility, the State
must prove specific criteria.62 When met, this criteria shows that the
57.
Id.
58.
See id.
59.
E. Fuller Torrey, Homelessness, Incarceration, Episodes of Violence:
Way of Life for Almost Half of Americans with Untreated Schizophrenia and Bipolar, MENTAL
ILLNESS POL’Y ORG., http://www.mentalillnesspolicy.org/consequences/consequences-2.html
(last visited Dec. 31, 2017); see also Bianchi, supra note 41, at 104 n.38.
60.
See FLA. STAT. § 394.467(6)(a)(2) (2016); Doe v. State, 210 So. 3d 154,
157 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2016), rev’d, 217 So. 3d 1020 (Fla. 2017); Brief for the Chief
Judge of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 7,
at 5.
61.
FLA. DEP’T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, INVOLUNTARY INPATIENT
PLACEMENT
9
(2008),
http://www.dcf.state.fl.us/programs/samh/mentalhealth/laws/involinpplac0809.pdf; cf. In re
Beverly, 342 So. 2d 481, 489 (Fla. 1977).
62.
FLA. STAT. § 394.467(1). To commit a patient involuntarily into inpatient
mental health facilities, the finding of the court must meet the following criteria by clear and
convincing evidence:
(a) He or she has a mental illness and because of his or her mental illness:
1.a. He or she has refused voluntary inpatient placement for treatment after
sufficient and conscientious explanation and disclosure of the purpose of inpatient
placement for treatment; or
b. He or she is unable to determine for himself or herself whether inpatient
placement is necessary; and
2.a. He or she is incapable of surviving alone or with the help of willing and
responsible family or friends, including available alternative services, and, without
treatment, is likely to suffer from neglect or refuse to care for himself or herself,
and such neglect or refusal poses a real and present threat of substantial harm to his
or her well-being; or
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individual is incapable of surviving alone, or that there is significant cause to
believe that the individual would inflict serious bodily harm upon himself,
and all less restrictive means and treatment alternatives were judged
inappropriate.63 This is because once the patient is involuntarily committed,
he or she is deprived of his or her liberty as provided by the Due Process
Clause of the Constitution.64
D.
The 1970s: Establishing a “Clear and Convincing Evidence”
Standard to Involuntarily Commit Patients
In the 1970s, Florida courts were preoccupied with determining the
burden of proof necessary to involuntarily commit a mentally ill patient and
were also concerned with validating the constitutionality of depriving private
citizens of their liberty while they were in such vulnerable health states.65 A
patient can be involuntarily committed through a showing of clear and
convincing evidence that they meet the requirements as set forth in the Baker
Act.66 In 1977, in In re Beverly,67 the Supreme Court of Florida held that
given that the standard of proof of civil commitment hearings was clear and
convincing evidence, the Baker Act was not unconstitutionally overbroad or
vague, as long as all the elements of the Baker Act were met by the burden of
proof described by the court.68 Strict adherence to the rules was imperative
given the serious nature of the deprivation of liberty.69 The balance between
state interests and the individual’s interest70 must be constantly evaluated and
b. There is substantial likelihood that in the near future he or she will inflict serious
bodily harm on self or others, as evidenced by recent behavior causing, attempting,
or threatening such harm; and
(b) All available less restrictive treatment alternatives that would offer an
opportunity for improvement of his or her condition have been judged to be
inappropriate.

Id.
63.
Id.
64.
U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1; see also FLA. STAT. § 394.467(1); Brief
for the Chief Judge of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent,
supra note 7, at 4; MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAM OFFICE & DEP’T OF MENTAL HEALTH LAW &
POLICY, supra note 16, at ix.
65.
See In re Beverly, 342 So. 2d at 488–90 (Fla. 1977); STATE OF FLA. DEP’T
OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAM OFFICE, supra note 16, at 1.
66.
FLA. STAT. § 394.467(1)(a)–(b).
67.
342 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1977).
68.
See id. at 486, 490.
69.
Id. at 489.
70.
Id. at 489–90. The state’s interest is to protect society from individuals
who are dangerous either to themselves or to others, while protecting the individual interest
pertains to providing individuals with their basic constitutional right of freedom without the
undue imposition of a state’s governmental restraints. Id.
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weighed.71 Neff v. State72 reiterated what the Donaldson case had already
established and held that in Florida, if an individual is mentally ill and unable
to recognize their illness, they still cannot be held against their will if they
are considered non-dangerous, capable of caring for themselves, and
ultimately able to survive despite their mental illness without help.73
E.
The 1980s and 1990s: Explicit Examinations to Determine, Caseby-Case, if Involuntary Commitment Is Necessary
By the 1980s and into the 1990s, Florida courts began to define caseby-case what clear and convincing evidence meant regarding the elements of
the Baker Act.74 They also began defining on a case-by-case basis whether
involuntary commitment was the appropriate and least restrictive measure
needed by the patient to meet his or her needs while ensuring the safety of
the public.75 Schexnayder v. State76 held that, even if a person was severely
mentally ill, the state would not meet the clear and convincing burden of
proof if a person had a place to live, had financial resources, and had
knowledge they needed medication but would periodically forget their
medication, which often led to the patient’s hospitalization.77 Despite the
patient’s mood changes and hospitalizations, the court held that these
instances did not show clear and convincing evidence that she was dangerous
to herself or the public or that these events led to substantial harm to her
well-being.78
The Everett v. State79 case, in 1988, demonstrated the incredible and
detrimental impact an incorrectly imposed court order of involuntary
commitment against an individual can have on the liberty rights of that
patient within the Baker Act system.80 The patient appealed the finding by
the circuit court that held that she be involuntarily committed at a treatment
facility to the First District Court of Appeal.81 The First District Court of
71.
72.
73.

In re Beverly, 342 So. 2d at 489–90.
356 So. 2d 901 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975); Neff, 356 So. 2d at

903.
74.
Everett v. State, 524 So. 2d 1091, 1092 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1988)
(citing Schexnayder v. State, 495 So. 2d 850, 851–52 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1986)); see also
Welk v. State, 542 So. 2d 1343, 1344–45 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
75.
See Burley v. State, 59 So. 3d 131, 134 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
76.
495 So. 2d 850 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
77.
Id. at 851–52.
78.
Id.
79.
524 So. 2d 1091 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
80.
See id. at 1092–93.
81.
Id. at 1092.
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Appeal reversed the decision of the circuit court because it found that the
State did not provide evidence that showed involuntary placement was
necessary and that she refused voluntary placement for mental health
treatment.82 The devastating result in this case was that the appeal process
endured beyond the original court order and, when the original court order
expired, she had already been ordered to continue her involuntary
placement.83 While the district court agreed that the State had not met its
burden of proof in the original hearing, the order for continuing involuntary
placement was not automatically considered null and void.84 Further, the
patient’s liberty and time spent involuntarily committed while waiting for the
appeal to be heard by the court could not be undone or recovered.85
Welk v. State86 established that if there is insufficient evidence to
show that a person poses real and current harm to themselves or others, then
involuntary commitment is not justified even if an expert testifies that
without supervision problems with the mentally ill patient will continue to
arise.87 The Fifth District Court of Appeal held in Hedrick v. Florida
Hospital Medical Center88 that even if the State can prove that the patient
shows potential for poor judgment, without the evidence of a present and
current threat to substantially harm himself or herself or someone else, the
statutory test of clear and convincing evidence was not met.89 Conclusory
statements that a patient had potential to cause substantial harm to himself
and a potential for aggression did not meet the clear and convincing evidence
standard to substantiate a court ordered continued involuntary placement
under the Baker Act.90 Even the testimony of a psychologist stating that a
patient should be institutionalized through the Baker Act—because she was
incapable of taking care of herself and surviving alone, and would cause her
own suffering through neglect and a refusal to take care of herself—did not
pass the clear and convincing evidence standard according to the First
District Court of Appeal in the Archer v. State91 case.92 The test was not met
because the psychologist conceded that the patient had not threatened to hurt

82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id.
Id.
Everett, 524 So. 2d. at 1092–93.
See id.
542 So. 2d 1343 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
See id. at 1344–45.
633 So. 2d 1153 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
Id. at 1153–54.
See id.
681 So. 2d 296 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
Id. at 300–01.
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herself or others, and the patient testified that she would take her
medication.93
To this end, the First District Court of Appeal in Lyon v. State,94 held
that a schizophrenic woman, who refused to care for herself and was “likely
to suffer from neglect,” did not show signs of a “real [or] present threat of
substantial harm” to herself or anyone else and did not meet the requirements
of involuntary commitment under the Baker Act.95 In this case, a doctor
stated that the woman would become incoherent in her speech, would be
unable to take care of herself, and would need supervision and structure
when and if she did not take her medications.96 Still, despite these
statements in the trial court hearing, the appellate court reversed the
involuntary commitment order and found that the trial court’s holding did not
meet the clear and convincing evidence burden.97 In Adams v. State,98 a
petition for the involuntary placement of a patient for treatment was not
granted because it did not meet the clear and convincing evidence burden,
since a witness mentioned in the original Baker Act petition was not present
at the hearing.99 This highlighted the ever-important issue of ensuring that
the liberty of a patient is not deprived, without confirmation that all
information and facts within the petition are confirmed by the judge, and
rendered presently clear and convincing that the patient meets all the Baker
Act requirements.100
F.
The Role of Teleconferences in Baker Act Hearings: State’s Interests
Versus Mental Health Patients’ Constitutional Rights
Historically, there are court proceedings that occur by video, such as
arraignments.101 On November 12, 1998, video hearings were suggested as a
means for involuntary commitment hearings to be held in a more convenient
and cost-effective manner.102 While some judges commented that the
videoconferences would lessen the need for patients to be transported to the
courthouse, other mental health professionals pointed out several issues
regarding mental health patients being provided their court hearings through

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 301.
724 So. 2d 1241 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (per curiam).
Id. at 1241–42; see also FLA. STAT. § 394.467 (2016).
Lyon, 724 So. 2d at 1242.
Id. at 1243.
713 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1998).
See id. at 1063–64.
See id.
FLA. DEP’T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, supra note 61, at 9.
Id.
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videoconferences.103 Many mental health patients suffer from paranoia and
will react negatively to video hearings.104 Mental health patients can be
confused and unable to understand that the videoconference was a formal
court hearing.105 Representatives from the Mental Health Program Office of
the Department of Children and Families were concerned that the use of
videos to conduct court hearings would deter mental health patients from
participating in their involuntary placement proceedings.106 Judge Winifred
Sharp, from the Fifth District Court of Appeal, admitted that it would be
difficult to make a video proceeding feel like a formal court hearing, making
it more difficult to ensure that a patient understands the proceeding was a
formalized court proceeding which determines stakes as serious as their
liberty and possible involuntary commitment.107 While the legislature never
enacted the recommendations of the Supreme Court Commission, the
Commission did recommend that to improve administrative justice during
Baker Act hearings the use of videoconferences for involuntary placement
hearings should not be used.108
The Supreme Court of Florida cited to Ibur v. State,109 which stated,
“[b]ecause involuntary commitment is a substantial deprivation of liberty at
which fundamental due process protections must attach, the patient cannot be
denied the right to be present, to be represented by counsel, and to be
heard.”110
Part of the specified criteria in the Baker Act is that an evidentiary
hearing must be conducted for involuntary inpatient treatment.111 The court
must also conduct the hearing within five court-working-days, except for
when a continuance is granted.112 And unless otherwise represented, the
individual will be appointed a public defender by the court within one courtworking-day.113 The Baker Act requires that, unless for good cause, the
hearing would be held in the county or facility where the patient was located,
as deemed appropriate.114 The hearing would need to be “convenient [for]
the patient [and] consistent with orderly procedure,” and would need to be in
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

See id.
See id.
See id.
FLA. DEP’T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, supra note 61, at 9.
Id.
Id.
765 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
Doe v. State, 217 So. 3d 1020, 1026 (Fla. 2017) (quoting Ibur, 765 So. 2d

111.
112.
113.
114.

FLA. STAT. § 394.467(2), (6) (2016).
Id. § 394.467(6)(a)1.
Id. § 394.467(4).
Id. § 394.467(6)(a)2.

at 276).
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a physical setting that is not dangerous to the patient’s condition.115
Magistrates, along with judges, are allowed to preside over these hearings.116
These procedural safeguards were established by the legislature to
protect and recognize that individuals who fell under the auspices of the
Baker Act were some of “the most vulnerable individuals of . . . society.”117
No doubt, the safeguard spelling out that hearings must be held by judges
physically present was not in the statute.118
II.

RECIDIVISM AND THE PUSH FOR REFORM

Before twenty years had passed since the Baker Act’s initial
implementation, calls for reform were prevalent throughout Florida.119
Reformers and civilians alike began to question the effectiveness of the
Baker Act system at providing patients with treatment without depriving
them of their constitutional rights.120 In many cases, mentally ill patients
could not recognize they were ill and needed services.121 The Baker Act’s
aim was to promote families and patients to voluntarily seek help at
outpatient community centers, yet patients consistently lacked the insight to
know they were ill.122 The Baker Act was originally drafted to authorize law
enforcement officers and agents to provide emergency services through
115.
Id.
116.
FLA. STAT. § 394.467(6)(a)3.
117.
Doe v. State, 217 So. 3d 1020, 1025 (Fla. 2017).
118.
Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 394.467.
119.
FLA. STAT. § 394.467; see also STATE OF FLA. DEP’T OF CHILDREN &
FAMILIES MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAM OFFICE, supra note 16, at 2; Mark D. Killian, Fairness
Commission Says Baker Act Is in Need of an Overhaul, FLA. B. NEWS (Feb. 1, 2000),
http://www.floridabar.org/news/tfbnews/?durl=%2FDIVCOM%2FJN%2Fjnnews01.nsf%2FArticles%2FD7ADEF93C0A14EE7
85256B1100775780; South Florida Sun-Sentinel Editorial Board, Baker Act Reform: Protect
the Vulnerable with Changes in Law, SUN-SENTINEL (Feb. 18, 2004), http://www.sunsentinel.com/opinion/sfl-edittdmental4feb18-story.html.
120.
See Killian, supra note 119 (explaining that in the 1990s, while the law
required a Baker Act hearing to occur within four to five days after the initial seventy-twohour involuntary commitment time had passed and a petition was filed, only 40–50% of Baker
Act hearings would occur within that time frame). Thus, 50–60% of Baker Act hearings were
not occurring within the statutory time frame, and individuals were being effectively held
against their will without committing a crime and without recourse to combat their
detainment. Id. Hence, these individuals were denied their constitutional right to due process
during this time. See id.
121.
See South Florida Sun-Sentinel Editorial Board, supra note 119.
122.
Paul F. Stavis, The Nexum: A Modest Proposal for Self-Guardianship by
Contract: A System of Advance Directives and Surrogate Committees-at-Large for the
Intermittently Mentally Ill, 16 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 21–22 (1999); see also
STATE OF FLA. DEP’T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES MENTAL HEALTH PROGRAM OFFICE, supra note
16, at 1.
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inpatient involuntary commitments to stabilize persons dangerous to
themselves or others for only seventy-two hours.123 These two elements
combined led to individuals being repeatedly involuntarily committed.124
From 1965 until 1995, involuntary commitments increased dramatically,125
and in 2002, over 900 Florida adult patients were admitted to hospitals
through the Baker Act over four times.126 In one extreme case, a patient
received forty-one examinations, and cost the State of Florida in excess of
$81,000.127
Reforms attempting to overhaul the Baker Act in 1996 and 1999 did
not rid Florida’s Mental Health system of the constitutional abuses against
patients.128 The overhaul, from as recently as 1996, attempted to lessen
inappropriate commitments, such as vulnerable elderly individuals who were
committed despite not needing psychiatric treatment.129 These abuses
continued because patients became vulnerable once they were placed in the
seventy-two hour hold and unable to voluntarily make any decisions until
either released from the hospital or released by a judge.130 Further, while the
law guarantees that involuntary commitment will be imposed upon an
individual when all other methods are exhausted and the commitment is
considered the least restrictive means for that patient to receive help, the
definition of least restrictive is in itself up for interpretation.131 Receiving
facilities and hospitals are allowed to hold a patient for seventy-two hours if
the patient meets the involuntary commitment criteria.132 However, they
may also ask a judge to allow them to hold a patient for longer periods if the
facility feels that the person is a harm to themselves or others.133 In these

123.
South Florida Sun-Sentinel Editorial Board, supra note 119.
124.
See id.
125.
See Torrey, supra note 59.
126.
South Florida Sun-Sentinel Editorial Board, supra note 119.
127.
Id.
128.
See Jonathan Abel, Police Resort to Baker Act for a 7-Year-Old’s
Tantrum, TAMPA BAY TIMES (Fla.), Feb. 14, 2009, at 1B; Carol Marbin Miller, Locked in
Hospital, Woman Caught in Baker Act Fight, MIAMI HERALD: MIAMI-DADE CTY. (Aug. 18,
2015,
9:05
PM),
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miamidade/article31483943.html.
129.
Miller, supra note 128.
130.
Id.; see also STATE OF FLA. DEP’T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES MENTAL
HEALTH PROGRAM OFFICE, supra note 46, at 3.
131.
See Miller, supra note 128; South Florida Sun-Sentinel Editorial Board,
supra note 119.
132.
Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 394.467(1)–(2) (2016) (referring to the criteria a
patient must meet by clear and convincing evidence in order to be involuntarily committed
under the Baker Act).
133.
Miller, supra note 128.
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instances, the facility receives Medicaid money to cover the cost of
treatment—putting a price tag on each Baker Act patient’s head.134
A.
Unfunded and Short-Sighted Reforms Lead to a Resurgence of Old
Abuses and Re-Institutionalization via Criminalization and Incarceration
In 1997, the Supreme Court of Florida Commission on Fairness
organized and evaluated whether the 1970s Baker Act was providing
treatment, access, and opportunities to participate and receive services
through the state court system in an equal manner.135 The chair of the
Commission was Eleventh Circuit Judge Gill S. Freeman, and she wrote that
Florida “failed to develop . . . adequate . . . community programs [that met]
the needs of its people.”136 In 1997, the Commission reported that over half
a million people in the State of Florida suffered from mental illness—more
than 300,000 from Alzheimer’s; that “more than 70,000 [people] were
involuntarily examined [by] the Baker Act;” and close to “20,000 petitions
for involuntary civil commitment [were filed requesting] psychiatric
treatment.”137 The Commission focused on the idea that inadequate funding
was the main problem in meeting the goals and purpose described by the
1970s Baker Act.138 The system was slowed down and, as a result,
detentions in involuntary civil commitments became lengthier, and abuses
began to increase because monetary gains could be achieved by holding
individuals for longer than necessary, especially with regard to the elderly. 139
“[T]he tension between fiscally driven policy and clinically desirable
outcomes” has been named the key cause of these issues.140 The switch from
treating mentally ill patients with federally funded money to providing them
treatment through state-funded programs has caused a major shift in how
treatment is provided to patients and what patients qualify for state-funded
help.141
134.
Id.; see also Killian, supra note 119.
135.
See Killian, supra note 119.
136.
Id.
137.
Id.
138.
See id.
139.
See id.
140.
Jeffrey L. Gellar, Excluding Institutions for Mental Diseases from Federal
Reimbursement for Services: Strategy or Tragedy?, 51 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1397, 1397
(2000).
141.
See id. at 1399; Derek Gilliam, Panel Looks at Mental Health Reform;
Proper Treatment and Funding Could Help Many More in Need, FLA. TIMES-UNION, Jan. 30,
2015, at B8 (explaining that this tension in 2015 was a result of Medicare only reimbursing
60% of treatment provided to patients who qualified for Medicare funds, and the lack of funds
coupled with a “lack of uniformity [between] mental health courts, . . . a shortage of
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Other major issues that the Commission cited as to why the Baker
Act needed reform were: (1) time frames were not defined and up to
interpretation—five days could mean “five working days or five consecutive
days;” (2) no due process was afforded to a patient until the court hearing
occurred; (3) “justice system participants [were] not always . . . trained on
[the] mental health issues” they were either representing or making
judgments; (4) almost exclusively, mental health patients were only
represented by public defenders; (5) the quality of representation was not
uniform, despite most being represented by their county’s public defender
office; (6) resources to public defenders were not uniform; (7)
communication about the priority which these cases were to take in public
defender offices was not uniform; (8) compliance by state attorneys’ offices
to represent and participate at every involuntary commitment hearing did not
always occur, leading to the release of dangerous patients; (9) law
enforcement officials and agencies lacked training on mental health as well;
and (10) persons were, and could be, involuntarily committed because of the
vindictiveness of an enraged spouse or neighbor given some officials were
not trained properly.142 Beyond these issues cited by the Commission, the
deinstitutionalized system depended on patients who lacked self-recognition
and insight by mental health patients that they were sick and needed help.143
Mental health advocates argued that as the system stood in 2004, a
reform was needed because the system “deinstitutionaliz[ed] . . . persons
with mental illness [away] from . . . mental health hospitals” and, ultimately,
led them to “their re-institutionalization [within] the criminal justice
system.”144 In 1992, a Public Citizen Survey found that sometimes
individuals with no charges against them are incarcerated because they are
waiting for a psychiatric evaluation, a hospital bed, or transportation to the
hospital.145 One sheriff in Florida stated, “I have had mentally ill inmates in
paper gowns in holding cells for close observation for up to six weeks before
we could find a hospital bed for them.”146

psychiatrists, and [a] need for flexible spending” created a system that was constantly in
turmoil).
142.
Killian, supra note 119.
143.
Id.; see also Stavis, supra note 122, at 21–22.
144.
Fla. H.R. Comm. on Mental Health, HB 463 (2004) Staff Analysis 6 (Apr.
1, 2004); see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EMERGING JUDICIAL STRATEGIES FOR THE MENTALLY
ILL IN THE CRIMINAL CASELOAD: MENTAL HEALTH COURTS IN FORT LAUDERDALE, SEATTLE,
SAN
BERNADINO,
AND
ANCHORAGE
2,
10
(2000),
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/182504.pdf.
145.
E. FULLER TORREY, OUT OF THE SHADOWS: CONFRONTING AMERICA’S
MENTAL ILLNESS CRISIS 37 (1997).
146.
Id.
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B.
The Disastrous Failures of Deinstitutionalization and the Move to
Implement New Reforms in 2004
In July 1998, forty-three year old Alan Singletary of Seminole
County, Florida, killed Deputy Eugene Gregory after a thirteen-hour standoff
ensued over a simple landlord-tenant dispute.147 Singletary had untreated
schizophrenia, and his family had sought help for him for years without
success.148 The landlord-tenant dispute quickly plummeted into a confusing
and unsettling “standoff between Singletary, Seminole [Florida] Sheriff’s
deputies, and SWAT team members.”149 Ultimately, Singletary died after
killing Deputy Gregory and wounding two other law enforcement officers.150
Politicians and law enforcement agents would state that this incident was
emblematic of a growing “law enforcement and humanitarian issue”
regarding the treatment of mentally ill patients.151 While Florida was
considered a pioneer in mental health law, heavy burdens induced upon law
enforcement, the court system, and hospital crisis units made the
practicalities of enforcing the 1971 Baker Act exceedingly difficult.152
Loopholes in implementing the law existed and continuing care was not
provided.153 If an inpatient bed was not readily available, that patient was
released, and the continued care they needed was not always provided.154
By 2004, a call for Baker Act reform headed by Seminole County
Sheriff Don Eslinger, made it to the State Legislature calling for sustained
outpatient commitment orders combined with intensive mental health
services.155 On the session’s last day, a major rewrite of the Baker Act was
instituted.156 The reform was enacted into law by Governor Jeb Bush in
2004.157 The push was to begin to enact reforms; to create avenues which
147.
In Memoriam…, CATALYST: SPECIAL FLA. EDITION (Treatment Advocacy
Ctr., Arlington, Va.), Summer 2004, at 9.
148.
Id.
149.
Id.
150.
Id.
151.
Jan Pudlow, Baker Act Rewrite Calls for Outpatient Treatment, FLA. B.
NEWS, June 1, 2004, at 7.
152.
Lilac, Editorial, Sensible Help; Our Position: Continuing Treatment
Should Be Required for Violent Mental Patients., ORLANDO SENTINEL (Fla.), Jan. 25, 2004, at
G2; see also FLA. STAT. § 394.467 (2016); In Memoriam..., supra note 147, at 9; Killian,
supra note 119.
153.
Lilac, supra note 152; see also In Memoriam…, supra note 147, at 9.
154.
TORREY, supra note 145, at 10; Lilac, supra note 152.
155.
See Pudlow, supra note 151.
156.
Id.
157.
New Help, New Hope, in Florida, CATALYST: SPECIAL FLA. EDITION,
(Treatment Advoc. Ctr., Arlington, Va.), Summer 2004, at 1; see also FLA. STAT. § 394.467
(2016).
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provide mental health patients with the resources they need—while keeping
the public safe: to not create confusion in an underfunded mental health
system; and to not overburden the court system.158 Mental health advocates
believed that people with serious mental illness could avoid hospitalization if
they received early interventions and treatments that were appropriate before
their mental health deteriorated.159
Mental health advocates began to look at other states’ mental health
systems and eventually fixated on New York’s Kendra’s Law.160 The law in
New York authorized court ordered assisted outpatient treatment to
individuals with mental illness.161 Kendra’s Law, developed after a man
with severe mental illness who was unable to comply with doctor’s orders
and medical prescriptions, pushed thirty-two-year-old Kendra Webdale into a
New York City subway train and killed her.162 Many Baker Act reforms
were passed in 2004, intending to solve the problems that were discussed
above.163 However, the amount allotted to institute these reforms was
devastatingly under the estimated $150 million needed to institute Kendra’s
Law in its first five years.164 Citing only to a 25% government match and
one additional administrator at each mental health location to input
additional data, the bill only loosely defined its financial terms and
reforms.165
Judges and other legal personnel in Florida’s criminal system argued
that persons with mental illness often committed misdemeanors and would
cycle in and out of county jails.166 This was attributed by judges and legal
professionals in the criminal legal community as resulting from persons with
mental illness not being diagnosed correctly; the lack of management of
mental health patients outside inpatient facilities, and that for some
individuals treatment only occurred when in jail, but was discontinued, along
with their use of medications, once released from imprisonment.167 Some
even argued that the newest rewrite of the Baker Act would save money by

158.
159.

See Pudlow, supra note 151.
Fla. H.R. Comm. on Mental Health, HB 463 (2004) Staff Analysis 6 (Apr.

1, 2004).
160.
See South Florida Sun-Sentinel Editorial Board, supra note 119.
161.
Id.
162.
Id.
163.
Id.; see also Fla. H.R. Comm. on Mental Health, HB 463 (2004) Staff
Analysis 1.
164.
See Fla. H.R. Comm. On Mental Health, HB 463 (2004) Staff Analysis
12; South Florida Sun-Sentinel Editorial Board, supra note 119.
165.
Fla. H.R. Comm. On Mental Health, HB 463 (2004) Staff Analysis 12–13.
166.
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 144, at 9.
167.
Fla. H.R. Comm. on Mental Health, HB 463 (2004) Staff Analysis 6.
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keeping patients out of a revolving door of expensive hospitals and jails.168
While others predicted oppositely and believed that the legislation that came
with no funding would, in fact, overburden courts and create confusion; and
the workload cost, while not determined, would undoubtedly be excessive.169
The legislation was deemed by many as a mandate without resources, both in
physical and monetary support.170 Even the House of Representatives’ Staff
Analysis Report stated that HB 463 would create a recurring fiscal impact,
but only estimated the impact to be at $636,608 to $954,912.171
Given that the laws put into place in 2004 were modeled after New
York’s Kendra’s Law, the recurring estimated amount to fund SB 700/HB
463 was grossly underestimated over the actual cost of $150 million to
institute Kendra’s Law in New York.172 The $150 million was only allotted
to pay for the first five years of its implementation.173 Beyond the
considerable discrepancy between the amount used to fund Kendra’s Law
and the amount estimated to institute the 2004 reforms, the workload cost
was described as the most detrimental in the 2000 Commission on Fairness
Report, which stated that more training on mental health issues was needed
and more thorough efforts by those representing and involuntarily
committing patients needed to be provided to both protect the patient and the
state’s interests.174 Judge Mel Grossman from the Seventeenth Circuit
pointed to the fact that the legislation entitled patients to resources that the
State did not currently have.175 “[T]he statute talks about entitlements to
guardian advocates. In most areas of the state, there are very few people.
[You are] talking about people committing to multi-year supervision,
because mental illness is not something that is cured overnight. I think there
will be some difficulty there.”176 President of the Florida Public Defender
Association, Nancy Daniels, stated that the new legislation would very likely
“bring a lot of new cases into the system.”177
A major problem that Kendra’s Law faced in New York, and persists
as a major concern in Florida, is that the mentally ill will become
incarcerated, homeless, and loiter in public spaces.178 Laws focused on
168.
Pudlow, supra note 151.
169.
Id.
170.
Id.
171.
Fla. H.R. Comm. on Mental Health, HB 463 (2004) Staff Analysis 14.
172.
Id.; see also South Florida Sun-Sentinel Editorial Board, supra note 119.
173.
See South Florida Sun-Sentinel Editorial Board, supra note 119.
174.
See Fla. H.R. Comm. on Mental Health, HB 463 (2004) Staff Analysis 12;
Killian, supra note 119; South Florida Sun-Sentinel Editorial Board, supra note 119.
175.
Pudlow, supra note 151.
176.
Id.
177.
Id.
178.
See id.; Watnik, supra note 55, at 1186–87.
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deinstitutionalizing mental health, such as Kendra’s Law, moved away from
traditional notions of mental illness treatment that institutionalized patients in
hospitals where they received structured, guided, and controlled care.179
Kendra’s Law was a move towards deinstitutionalization of mental health
treatment for patients.180 The move to deinstitutionalize allowed patients to
gain liberty in exchange for treatment.181 However, those who are
imminently at danger often qualify for outpatient treatment until an actual
danger, risk, or harm occurs.182 While patients gain their liberty and freedom
through this process, the discharge of thousands of mentally ill patients from
psychiatric hospitals, without providing a means to ensure that those same
patients receive and take the medications they need to stay healthy, creates a
crisis produced by deinstitutionalization.183
One major contribution to the predicted workload increase was a
new requirement that all Baker Act cases be reviewed every six months,
making for heavy traffic within the court system without any resources or
means to meet the excess demands on the court system. 184 Predicting these
difficulties, a prosecutor and chair for the House Appropriations Committee,
Republican Bruce Kyle put in an amendment that funds would be provided
to “state attorneys and public defenders” to assuage the predicted increase
workload.185 However, the amendment was later taken off, before the bill
was actually passed in the House by final vote 100 to 15.186 Ultimately, the
bill was passed and predictions were that hearings would double or even
triple, yet few resources were offered by politicians to alleviate
implementing laws through practical procedures.187 Judge Grossman stated
the frustration felt by many: “They gave us no money to go with this. They
[did not] give us any new judges. It is an unfunded mandate.”188

179.
See Pudlow, supra note 151; South Florida Sun-Sentinel Editorial Board,
supra note 119; E. Fuller Torrey & Mary Zdanowicz, Why Deinstitutionalization Turned
Deadly, WALL ST. J. (N.Y.), Aug. 4, 1998, at A18.
180.
See South Florida Sun-Sentinel Editorial Board, supra note 119.
181.
Watnik, supra note 55, at 1185–86; see also TORREY, supra note 145, at 8,
10.
182.
See Watnik, supra note 55, at 1187 n.29; Torrey & Zdanowicz, supra note
179.
183.
See Torrey & Zdanowicz, supra note 179.
184.
Pudlow, supra note 151.
185.
See id.
186.
Id.
187.
Id.
188.
Id.
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C.
The Curious Case of Cindy Mertz: Abuses Recalling Back to
Florida’s Mental Health System Pre-Baker Act Still Exist
A systematic upheaval, the deinstitutionalization of a system, and a
revolving door of reforms have not rid Florida’s Mental Health System of the
abuses and problems that the Baker Act promised and aimed to resolve since
1971.189 The case of Cindy Mertz is one case that typifies this abuse.190
Mertz was an intellectually disabled twenty-one-year-old who was held
under the Baker Act in 2015.191 She was a child of abuse, placed into the
foster system, and eventually adopted by a family in 2008.192 Against the
wishes of her adopted family who became her legal guardians, Mertz was
locked into North Tampa Behavioral Health Hospital instead of the statefunded group home where staff and her family had placed her originally.193
North Tampa Behavioral Health is owned by Acadia Healthcare—a
conglomerate that runs 225 health facilities in thirty-seven states.194 North
Tampa Behavior Health came into trouble, only a year earlier, when a
woman admitted herself into the hospital voluntarily and was then refused
release.195 The hospital was also criticized in 2014 for not ensuring that
patients were competent to consent when admitting themselves pursuant to
what the Baker Act laws in Florida require.196 At the time the article was
printed, August 18, 2015, Mertz had been locked up for three weeks in the
North Tampa Behavioral Health Hospital, well beyond the seventy-two hour
hold prescribed by the Baker Act.197 Nikki Drake, a board member of the
National Association for Mental Illness, wrote an email to hospital staff on
August 13, 2015, asking what needed to be done in order for Mertz to leave
the hospital.198 She stated in the email, “[s]he can[not] live there. You
[cannot] cure her developmental disability.”199 Two days after the original
article was published in the Miami Herald, Mertz was sent back to her group

189.
See FLA. STAT. § 394.467(1) (2016); Bianchi, supra note 41, at 102–04,
113, 117–19; Editorial, Baker Act Is Inadequate and Overused, FLA. TIMES-UNION, Nov. 8,
2015, at F4; Miller, supra note 128.
190.
See Miller, supra note 128.
191.
Id.
192.
Id.
193.
Id.
194.
Id.
195.
Miller, supra note 128.
196.
Id.
197.
Id.
198.
Id.
199.
Id.
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home.200 The original arguments for keeping her in the hospital no longer
appeared to apply as reasons for keeping her in the facility.201
Mertz’s case is not unique, and it is possible under the Baker Act to
be taken against one’s will legally.202 Richard Smith’s seven-year-old son
was involuntarily committed into a mental institution by officers and school
officials when he threw a temper-tantrum in his second-grade class.203 After
reporting to the boy’s elementary school, seeing a classroom torn apart,
hearing he stepped on a teacher’s foot, and battered another school official,
the officers decided that the boy needed to be evaluated for his mental
health.204 While school officials and officers believe that their decision to
have the boy involuntarily committed under the Baker Act was valid, other
legal officials, and the boy’s parents, believe that this was an abuse of the
mental health system, given that the most harm caused was stepping on a
teacher’s foot.205 In Pinellas County alone, in the school year of 2008 to
2009, between August and early February, the Pinellas School Police
reported that it Baker Acted eighty-three children within its system alone.206
III.

REFORM FAILURE WITHIN FLORIDA’S BAKER ACT SYSTEM AND THE
CAUSES OF SYSTEMIC ABUSE

The numerous allegations of abuse and the general overbreadth of
those alleged abuses have many causes.207 The 2004 reforms were instituted
as a humane measure that would prevent the mentally ill from hurting
200.
Carol Marbin Miller, Woman Locked in Florida Mental Hospital Released
to Her Group Home, MIAMI HERALD: FLA. (Aug. 20, 2015, 11:56 AM),
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/state/florida/article31620170.html.
201.
See id.; Miller, supra note 128.
202.
See FLA. STAT. § 394.467 (2016); Abel, supra note 128.
203.
Abel, supra note 128.
204.
Id.
205.
See id.
206.
Id. (comparing this number to the fact that the figure of eighty-three
children, in less than six months, excludes all other legal agencies in the area and is specific to
the Pinellas School Police Force); see also Laura C. Morel, Numbers Show Surge in Baker Act
Exams of Kids in Tampa Bay Area, TAMPA BAY TIMES: NEWS (Dec. 19, 2016, 10:55 AM),
http://www.tampabay.com/news/publicsafety/numbers-show-surge-in-baker-act-exams-ofkids-in-tampa-bay-area/2306799 (referring to the fact that children are being committed
involuntarily by the school system and parents because there is no oversight of the initial
commitment by the court system and patient/minor child confidentiality prevents further
investigation into the matter).
207.
Florida Supreme Court Justices Ask for More Judges, SUN-SENTINEL
(Dec. 15, 2016, 1:52 PM), http://www.sun-sentinel.com/news/politics/fl-more-judges-needed20161215-story.html; see also Miller, supra note 128; Editorial, supra note 189; Associated
Press, Involuntary Health Commitments Surge in Minors, HEALTH NEWS FLA. (Dec. 20, 2016),
http://www.health.wusf.usf.edu/post/involuntary-mental-health-commitments-surge-minors.
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themselves or others.208 Yet, a Times-Union editorial declared—as recent as
November 2015—the 2004 reforms had not solved the problems they set out
to resolve.209
A.
Misuse and Abuse of the Baker Act System: Ever-Increasing
Involuntary Commitments
From 2004 to 2015, involuntary commitments in Florida increased
by 64%.210 The Times-Union reported that involuntary commitments were
often misused and abused.211 The article referenced reported Baker Act
hospitalizations by schools and parents who cannot or will not care for their
difficult children.212 Meanwhile, the frail, elderly population—who suffer
from dementia and act out as a symptom of the disease or other illnesses—
are also often Baker Acted213 rather than placed where their needs would be
better addressed.214 While mental health advocates applauded the Baker Act
in the 1970s, they are now concerned with the Baker Act being a dumping
ground used to commit and institutionalize individuals when the system has
nowhere else to place them.215
Continuous increases in involuntary commitments also reflect mental
health advocates’ concerns regarding the validity of research used to promote
the status-quo and subdue the call for more reforms of the current Baker Act
system.216 While Baker Act patients are in contact with substance abuse
services, mental health advocates question the validity of that research and
state real concerns about a missing connection or coordination between
those Baker Acted and substance abuse services.217 This problem becomes
compounded in situations where the mentally ill are homeless or without
resources and help once released.218 Once released, the revolving door

208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

See Editorial, supra note 189.
See id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Miller, supra note 128; see also Voices on Baker Act Reform, TREATMENT
ADVOC.
CTR.,
http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/storage/documents/voices_on_baker_act_reform.pdf
(last visited Dec. 31, 2017). It is generally understood and accepted that if someone is Baker
Acted, he or she has been involuntarily committed under the Baker Act. Voices on Baker Act
Reform, supra.
214.
See Editorial, supra note 189.
215.
Id.
216.
See id.
217.
Id.
218.
Id.
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becomes almost inevitable as patients leave with only pills, a prescription,
and no easy access to continued mental health care.219
The Baker Act Reporting Center reported that thirty-one mental
health patients were Baker Acted sixteen or more times in one year alone.220
From 2004 to 2013, close to 350 patients were involuntarily committed over
thirty-six times or more.221 This problem worsened when each institution
and the bodies of professionals who were required to act in involuntary civil
commitments acted independently and disjointedly.222 The Times-Union
Editorial Board opined and warned that these issues were a product of a
broken system and an obvious result of legislators passing reforms without
providing the necessary funding to enact the reforms.223 Florida ranks fortyninth out of fifty states regarding the amount of money it spends on mental
health.224 Annette Christy, who was in charge of Florida’s Baker Act
Reporting Center in 2015, stated that there was a need for funds and that,
unfortunately, tragedy appears to be one of the few triggers that will
stimulate the funds needed.225
B.
Competing Authorities and Interests: Who Prevails? How Can
Information Be Communicated to Meet the Needs of the Patient and
Competing Authorities?
W.M. v. State226 established that multiple divisions and courts
representing the State can have concurrent jurisdiction overseeing the
involuntary inpatient placement hearings of patients involuntarily
committed.227 This can result in what is seen in the W.M. case: A patient
can be committed for a short period of time and then be mandated by a
facility administrator to stay a longer term than the circuit court’s initial
determination.228 The facility administrator only needed to determine the
patient was incompetent to act on his or her own behalf.229 Further, given the
confidential nature of the patients and separate oaths of confidentiality
between the patient, psychiatrists, lawyers, guardians, and mental health
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
supra note 128.

Editorial, supra note 189.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Editorial, supra note 189.
Id.
992 So. 2d 383 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2008).
Id. at 384, 388.
Id. at 384–86.
FLA. STAT. § 394.467(1)–(2) (2016); W.M., 992 So. 2d at 384; Miller,
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advocates, necessary oversight over each patient, case, the facilities, and
treatment becomes almost impossible without inherently violating a patient’s
right to privacy.230
Referring back to the case of the Cindy Mertz, a major cause of her
alleged kidnapping resulted from competing authorities, interests, and an
inability to communicate clearly.231 Communication between judges, mental
health advocates, and the hospital was not handled in-person and primarily
done through varying forms of technology—either email or the phone.232
These technological communications prevented immediate actions from
being taken, and allowed for delays, as the allegations of Mertz’s advocates
and guardian—based primarily on their communications over phone and
email with hospital staff and Mertz—were weighed against the alleged
observations of hospital staff and administrators.233 The Miami Herald
reported, “[l]ong email threads among Drake, [Mertz’s advocate], Mertz’s
guardian, her behavior analyst, and hospital staffers beg[a]n on Aug[ust]
[third], and bec[a]me increasingly frantic.”234 J. Rob Phillips, the Director of
Clinical Services at North Tampa Behavioral Health, validated the hospital’s
decision to keep the developmentally impaired woman in the hospital by
stating in an email that Mertz had shown “suicidal ideation[s] and suicidal
gestures” and that it would be sending Mertz to court to keep her in its
facility.235 Meanwhile, Drake wrote back that the woman was not psychotic
and, when he spoke to her over the phone, she sounded over-medicated
causing her speech to be severely slurred.236 Access to the patient was
regulated by the hospital, and the patient’s access to the court was dependent
upon the facility or hospital where they are admitted.237 This holds true until
the patient is deemed by a judge to have met the criteria for release, and he or
she is released by the judge from the facility’s control.238

230.
See Miller, supra note 128 (discussing how doctors referred to the
patient’s confidentiality as a reason why they would not be able to provide more reasons as to
why they were not releasing Mertz as requested).
231.
See id.
232.
See id.
233.
See id.
234.
Id.
235.
Miller, supra note 128.
236.
Id.
237.
Id.
238.
FLA. STAT. § 394.467(7)(d) (2016); Miller, supra note 128.
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DOE V. STATE: DOES TELECONFERENCING BAKER ACT HEARINGS
PROVIDE A NECESSARY REMEDY OR VIOLATE AN INDIVIDUAL’S
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS?

Video technology developed and advanced at the same time that
Florida’s judiciary confronted many financial limitations.239 Budget cuts
forced courts and the judiciary to create new and efficient ways to meet the
rigorous demands of their judicial obligations, and ultimately led to an
inquiry into how technology could be used for efficient and effective
change.240 Statutory prohibitions and rule-based prohibitions do not exist
regarding the use of videoconferencing during Baker Act proceedings.241 At
the time that the Supreme Court of Florida considered this case, case law did
not exist stating that Baker Act hearings by videoconferences were
prohibited by the Constitution.242
On March 30, 2016, two seemingly innocuous email lines began a
firestorm of legal debate, questioning the procedural validity,
constitutionality, decision-making, and duties of judges with regard to using
videoconferencing during Baker Act Hearings.243 As part of her daily
routine, Judicial Assistant for the Honorable Judge Swett, Kate Hroncich,
sent an email to Public Defender Kathleen Smith with the subject of Baker
Acts on Friday.244 The email stated: “Per Judge Swett, he will be doing
Baker Acts beginning this Friday via Polycom. Thank you.”245
These two lines began a legal battle between mental health officials,
attorneys for the mentally ill, and trial judges who presided over Baker Act
hearings.246 The debate would highlight the problematic procedural structure
of the Baker Act, showcase how the mentally ills’ due process rights can be
easily violated, re-emphasize the importance and need for reform, and
underscore the continued lack of effective reform. 247 Beyond whether the
judge’s email violated an established legal procedure, petitioners questioned
whether the patients’ constitutional and due process rights were violated as a
result of this procedure.248
239.
Brief for the Chief Judge of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 7, at 20.
240.
Id.
241.
Id. at 2.
242.
Id.
243.
See Doe v. State, 217 So. 3d 1020, 1023 (Fla. 2017); Petitioners’ Initial
Brief at 5–6, Doe v. State, 217 So. 3d 1020 (Fla. 2017) (No. SC16-1852).
244.
Petitioners’ Initial Brief, supra note 243, at 5.
245.
Doe, 217 So. 3d at 1023; Petitioners’ Initial Brief, supra note 243, at 5.
246.
See Doe, 217 So. 3d at 1023.
247.
See id. at 1022; infra Part IV (A)–(C).
248.
Petitioners’ Initial Brief, supra note 243, at 1–2, 15.
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A.
The Practical and Procedural Costs of the 2004 Baker Act Reforms:
Insufficient Resources and the Advent of Teleconferencing for Baker Act
Hearings
In order to understand the significance of Doe, the historical and
legal context of the judges’ plight must be understood and considered.249
Despite the legislature passing Baker Act reforms in 2004, the Florida
Legislature had not added circuit or county judgeships in ten years to support
the enactment of those reforms.250 Only in 2016, were twelve new
judgeships recommended and announced by the Supreme Court of Florida.251
Yet, these recommendations came ten years behind schedule as reforms from
2004 increased judges’ workloads regarding Baker Act hearings.252 From
2010 until 2015 alone, some counties reported a 50% or more increase in
Baker Act evidentiary hearings for minors alone.253 With no new judgeships
added, judges were required to meet the needs of these patients and conduct
the hearings at the courthouse or at patients’ facilities.254 When judges
commuted to patient facilities, they would often have to wait as patients met
with their attorneys.255 Wait time and time lost in travel backed up the
hearing schedule in an already bogged down system.256 Costs accumulated
as a result of the travel and wait time incurred by judges traveling from
facility to facility.257 Yet, the travel and wait time was not limited to
judges—all legal and medical authorities involved in the case were also
required to attend the hearings, imparting more fees on the state through the
presence and appearance of state, medical, and law enforcement officials. 258
249.
See Florida Supreme Court Justices Ask for More Judges, supra note 207
(discussing how Florida lawmakers have not added judgeships in a decade and how
judgeships have been impacted by heavy burdens on the state’s fiscal health because of crises
such as the mortgage crisis).
250.
See Brief for the Chief Judge of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 7, at 13; Fla. S. Comm. on Child., Fams. & Elder
Aff., 2004 Regular Session: Summary of Legislation Passed 83 (2004), available at
http://archive.flsenate.gov/publications/2004/senate/reports/summaries/pdf/sessum04.pdf;
Florida Supreme Court Justices Ask for More Judges, supra note 207.
251.
Florida Supreme Court Justices Ask for More Judges, supra note 207.
252.
See Brief for the Chief Judge of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 7, at 13; Florida Supreme Court Justices Ask for
More Judges, supra note 207; Morel, supra note 206.
253.
Morel, supra note 206.
254.
Brief for the Chief Judge of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 7, at 13–15.
255.
Id. at 14 n.15.
256.
See id. at 14.
257.
Id. at 14–15.
258.
See id.
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Meanwhile, judges would argue that the courthouse did not provide patients
with a proper and safe setting to hold Baker Act evidentiary hearings.259
Patients traveled to locations that were unfamiliar to them and followed strict
protocols that were usually used to control “criminals or those accused of
crime[s].”260 “The Baker Act [mandates] that the patients’ individual
digniti[es] [be upheld and] respected at all times,” and these procedures were
in direct opposition of that humane mandate.261 Holding cells were the only
location where patients involuntarily committed could wait for their
evidentiary hearings as no private or secure holding areas existed for
patients.262 Meanwhile, placing patients in open and public areas caused a
new host of problems as the patient presumably was involuntarily committed
because he or she posed a danger either to himself or herself or the public.263
By placing him or her in an open and public place, the respondent judges
argued that this could cause the patient more harm and expose the public to
unnecessary risks within the courthouse.264
Further, medical facilities become responsible for relocating the
patients to the courthouse, causing the state to incur more costs.265
“[T]ransport service employees [would] not [necessarily] be law
enforcement” officers properly trained to handle the risks of transporting
such vulnerable patients.266 Escapes, medical emergencies, risk to the
transport service employees, and increased costs to the state would all be the
basis of the judge’s reasoning that teleconferences were appropriate and
applicable to Baker Act hearings and could substitute the statutory in-person
hearings held at the courthouse.267
B.
Doe v. State: Petitioners Argue Baker Act Hearings Via
Teleconferences Are a Violation of Patients’ Rights
The issue at the heart of Doe was whether a judicial officer should be
required to be physically present with the petitioners when Baker Act
hearings were held—either by law or legal duty.268 The case was initiated
259.
Brief for the Chief Judge of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 7, at 15–16.
260.
Id. at 15 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 394.459(1) (2016)).
261.
Id.
262.
See id. at 15–16.
263.
Id. at 16.
264.
See Brief for the Chief Judge of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 7, at 16.
265.
Id. at 14–15.
266.
Id. at 16.
267.
See id. at 14–17, 20.
268.
Doe v. State, 217 So. 3d 1020, 1022–23 (Fla. 2017).
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and filed with the Second District by fifteen petitioners, including John Doe,
seeking relief from a seemingly off-the-cuff and without notice decision
made by Judge Swett in Lee County that declared all involuntary
commitment hearings would be held remotely.269 The Second District
questioned the judgment of holding these hearings remotely, but held that
conducting Baker Act hearings through teleconferences were “within the
discretion of the court.”270 The Baker Act did not establish that judicial
officers had a ministerial or indisputable legal duty to be physically present
when they “presid[ed] over involuntary inpatient placement hearings.”271
The majority of the district court panel reviewing the briefs submitted by
both parties concluded that there was no “express legal right to have the
judicial officer be physically present with the petitioners” during Baker Act
hearings, and that no legal duty was outright expressed.272 However, they
did determine the law clearly established that necessary mandamus relief
“can derive from a variety of legal sources, including . . . rules of court.”273
Judge Wallace wrote a concurring opinion with the majority where
he expressed concerns about the law as it stood.274 The Second District did
state that despite there being no express legal right to have a judge physically
preside over Baker Act hearings, two problems did exist in the proceedings
of the trial court: (1) a court order supporting the judge’s arguments was not
provided; and (2) the trial judge did not provide a reason for his decision to
preside over involuntary placement hearings over teleconference.275 Even
still, Wallace wrote in this opinion that while the majority held correctly,
“the manner in which the trial judges . . . exercised [their] authority” over
these hearings was unwarranted, inappropriate, and ill-advised.276 Despite
his concurring opinion, Judge Wallace stated three reasons why conducting
Baker Act hearings through teleconferencing equipment was questionable:
(1) potential difficulties such as equipment malfunctioning and counsel not
being able to approach the bench to speak in private; (2) the Supreme Court
of Florida appointed a subcommittee on this topic in 1997, and the circuit
court was disregarding the opinion of the subcommittee by continuing to
269.
Id. at 1023.
270.
Id.
271.
Id.
272.
Doe v. State, 210 So. 3d 154, 157 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2016), rev’d, 217
So. 3d 1020 (Fla. 2017).
273.
Id. (quoting Nader v. Dep’t of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 87 So.
3d 712, 723 (Fla. 2012)). Established law does not have to only be defined by the legislature,
but can also be derived from rules of court, statutes, constitutional law, and controlling case
law. Nader, 87 So. 3d at 723.
274.
Doe, 210 So. 3d at 159.
275.
Id. at 160–62.
276.
Id. at 159.
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hold such hearings; and (3) similar procedures for juvenile hearings were
used before and ultimately failed.277
This begged the question of whether the silence by the legislature
was an oversight or purposely excluded.278 The question became whether the
silence on this procedure provided judges with a choice in how to handle
such hearings, or if it was an oversight and the legislature assumed that
longstanding traditions—always compelling the personal attendance of
judicial officers at the evidentiary hearings and trials of which they preside—
would prevail.279
Judge Lucas of the Second District Court of Appeal offered in his
dissent that while no law required the physical presence of a judge in express
terms,280 Bryant v. State281 established that the physical presence of a judge
was constitutionally mandated in a criminal trial, unless waived.282 The case
law held precedent that the physical presence of a judge was a bedrock
principle and the reason it was not expressly stated in the law was because
the physical presence of a judge or magistrate has always been a standard
assumed as an elemental component to preside over trials and evidentiary
hearings.283 The Baker Act hearings constitute evidentiary hearings; and as
277.
Id. at 163–65 (discussing Florida’s videoconferencing experiment with
juvenile detention hearings).
The Second District summarized the difficulties of
videoconferencing in juvenile proceedings by referring to the Amendment to Florida Rule of
Juvenile Procedure 8.100(A), which states:
Independent observations confirmed the fears expressed by all who have strongly
and continuously opposed the adoption of the proposed robotic procedure.
Specifically, many observed that there was no proper opportunity for meaningful,
private communications between the child and the parents or guardians, between
the parents or guardians and the public defender at the detention center, and
between a public defender at the detention center and a public defender in the
courtroom. The mechanical process produced a proceeding where, on many
occasions, multiple parties would speak at once, adding to the confusion. At the
conclusion of far too many hearings, the child had no comprehension as to what
had occurred and was forced to ask the public defender whether he or she was
being released or detained. It was also problematic that the public defender at the
detention center often had no access to the child’s court file, and there was
absolutely no opportunity to approach the bench to discuss private matters or
anything that should not have been openly broadcast. Moreover, perhaps because it
was difficult for the children to see, hear, and understand what was taking place, the
youth did not behave as those participating in person in a courtroom; that is, the
hearings totally lacked the dignity, decorum, and respect one would anticipate in a
personal appearance before the court.

Id. at 165; Amendment to Fla. Rules of Juvenile Procedure 8.100(A), 796 So. 2d
470, 473 (Fla. 2001).
278.
See Doe, 210 So. 3d at 168.
279.
See id.
280.
Id. at 166–68.
281.
656 So. 2d 426 (Fla. 1995) (per curiam).
282.
Id. at 428–29.
283.
Doe, 217 So. 3d at 1024; see also Doe, 210 So. 3d at 168.
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such, Judge Lucas argued that these court proceedings must be followed
pursuant to the rules of evidence.284 Lucas argued that the advent and
expansion of teleconferencing does not authorize judges to violate their
duties as would otherwise be assigned.285 This was something implicitly
assumed by the judges and magistrates who chose to use the technology as a
substitute for their physical presence during evidentiary hearings.286
C.
Doe v. State: Judges Argue that Technology Is a Necessary Remedy
for Failed Baker Act Reforms and Increasingly Insurmountable Workloads
The respondents in the Doe case argued in their Amicus Brief before
the Supreme Court of Florida287 that the Supreme Court of Florida’s Task
Force on the Management of Cases Involving Complex Litigation Report
and Recommendations, published in 2008, stated that the Supreme Court of
Florida should promote all courts throughout Florida to use
videoconferencing when possible.288 The respondents pointed out in the
same report that attorneys and judges were encouraged by the Supreme Court
Task Force to use videoconferencing to resolve their cases more quickly.289
The respondents argued, referring back to Judge Lucas’s dissent, that
the Florida Rules of Evidence provided statutory authority that video
recordings could be used to provide substantial testimonial evidence and
witness statements.290 Important court appearances, such as criminal
arraignments and first appearances, are often made by employing the use of
technology.291 Medical experts testify using videoconferencing technologies
during trial proceedings, and children testify during trial proceedings through
videoconference calls in order to avoid trauma pursuant to Florida Statute
section 92.55.292 Much in the same way that children need protecting, the
judges argue in their Amicus Brief that the Baker Act provided several
protections for the mentally ill and none were impeded upon by the use of
284.
Doe, 210 So. 3d at 168.
285.
Doe, 217 So. 3d at 1027; see also Doe, 210 So. 3d at 168–69.
286.
Doe, 210 So. 3d at 168; see also Doe, 217 So. 3d at 1027.
287.
Answer Brief of Respondent at 10–11, Doe v. State, 217 So. 3d 1020 (Fla.
2017) (No. SC16-1852); see also Brief for the Chief Judge of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 7, at 2.
288.
See Answer Brief of Respondent, supra note 287, at 10–11.
289.
See id. at 10.
290.
Id. at 12 (citing Kelley v. Webb, 676 So. 2d 538, 539 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1996)); see also Doe v. State, 210 So. 3d 154, 168 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2016) (Lucas
J., dissenting), rev’d, 217 So. 3d 1020 (Fla. 2017).
291.
Answer Brief of Respondent, supra note 287, at 12.
292.
See FLA. STAT. § 92.55 (2016); Answer Brief of Respondent, supra note
287, at 12.
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teleconferencing.293
While the petitioners argued that the use of
videoconferencing technology during involuntary commitment procedures
infringes upon the due process rights of the mentally ill, the respondents
quoted the holding of M.W. v. Davis.294 M.W. held that while the purpose of
due process in substantive due process claims was to protect the fair
treatment of individuals by using proper administrative justice, the purpose
and validity of due process claims in procedural due process depended on the
nature of the court proceeding.295
The Chief Judge Jeffrey Colbath of the Fifteenth District wrote an
Amicus Brief citing that the Florida Legislature had not added or created
new county or circuit judgeships in a decade but expected the reforms to be
enacted.296 In his brief, he described the specific struggles of judges in Palm
Beach County who comprised the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit.297 The struggles
derived from the expanse of the county and the lack of judges and time
needed to cover the area; the county is sixty-miles-long and forty-mileswide, with seven mental health facilities all serviced by only four magistrates
who would travel to attend the Baker Act hearings.298 The public defender,
the state attorney, the sheriff deputy, and the judicial officer would all travel
to each facility housing patients where they would preside over each of these
hearings.299 The Chief Judge argued that time and resources lost were a
waste as these hearings could be easily performed over teleconference.300
The Chief Judge also referred to cost concerns related to Baker Act
proceedings.301 Travel-related costs would no longer be incurred by the
judicial officer or the sheriff deputy’s office.302 The state attorney and the
public defender’s offices would also save these travel costs.303 Furthermore,
the facilities would also avoid the travel costs of transporting the patient
between the facility and courthouse.304

293.
See FLA. STAT. § 92.55; Brief for the Chief Judge of the Fifteenth Judicial
Circuit as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 7, at 2–3, 20.
294.
756 So. 2d 90, 92 (Fla. 2000); see also Answer Brief of Respondent,
supra note 287, at 14.
295.
M.W., 756 So. 2d at 97.
296.
See Brief for the Chief Judge of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 7, at 13.
297.
Id. at 14.
298.
Id.
299.
See id.
300.
Id.
301.
Brief for the Chief Judge of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 7, at 14.
302.
Id.
303.
See id. at 14–15.
304.
Id.
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The security of the patient and the public is also cited in the Chief
Justice’s Amicus Brief.305 Specifically, the judge wrote that the courthouses
were not well equipped to hold Baker Act hearings because patients could
only be held in criminal holding cells.306 He argued that the Baker Act states
in plain language that holding cells should not be used and avoided for Baker
Act hearings.307 Holding a Baker Act patient in an open waiting area, who
has been involuntarily committed because he or she is deemed either a
danger to themselves or others, is an equally disconcerting idea as it would
expose the public to a known and unnecessary risk.308 Security protocols are
not as easily controlled when a Baker Act hearing is held within the
courthouse, given the environment cannot be completely controlled by the
security provided by the facility.309
D.
The Supreme Court’s Final Decision on Doe v. State:
Teleconferences are Unconstitutional
The Supreme Court of Florida in the Doe case ultimately held that
the lack of resources and the struggles that the judges described did not
outweigh the individuals’ constitutional rights to due process and liberty.310
The expediency and problems with workload did not provide sufficient
reason to validate holding Baker Act hearings by teleconference.311 The
Supreme Court of Florida stated that in Baker Act hearings, unlike in
criminal proceedings, the use of teleconference technology is not expressly
sanctioned against by the statute.312 However, the Court did take issue with
the way the judge incorrectly used his authority to determine that he would
only preside over Baker Act hearings through teleconference technology. 313
The Supreme Court of Florida described Judge Swett’s actions as misguided
wisdom and an overreach of authority.314 His decision did not meet the
standards intended by the legislature that allows judges to use their discretion
as to where and how to hold Baker Act hearings.315 Longstanding traditions
require that judicial officers be present at trials and the advent of technology
305.
Id. at 15.
306.
Brief for the Chief Judge of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 7, at 15.
307.
Id. at 15.
308.
Id. at 16.
309.
See id.
310.
Doe v. State, 217 So. 3d 1020, 1026 (Fla. 2017).
311.
Id.
312.
Id. at 1025, 1028.
313.
Id. at 1031.
314.
Id. at 1031–32.
315.
See Doe, 217 So. 3d at 1023–25.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol42/iss1/1
Published by NSUWorks, 2018

188
189

Nova Law Review,
et al.: Nova
Vol.Law
42, Iss.
Review
1 [2018], Art. 1

2017]

THE PRACTICAL AND PROCEDURAL REPERCUSSIONS

173

does not change this tradition, nor is it a reason to change this tradition, nor
should it be assumed to change this tradition.316 The Supreme Court of
Florida wrote that the legislature’s intent regarding how and where to hold
Baker Act hearings was to benefit the patient only, and ultimately depended
upon what was least injurious to the patient’s condition.317 With the patient’s
conditions in mind, judges could use their discretion as to whether Baker Act
hearings should be held in the courthouse or at the mental health facility. 318
The final conclusion regarding the respondents’ practical and logistical
concerns was that judicial expediency never justifies the exercise of a judge’s
discretion regarding Baker Act hearings.319
V.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The arguments made in the Amicus Brief of Chief Judge Jeff
Colbath, while found to be insufficient to validate Baker Act hearings being
teleconferenced, reflect a larger problem with the mental health system in
Florida.320 Deinstitutionalization has created a mental health funding crisis
with consistent decreases in funding provided to state-run treatment over the
last three decades.321 In fact, after 2008, states were obligated to cut over $4
billion in mental health spending, equating to the greatest decrease in
spending and funding for mental health since deinstitutionalization began.322
In 2004, seemingly needed calls for reform took place and many were
applied, but without the proper funding to support those reforms.323 The lack
of funding allotted to implement these reforms and the decrease in federal
funding that justified the move towards deinstitutionalization left mental
health facilities to find means—sometimes described as abuses—to pay for
the treatments they were meant to provide.324 As recent as 2015, Governor
Rick Scott proposed an increase of $19 million for mental health treatment,
which ultimately was passed as a split between mental health and drug

316.
Id. at 1027.
317.
Id. at 1025.
318.
Id.
319.
Id. at 1026.
320.
See Brief for the Chief Judge of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 7, at 1–3, 20.
321.
See Deanna Pan, Timeline: Deinstitutionalization and Its Consequences,
MOTHER
JONES
(Apr.
29,
2013,
10:00
AM),
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/04/timeline-mental-health-america/.
322.
Id.
323.
See Pudlow, supra note 151.
324.
See Editorial, supra note 189; Miller, supra note 128.
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treatment to be released over two years.325 This amount, while seemingly
large, is dwarfed by the $150 million used by the New York Legislature to
implement Kendra’s Law for its first five years in the 1990s.326
With the proper funding, more licensed professionals could provide
care and services, and the services could be more effective.327 Without the
proper funding, the mental health system in Florida, and those who must
orchestrate and provide Baker Act services, will be consistently providing
the same services to patients who consistently return to treatment, and will
become overworked because they work in an inefficient and, possibly,
dangerous system—due to patients not receiving treatment in time, or acting
without medicine, or simply living in constant threats of lawsuits.328
Meanwhile, patients will continue to be misdiagnosed, mistreated, held
against their will without due process, negated liberty, and held without
treatment until the system can provide them with their court appearance. 329
Patients may even be incarcerated—for acts they commit while being
improperly treated or misdiagnosed—by an underfunded and ineffective
system.330 In the past, reforms were consistently made without sufficient and
proper funding provided, which has created our present mental health care
crisis.331 When funds were allotted, they were minimal and token amounts,
unable to achieve the lofty humanitarian notions the Baker Act and its
reforms strived to achieve.332
The Supreme Court of Florida questioned the wisdom of the judges’
use of technology and their justifications for its use in Baker Act hearings in
Doe.333 Yet, the Amicus Brief was not an attempt to abscond from the
official duties of Baker Act hearings, but rather a diligent attempt to deal
325.
Margie Menzel, Mental Health, Substance Abuse Reforms Get Approval,
HEALTH NEWS FLA. (Mar. 14, 2016), http://www.health.wusf.usf.edu/post/mental-healthsubstance-abuse-reforms-get-approval/; Margie Menzel, State Leaders Look to Improve
Mental-Health Funding, Policy, CBS MIAMI (Dec. 7, 2015, 9:41 PM),
http://miami.cbslocal.com/2015/12/07/state-leaders-look-to-improve-mental-health-fundingpolicy/.
326.
See South Florida Sun-Sentinel Editorial Board, supra note 119.
327.
See South Florida Sun-Sentinel Editorial Board, supra note 119
(explaining that as early as 2004, calls for reform were made to make the powers of the court
more explicit). Periods of patient observations needed to be extended beyond the standard
fifteen minutes prescribed, and even with these two changes, major reductions in recidivism
and mental illness turning into crime were expected. Id.
328.
Editorial, supra note 189.
329.
See Gilliam, supra note 141; Killian, supra note 119; Torrey &
Zdanowicz, supra note 179.
330.
Torrey & Zdanowicz, supra note 179.
331.
Gilliam, supra note 141; Pudlow, supra note 151.
332.
See Pudlow, supra note 151.
333.
Doe v. State, 217 So. 3d 1020, 1026 (Fla. 2017).
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with an overwhelming and ever-increasing problem given the documented
surge in involuntary commitments and too few professionals and officials
managing involuntary commitments under the Baker Act within Florida’s
Mental Health System.334 Reforms should be conceived and approved within
the limits of the funding provided—rather than minimal funding being
promised by legislature to provide token gifts of support to reforms that are
not achievable—otherwise, the increased pattern of incarcerating the
mentally ill will continue to cost the state more than if patients were to
receive proper treatment from the beginning.335
VI.

CONCLUSION

Given the most recent holding of the Supreme Court of Florida in the
Doe case, the Florida Legislature should begin to rethink their reactive and
token-funding approach to mental health.336 Proactive action needs to take
place regarding mental health, where feasible reforms are enacted and a
sufficient and healthy amount of funding is provided to ensure the success of
the reforms.337 Baker Act reforms have consistently been underfunded and a
response to crisis.338 The clear and convincing standard of dangerousness,
either to one’s self or to others, is another pitfall that must be overcome
because help is too often provided too little and too late.339 New legal
definitions and grounds need to be created that better distinguish individuals
who need involuntary commitments and those who solely just need mental
health treatment and support.340 The definition of dangerousness needs to be
expanded to include concerns about patients’ welfare, their ability to manage
themselves healthily regarding self-care and neglect, as well as ensure that
they are living in suitable living environments that promote mental health
and self-care.341 A system responding to repeated crises without funding has
created a system riddled with issues that make Florida’s Mental Health
System a complex knot that must be untied; concurrent jurisdictions,
disjointed action by competing authorities, a broken communication system,
a concern for patient privacy, and a concern for funding underfunded
hospitals all create a perfect storm where abuse threatens the patient’s liberty
334.
See Brief for the Chief Judge of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 7, at 1–2.
335.
See Gilliam, supra note 141; Pudlow, supra note 151.
336.
See Doe, 217 So. 3d at 1032.
337.
See Gilliam, supra note 141; Editorial, supra note 189.
338.
See Gilliam, supra note 141.
339.
See Editorial, supra note 189.
340.
Paul F. Stavis, Why Prisons Are Brim-Full of the Mentally Ill: Is Their
Incarceration a Solution or a Sign of Failure?, 11 GEO. MASON C.R. L.J. 157, 197 (2000).
341.
Id.
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at every turn and the fight between all competing and interested parties
ultimately affect the patient whose interest they all allegedly aim to
protect.342 These abuses do not begin in hospitals or courtrooms, but rather
have been created on Florida’s Senate floor.343 The State of Florida needs to
stop reacting to crisis and, instead, act to prevent crisis by putting real money
into these reforms.344

342.
See W.M. v. State, 992 So. 2d 383, 386–87 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 2008);
Stavis, supra note 340, at 198; STATE OF FLA. DEP’T OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES MENTAL
HEALTH PROGRAM OFFICE, supra note 16, at 3; Killian, supra note 119. Miller illustrates how
competing interests and an inability to communicate clearly and effectively between parties
interested in the treatment and status of Mertz ultimately led to a chaotic scene that kept Mertz
in treatment or kidnapp[ed] depending on which party was addressing the status and topic of
Mertz’s inpatient commitment. Miller, supra note 128.
343.
See Pudlow, supra note 151; Editorial, supra note 189.
344.
See Pudlow, supra note 151; Editorial, supra note 189.
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